Managerial Labor Market during Institutional Transition: A study of CEO compensation and voluntary turnover

2016 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 167-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lerong He ◽  
Tara Shankar Shaw ◽  
Junxiong Fang
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Voluntary Turnover ◽  
Institutional Transition ◽  
Managerial Labor Market

China's Closed Pyramidal Managerial Labor Market and the Stock Price Crash Risk

2017 ◽  
Vol 93 (3) ◽  
pp. 105-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donghua Chen ◽  
Jeong-Bon Kim ◽  
Oliver Zhen Li ◽  
Shangkun Liang
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Negative Association ◽  
Political Connections ◽  
Crash Risk ◽  
The Political ◽  
Market Forces ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
Managerial Labor Market

ABSTRACT Managers of China's state-owned firms work in a closed pyramidal managerial labor market. They enjoy non-transferable benefits if they choose to stay within this system. The higher up are they in this labor market hierarchy (their political ranks), the fewer are their outside employment opportunities. Due to career and wealth concerns, they are cautious and risk-averse when managing firms. We examine the effect of managers' political ranks on firms' stock price crash risk and find a negative association. This association mainly exists in firms with younger managers and managers with shorter tenure. Further, this effect is only significant in regions with weak market forces, in firms without foreign investors, without political connections, and during periods with no local government leaders' or managers' political promotions. We conclude that the political ranking system reduces the stock price crash risk. JEL Classifications: G30; J33.

scholarly journals Shareholder Governance and CEO Compensation: The Peer Effects of Say on Pay

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (7) ◽  
pp. 3130-3173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diane K Denis ◽  
Torsten Jochem ◽  
Anjana Rajamani
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Peer Effects ◽  
Web Site ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Peer Groups ◽  
Spillover Effects ◽  
Compensation Contracts ◽  
Say On Pay ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Published Paper

Abstract We document that firms whose compensation peers experience weak say on pay votes reduce CEO compensation following those votes. Reductions reflect proxy adviser concerns about peers’ compensation contracts and are stronger when CEOs receive excess compensation, when they compete more closely with their weak-vote peers in the executive labor market, and when those peers perform well. Reductions occur following peers’ disclosures of revised pay and are proportional to those needed to retain firms’ relative positions in their peer groups. We conclude that the spillover effects of shareholder voting occur through both learning and compensation targeting channels. (JEL G34, G38, J38, M12, M52) Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

On the Evidence of a Working Spouse Penalty in the Managerial Labor Market

ILR Review ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 410 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julie L. Hotchkiss ◽  
Robert E. Moore
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Managerial Labor Market
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