scholarly journals Does Managed Care Change the Mission of Nonprofit Hospitals? Evidence From the Managerial Labor Market

10.3386/w7924 ◽  
2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Arnould ◽  
Marianne Bertrand ◽  
Kevin Hallock
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Managed Care ◽  
Nonprofit Hospitals ◽  
Managerial Labor Market ◽  
Care Change

scholarly journals Does Managed Care Change the Management of Nonprofit Hospitals? Evidence from the Executive Labor Market

ILR Review ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 494-514 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marianne Bertrand ◽  
Kevin F. Hallock ◽  
Richard Arnould
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Executive Turnover ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Nonprofit Hospitals ◽  
For Profit ◽  
Top Executives ◽  
Not For Profit ◽  
Profit Performance ◽  
Top Executive ◽  
Care Change

This paper examines how the managerial labor market in nonprofit hospitals has adjusted to the financial pressures induced by HMO penetration. Using a panel of about 1,500 nonprofit hospitals over the period 1992–96, the authors find that top executive turnover increased following an increase in HMO penetration. Moreover, the increase in turnover was concentrated among the hospitals that had lower levels of economic profitability. While the link between top executive pay and for-profit performance measures was on average very weak, HMO penetration tightened that link: as HMO penetration increased, top executives were compensated more for improving the profitability of their hospitals. These results, while of limited economic magnitude, are qualitatively consistent with the view that HMO penetration has increased the weight assigned to for-profit performance in the management of not-for-profit hospitals.

China's Closed Pyramidal Managerial Labor Market and the Stock Price Crash Risk

2017 ◽  
Vol 93 (3) ◽  
pp. 105-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donghua Chen ◽  
Jeong-Bon Kim ◽  
Oliver Zhen Li ◽  
Shangkun Liang
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Negative Association ◽  
Political Connections ◽  
Crash Risk ◽  
The Political ◽  
Market Forces ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
Managerial Labor Market

ABSTRACT Managers of China's state-owned firms work in a closed pyramidal managerial labor market. They enjoy non-transferable benefits if they choose to stay within this system. The higher up are they in this labor market hierarchy (their political ranks), the fewer are their outside employment opportunities. Due to career and wealth concerns, they are cautious and risk-averse when managing firms. We examine the effect of managers' political ranks on firms' stock price crash risk and find a negative association. This association mainly exists in firms with younger managers and managers with shorter tenure. Further, this effect is only significant in regions with weak market forces, in firms without foreign investors, without political connections, and during periods with no local government leaders' or managers' political promotions. We conclude that the political ranking system reduces the stock price crash risk. JEL Classifications: G30; J33.

On the Evidence of a Working Spouse Penalty in the Managerial Labor Market

ILR Review ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 410 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julie L. Hotchkiss ◽  
Robert E. Moore
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Managerial Labor Market

scholarly journals THE PHYSICIAN LABOR MARKET IN A MANAGED CARE-DOMINATED ENVIRONMENT

1999 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 282-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A. Hirth ◽  
Michael E. Chernew
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Managed Care
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