RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CEO COMPENSATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF LABOR MARKET NORMS

1995 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 268-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rajaram Veliyath ◽  
James W. Bishop
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Ceo Compensation

CEO Compensation in Private Family Firms

2012 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 140-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anneleen Michiels ◽  
Wim Voordeckers ◽  
Nadine Lybaert ◽  
Tensie Steijvers
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Significant Role ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Objective Performance ◽  
Privately Held

Although classical agency theorists claim that pay-for-performance is not relevant in the context of private family firms, the authors provide empirical evidence of the opposite, using a sample of 529 privately held U.S. family firms. The results suggest that objective performance-based measures play a significant role in CEO compensation. Additionally, the authors find that in private family firms CEO compensation is more responsive to firm performance in firms with low ownership dispersion and in the controlling-owner stage. Furthermore, the positive pay-for-performance relation is slightly stronger for nonfamily CEOs than for family CEOs.

CEO Compensation and Acquired and Acquiring Companies in Large Corporate Acquisitions

GIS Business ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 01-13
Author(s):  
Simon Yang
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Relative Sensitivity ◽  
Matched Sample ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Corporate Acquisitions ◽  
Acquiring Firms ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
To Receive

This paper examines the relative sensitivity of CEO compensation of both acquiring and acquired firms in the top 30 U.S. largest corporate acquisitions in each year for the period of 2003 to 2012. We find that total compensation and bonus granted to executive compensation for acquired companies, not acquiring companies, are significantly related to the amount of acquisition deal even after the size and firm performance are controlled for. Both acquiring and acquired CEOs are found to make the significantly higher compensation than the matched sample firms in the same industry and calendar year. We also find that executives with higher managerial power, as measured by a lower salary-based compensation mix, prior to a corporate acquisition are more likely to receive a higher executive pay in the year of acquisition. The association between executive compensation and managerial power seems to be stronger for acquired firms than for acquiring firms in corporate acquisition. Overall, our findings suggest that corporate acquisition has higher impacts on executive compensation for acquired firm CEOs than for acquiring firm CEOs.

scholarly journals The Impact of Debt Structure on Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence from Nigerian Quoted Firms

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (11) ◽  
pp. 647-660 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Chuke Nwude ◽  
Idam Okpara Itiri ◽  
Bamidele Oyakhiromhe Agbadua ◽  
Sergius Nwannebuike Udeh
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Debt Structure ◽  
The Impact
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