Household Property Rights Formation in Rural China: Farmers' Preference, Transaction Cost and the Efficiency Hypothesis

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-164
Author(s):  
Yi Che ◽  
Zuojun Fan ◽  
Yan Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Rural China ◽  
Efficiency Hypothesis

A Weapon of the Weak? Shareholding, Property Rights and Villager Empowerment in China

2018 ◽  
Vol 237 ◽  
pp. 131-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karita Kan
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Rural China ◽  
Community Based ◽  
Bottom Up ◽  
Collective Property

AbstractAs urbanization continues to fuel land and property conflicts in rural China, shareholding has been promoted as a reform in property rights that would enhance bottom-up control in the governance of collective assets. The recent proliferation of community-based shareholding companies has been credited for giving villagers new identities as shareholders, which entitle them to vote, receive their share of collective profits, and elect the managers of their wealth. This paper critically appraises these reforms and offers a contrarian perspective to singular narratives of villager empowerment. While shareholding clarifies villagers’ rights of control, income and transfer in collective property, the effective exercise of such powers is often forestalled on the ground by the concentration of power in elite hands. To the extent that formal and informal constraints on cadre power remain tenuous, shareholding could function as a vehicle for the powerful to appropriate collective wealth rather than as a weapon of the weak.

scholarly journals Towards a Theory of Innovation Governance and the Role of IPRs

2020 ◽  
Vol 69 (4) ◽  
pp. 341-354
Author(s):  
Ove Granstrand
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Open Innovation ◽  
Organization Theory ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Theoretical Perspective ◽  
Hybrid Approach ◽  
Institutional Arrangement ◽  
Innovation Governance

Abstract This paper theorizes about innovation governance, especially about governance of open innovation and the nature and role of IPRs. A reinterpretation of open innovation is offered in terms of the emergence of various types of markets for inputs to and outputs from innovative activities. These open innovation markets are typically markets for ideas, technologies, knowledge and data such as licensing markets, equity markets, and matching markets for innovation collaborations and correspond to various types of open innovation strategies viewed from the inside out in a focal firm's perspective. Open innovation – seen as a set of quasi-integrated organizational forms for innovative activities in between market and hierarchical firm organizations – is then explainable in terms of determinants of supply and demand. Intellectual property rights (IPRs) then play a new role as tools for innovation governance, thereby economizing on governance costs in an extended transaction cost framework. Licensing of usage rights is key to using IPRs for innovation governance. The by now standard property rights approach to rights in intellectual resources has to be challenged, however, and referred to as ‘intellectual rights’ rather than IPRs. In addition, the governing role of IPRs can be improved by combining them with liabilities into a hybrid approach. Organizational responsibilities provide still another institutional arrangement for innovation governance, and integration of rights, liabilities and responsibilities provide a new theoretical perspective on innovation governance – a perspective that also can provide links between organization theory, transaction cost economics and property rights theory.

scholarly journals The policy arrangements of financial deepening in rural China --

2011 ◽  
Vol 57 (No. 9) ◽  
pp. 449-456
Author(s):  
L. He ◽  
C.G. Turvey ◽  
D. Liao
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Rural Areas ◽  
Rural China ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Legal Environment ◽  
Financial Deepening ◽  
Policy Arrangements

Financial deepening has been successfully tested by many countries, which is also an optimal developing track in practice in rural China. Chinese government has implemented a variety of policies to alter the finance environment in rural areas to get to the financial deepening. These policies include making the multiform financial institutions, making a fair legal environment and clarified property rights. Based on the McKinnon-Shaw model, we test whether there exits the financial deepening in rural China to judge the policy efficiency and we find that no proof can demonstrate the financial deepening in rural China, which means policies of the financial deepening, should be improved.

The Coase Theorem and Core Theory

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Varouj A. Aivazian ◽  
Jeffrey L. Callen
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Social Cost ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Coase Theorem ◽  
Seminal Paper ◽  
Core Theory ◽  
Economics Of Institutions

AbstractThe writings of Ronald Coase, along with those of Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, on the theory of property rights, transaction cost economics, and the economics of institutions have yielded powerful insights and transformed many areas of economics. The seminal paper of Ronald Coase (Coase 1960, “The Problem of Social Cost,”

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