Local Government Behavior and Property Rights Formation in Rural China

The development of strategies for the conservation and wise use of wetlands in Uganda is significant for what it reveals about how law contributes to the sustainable management of natural resources in poor countries in general. The highly inter-disciplinary and cross-sectoral management requirements of wetlands make this issue one of the most challenging, and wetlands constitute today the single most important environmental issue being addressed by the Ugandan government. As part of this effort, the legal frameworks for property rights and local government are being overhauled so as to provide a sounder basis for environmental management in this field. This article analyses the Ugandan approach to wetlands management and the role of property rights and local government in the environmental policy-making process.

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The interaction between informal and formal institutions: A case study of private land property rights in rural China

Economic Analysis and Policy ◽

10.1016/j.eap.2021.10.005 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Tongwei Qiu ◽

Danru Zhang ◽

S.T. Boris Choy ◽

Biliang Luo

Keyword(s):

Property Rights ◽

Rural China ◽

Private Land ◽

Formal Institutions ◽

Land Property Rights

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A Weapon of the Weak? Shareholding, Property Rights and Villager Empowerment in China

The China Quarterly ◽

10.1017/s0305741018001352 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 237 ◽

pp. 131-152 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Karita Kan

Keyword(s):

Property Rights ◽

Rural China ◽

Community Based ◽

Bottom Up ◽

Collective Property

AbstractAs urbanization continues to fuel land and property conflicts in rural China, shareholding has been promoted as a reform in property rights that would enhance bottom-up control in the governance of collective assets. The recent proliferation of community-based shareholding companies has been credited for giving villagers new identities as shareholders, which entitle them to vote, receive their share of collective profits, and elect the managers of their wealth. This paper critically appraises these reforms and offers a contrarian perspective to singular narratives of villager empowerment. While shareholding clarifies villagers’ rights of control, income and transfer in collective property, the effective exercise of such powers is often forestalled on the ground by the concentration of power in elite hands. To the extent that formal and informal constraints on cadre power remain tenuous, shareholding could function as a vehicle for the powerful to appropriate collective wealth rather than as a weapon of the weak.

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