The study of supply chain competition model and cooperative innovation between supply chains

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Teng Chun-xian ◽  
Hu Yin-xia ◽  
Zhou Yan-shan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Competition Model ◽  
Supply Chain Competition ◽  
Cooperative Innovation

Strategic Inventories Under Supply Chain Competition

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xi Li ◽  
Yanzhi Li ◽  
Ying-Ju Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Distribution Channel ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Supply Chain Competition ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Holding Cost ◽  
Inventory Holding ◽  
Period Model

Problem definition: We consider the effects of strategic inventory (SI) in the presence of chain-to-chain competition in a two-period model. Academic/practical relevance: Established findings suggest that SI may alleviate double marginalization and improve the efficiency of a decentralized distribution channel. However, no studies consider the role of SI under chain-to-chain competition. Methodology: We build a two-period model consisting of two competing supply chains, each with an upstream manufacturer and an exclusive retailer. The retailers compete on either price or quantity. We characterize the firms’ strategies under the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We consider cases where contracts are either observable or unobservable across supply chains. Results: (1) SI still exists under chain-to-chain competition. Retailers may carry more inventory when the competition becomes fiercer, which further intensifies the supply chain competition. (2) Different from the existing findings, SI may backfire and hurt all firms. Interestingly, firms may benefit from a higher inventory holding cost. (3) Under supply chain competition, the prisoner’s dilemma can arise if competition intensity is intermediate; in other words, manufacturers are better off without strategic inventory, and yet they cannot help allowing strategic inventory, which is the unique equilibrium. Managerial implications: Despite its appeal among firms of a single supply chain, the role of SI is altered or even reversed by chain-to-chain competition. Conventional wisdom on SI should be applied with caution.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Competition: A Market Game Approach

2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (12) ◽  
pp. 5648-5664 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Gizem Korpeoglu ◽  
Ersin Körpeoğlu ◽  
Soo-Haeng Cho
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Operations Management ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Market Price ◽  
Market Game ◽  
Wholesale Market ◽  
Supply Chain Competition ◽  
Local Supply ◽  
Buyer Power

We study supply chains where multiple suppliers sell to multiple retailers through a wholesale market. In practice, we often observe that both suppliers and retailers tend to influence the wholesale market price that retailers pay to suppliers. However, existing models of supply chain competition do not capture retailers’ influence on the wholesale price (i.e., buyer power) and show that the wholesale price and the order quantity per retailer do not change with the number of retailers. To overcome this limitation, we develop a competition model based on the market game mechanism in which the wholesale price is determined based on both suppliers’ and retailers’ decisions. When taking into account retailers’ buyer power, we obtain the result that is consistent with the observed practice: As the number of retailers increases, each retailer’s buyer power decreases, and each retailer is willing to pay more for her order, so the wholesale price increases. In this case, supply chain expansion to include more retailers (or suppliers) turns out to be more beneficial in terms of supply chain efficiency than what the prior literature shows without considering buyer power. Finally, we analyze the integration of two local supply chains and show that although the profit of the integrated supply chain is greater than the sum of total profits of local supply chains, integration may reduce the total profit of firms in a retailer-oriented supply chain that has more retailers than suppliers. This paper was accepted by Charles Corbett, operations management.

scholarly journals The Optimal Production Decision of Competing Supply Chains When Considering Green Degree: A Game-Theoretic Approach

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (18) ◽  
pp. 7413
Author(s):  
Jiguang Wang ◽  
Jianhong Chang ◽  
Yucai Wu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Optimal Production ◽  
Supply Chain Competition ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Difference

Nowadays, the green supply chain has become an exciting concept in academic societies. This paper focuses on the optimal production decisions of two competing supply chains from the perspective of green degree. The manufacturers in each supply chain have two options—producing a green product or a non-green product. Game theory is applied to study four decision scenarios, which are derived from the difference in the products of the two supply chains. This study investigates the influence of inter-supply-chain competition on the wholesale price, green degree, and profits of the supply chain members. The results indicate that the inter-supply-chain competition has a negative correlation with the wholesale price. The inter-supply-chain competition has a significant impact on green degree in the four decision scenarios. In addition, green products are not always the dominant strategy of manufacturers. Both the competitors’ product decisions and the degree of inter-supply-chain competition should be considered. Finally, weak inter-supply-chain competition is beneficial to the leader supply chain, while strong competition is beneficial to the follower supply chain.

scholarly journals Strategic Integration Decision under Supply Chain Competition in the Presence of Online Channel

Symmetry ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 58
Author(s):  
Subrata Saha ◽  
Izabela Nielsen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Strategic Integration ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Substitutable Products ◽  
Product Pricing ◽  
Supply Chain Competition ◽  
Strategic Cooperation ◽  
Online Channel ◽  
Vertical Level

This study explores the pricing decisions of substitutable products for two competing supply chains in the presence of an online channel. Each supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and an exclusive retailer and one of the manufacturers distributes products through the online channel. We examine optimal decisions under five scenarios to explore how the strategic cooperation between two manufacturers at the upstream horizontal level or with the retailer at the vertical level affects product pricing decisions and the performance of two supply chains? The results reveal that decisions for cooperation with competing manufacturers and opening an online channel are correlated. In the absence of an online channel, cooperation with their respective retailer can lead to a higher supply chain profit. However, if a manufacturer opens an online channel, then cooperation with competing manufacturers can lead to a higher supply chain profit. Under the vertical integration, total supply chain profit might be lower compared to a scenario where members in each supply chain remain independent. Consumers also need to pay more for products.

Supply Chain Competition with Information Sharing

2011 ◽  
Vol 486 ◽  
pp. 309-312
Author(s):  
Rong Yao He ◽  
Zhong Kai Xiong ◽  
Yu Xiong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Pricing Policy ◽  
Supply Chain Competition ◽  
Demand Information ◽  
Total Profit

Given the case of two competing supply chains each consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, we explore whether the retailers should share the market demand information they know with their manufacturers when the manufacturers do not know the same specific demand information. We also determine the optimal pricing policy and total profit for the retailers when each chain either shares or does not share market demand information. We find that sharing information is always more profitable for both retailer and supply chain.

scholarly journals Online Cooperative Promotion and Cost Sharing Policy under Supply Chain Competition

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Erjiang E ◽  
Geng Peng ◽  
Xin Tian ◽  
Qinghong Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Price Sensitivity ◽  
Price Promotion ◽  
Online Retailer ◽  
Competition Intensity ◽  
Supply Chain Competition

This paper studies online cooperative promotion and cost sharing decisions in competing supply chains. We consider a model of one B2C e-commerce platform and two supply chains each consisting of a supplier and an online retailer. The problem is studied using a multistage game. Firstly, the e-commerce platform carries out the cooperative promotion and sets the magnitude of markdown (the value of e-coupon). Secondly, each retailer and his supplier determine the fraction of promotional cost sharing when they have different bargaining power. Lastly, the retailers decide whether to participate in the cooperative promotion campaign. We show that the retailers are likely to participate in the promotion if consumers become more price-sensitive. However, it does not imply that the retailers can benefit from the price promotion; the promotion decision game resembles the classical prisoner’s dilemma game. The retailers and suppliers can benefit from the cooperative promotion by designing an appropriate cost sharing contract. For a supply chain, the bargaining power between supplier and retailer, consumer price sensitivity, and competition intensity affect the fraction of the promotional cost sharing. We also find that equilibrium value of e-coupon set by the e-commerce platform is not optimal for all the parties.

scholarly journals Contracting for Competitive Supply Chains under Network Externalities and Demand Uncertainty

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaojing Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Demand Uncertainty ◽  
Network Externalities ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Competition Model ◽  
Supply Chain Competition ◽  
Vertical Alliance ◽  
Product Substitutability ◽  
Uncertainty Environment ◽  
The Impact

Based on network externalities and demand uncertainty environment, supply chain competition model is built; we identify the valid mechanism for the alternative range of profit-sharing contracts and also analyze the effect of product substitutability coefficient and network externalities on the alliance and profit-sharing contract. The results show that the vertical alliance contributes profit improvement to both the manufacturer and the retailer when the impact of network externalities on the product substitutability is not strong. However, vertical alliance will be out of operation when the effect of network externalities on the product substitutability is strong.

Post COVID-19 Potentials and Innovation: The Future Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (SPL1) ◽  
pp. 1054-1057
Author(s):  
Bindu Swetha Pasuluri ◽  
Anuradha S G ◽  
Manga J ◽  
Deepak Karanam
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
World Health Organization ◽  
World Wide ◽  
World Health ◽  
Future Supply ◽  
Entire World ◽  
Health Organization

An unanticipated outburst of pneumonia of inexperienced in Wuhan, , China stated in December 2019. World health organization has recognized pathogen and termed it COVID-19. COVID-19 turned out to be a severe urgency in the entire world. The influence of this viral syndrome is now an intensifying concern. Covid-19 has changed our mutual calculus of ambiguity. It is more world-wide in possibility, more deeply , and much more difficult than any catastrophe that countries and organizations have ever faced. The next normal requires challenging ambiguity head-on and building it into decision-making. It is examined that every entity involved in running supply chains would require through major as employee, product, facility protocols, and transport would have to be in place. It is an urgent need of structuring to apply the lessons well-read for our supply chain setup. With higher managers now being aware of the intrinsic hazards in their supply chain, key and suggestions-recommendations will help to guide leader to commit to a newly planned, more consistent supply chain setup. Besides, the employees’ mental health is also a great concern.

Lesconsumer-to-consumer supply chains

2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (277) ◽  
pp. 93-107
Author(s):  
Aurélien Rouquet ◽  
Christine Roussat ◽  
Valentina Carbone
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Management ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Chain Management ◽  
Le Fort

La littérature ensupply chain management(SCM) a délaissé un type desupply chains : lesconsumer-to-consumer(C2C)supply chains, qui relient les consommateurs lorsqu’ils échangent des produits. Reposant sur une approche conceptuelle, cet article montre à la communauté logistique et SCM l’intérêt qu’il y a à explorer cessupply chains. L’article dégage quatre spécificités de ces chaînes : 1) leur orientation perpendiculaire auxsupply chainsclassiques, 2) le fort amateurisme de ses acteurs, 3) leur large encastrement social, 4) leur structure plus directe. L’étude des C2Csupply chainsest susceptible d’élargir le spectre du SCM en y intégrant plus fortement le consommateur.

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