scholarly journals Online Cooperative Promotion and Cost Sharing Policy under Supply Chain Competition

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Erjiang E ◽  
Geng Peng ◽  
Xin Tian ◽  
Qinghong Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Price Sensitivity ◽  
Price Promotion ◽  
Online Retailer ◽  
Competition Intensity ◽  
Supply Chain Competition

This paper studies online cooperative promotion and cost sharing decisions in competing supply chains. We consider a model of one B2C e-commerce platform and two supply chains each consisting of a supplier and an online retailer. The problem is studied using a multistage game. Firstly, the e-commerce platform carries out the cooperative promotion and sets the magnitude of markdown (the value of e-coupon). Secondly, each retailer and his supplier determine the fraction of promotional cost sharing when they have different bargaining power. Lastly, the retailers decide whether to participate in the cooperative promotion campaign. We show that the retailers are likely to participate in the promotion if consumers become more price-sensitive. However, it does not imply that the retailers can benefit from the price promotion; the promotion decision game resembles the classical prisoner’s dilemma game. The retailers and suppliers can benefit from the cooperative promotion by designing an appropriate cost sharing contract. For a supply chain, the bargaining power between supplier and retailer, consumer price sensitivity, and competition intensity affect the fraction of the promotional cost sharing. We also find that equilibrium value of e-coupon set by the e-commerce platform is not optimal for all the parties.

Strategic Inventories Under Supply Chain Competition

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xi Li ◽  
Yanzhi Li ◽  
Ying-Ju Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Distribution Channel ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Supply Chain Competition ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Holding Cost ◽  
Inventory Holding ◽  
Period Model

Problem definition: We consider the effects of strategic inventory (SI) in the presence of chain-to-chain competition in a two-period model. Academic/practical relevance: Established findings suggest that SI may alleviate double marginalization and improve the efficiency of a decentralized distribution channel. However, no studies consider the role of SI under chain-to-chain competition. Methodology: We build a two-period model consisting of two competing supply chains, each with an upstream manufacturer and an exclusive retailer. The retailers compete on either price or quantity. We characterize the firms’ strategies under the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We consider cases where contracts are either observable or unobservable across supply chains. Results: (1) SI still exists under chain-to-chain competition. Retailers may carry more inventory when the competition becomes fiercer, which further intensifies the supply chain competition. (2) Different from the existing findings, SI may backfire and hurt all firms. Interestingly, firms may benefit from a higher inventory holding cost. (3) Under supply chain competition, the prisoner’s dilemma can arise if competition intensity is intermediate; in other words, manufacturers are better off without strategic inventory, and yet they cannot help allowing strategic inventory, which is the unique equilibrium. Managerial implications: Despite its appeal among firms of a single supply chain, the role of SI is altered or even reversed by chain-to-chain competition. Conventional wisdom on SI should be applied with caution.

scholarly journals Decision Analysis of Advertising and Price for Bilateral Competing Supply Chain

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Cheng-Tang Zhang ◽  
Shan-Lin Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Decision Model ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Decision Models ◽  
Competition Intensity ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Investment Level ◽  
First Mover Advantage ◽  
The Impact

The outcome of centralized equilibrium, prisoner's dilemma equilibrium, and decentralized equilibrium under different decision models has been provided with regards to bilateral competing supply chain system, either side of which is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. Theoretical analysis indicates a positive correlation between price and one's own advertising investment level and a negative correlation between price and the opponent's advertising investment level. Through analysis of numerical examples, the results reveal a first mover advantage that leads to prisoner's dilemma in the system as well as the impact that price and advertising competition intensity has on the supply chain's choice of decision model.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Competition: A Market Game Approach

2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (12) ◽  
pp. 5648-5664 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Gizem Korpeoglu ◽  
Ersin Körpeoğlu ◽  
Soo-Haeng Cho
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Operations Management ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Market Price ◽  
Market Game ◽  
Wholesale Market ◽  
Supply Chain Competition ◽  
Local Supply ◽  
Buyer Power

We study supply chains where multiple suppliers sell to multiple retailers through a wholesale market. In practice, we often observe that both suppliers and retailers tend to influence the wholesale market price that retailers pay to suppliers. However, existing models of supply chain competition do not capture retailers’ influence on the wholesale price (i.e., buyer power) and show that the wholesale price and the order quantity per retailer do not change with the number of retailers. To overcome this limitation, we develop a competition model based on the market game mechanism in which the wholesale price is determined based on both suppliers’ and retailers’ decisions. When taking into account retailers’ buyer power, we obtain the result that is consistent with the observed practice: As the number of retailers increases, each retailer’s buyer power decreases, and each retailer is willing to pay more for her order, so the wholesale price increases. In this case, supply chain expansion to include more retailers (or suppliers) turns out to be more beneficial in terms of supply chain efficiency than what the prior literature shows without considering buyer power. Finally, we analyze the integration of two local supply chains and show that although the profit of the integrated supply chain is greater than the sum of total profits of local supply chains, integration may reduce the total profit of firms in a retailer-oriented supply chain that has more retailers than suppliers. This paper was accepted by Charles Corbett, operations management.

scholarly journals The Optimal Production Decision of Competing Supply Chains When Considering Green Degree: A Game-Theoretic Approach

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (18) ◽  
pp. 7413
Author(s):  
Jiguang Wang ◽  
Jianhong Chang ◽  
Yucai Wu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Optimal Production ◽  
Supply Chain Competition ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Difference

Nowadays, the green supply chain has become an exciting concept in academic societies. This paper focuses on the optimal production decisions of two competing supply chains from the perspective of green degree. The manufacturers in each supply chain have two options—producing a green product or a non-green product. Game theory is applied to study four decision scenarios, which are derived from the difference in the products of the two supply chains. This study investigates the influence of inter-supply-chain competition on the wholesale price, green degree, and profits of the supply chain members. The results indicate that the inter-supply-chain competition has a negative correlation with the wholesale price. The inter-supply-chain competition has a significant impact on green degree in the four decision scenarios. In addition, green products are not always the dominant strategy of manufacturers. Both the competitors’ product decisions and the degree of inter-supply-chain competition should be considered. Finally, weak inter-supply-chain competition is beneficial to the leader supply chain, while strong competition is beneficial to the follower supply chain.

scholarly journals Strategic Integration Decision under Supply Chain Competition in the Presence of Online Channel

Symmetry ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 58
Author(s):  
Subrata Saha ◽  
Izabela Nielsen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Strategic Integration ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Substitutable Products ◽  
Product Pricing ◽  
Supply Chain Competition ◽  
Strategic Cooperation ◽  
Online Channel ◽  
Vertical Level

This study explores the pricing decisions of substitutable products for two competing supply chains in the presence of an online channel. Each supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and an exclusive retailer and one of the manufacturers distributes products through the online channel. We examine optimal decisions under five scenarios to explore how the strategic cooperation between two manufacturers at the upstream horizontal level or with the retailer at the vertical level affects product pricing decisions and the performance of two supply chains? The results reveal that decisions for cooperation with competing manufacturers and opening an online channel are correlated. In the absence of an online channel, cooperation with their respective retailer can lead to a higher supply chain profit. However, if a manufacturer opens an online channel, then cooperation with competing manufacturers can lead to a higher supply chain profit. Under the vertical integration, total supply chain profit might be lower compared to a scenario where members in each supply chain remain independent. Consumers also need to pay more for products.

Supply Chain Competition with Information Sharing

2011 ◽  
Vol 486 ◽  
pp. 309-312
Author(s):  
Rong Yao He ◽  
Zhong Kai Xiong ◽  
Yu Xiong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Pricing Policy ◽  
Supply Chain Competition ◽  
Demand Information ◽  
Total Profit

Given the case of two competing supply chains each consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, we explore whether the retailers should share the market demand information they know with their manufacturers when the manufacturers do not know the same specific demand information. We also determine the optimal pricing policy and total profit for the retailers when each chain either shares or does not share market demand information. We find that sharing information is always more profitable for both retailer and supply chain.

Supply Chain Structure and Competitor Relationship

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jing Wu ◽  
Yang Xu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Theoretical Basis ◽  
Chain Structure ◽  
Shock Propagation ◽  
Supply Chain Network ◽  
Empirical Methods ◽  
Competition Intensity ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Supply Chain Structure

This chapter discusses recent relevant empirical research using the supply chain structure observed in the actual data, including shock propagation in the supply chain network, social capital, and supply chains, and cross-border supply chains. It also introduces some commonly used empirical methods and databases, and provides the corresponding financial theoretical basis for the conclusions of these studies. Finally, the chapter suggests a new angle to fully utilize the supply chain structure to identify the competitor relationship and the competition intensity. The chapter indicates that higher supply chain overlap increases the correlation of the competitors’ economic performance, suggesting that sharing supply chains reduce competition. This conclusion is helpful for entrepreneurs to better manage firm competitions.

scholarly journals Can solidarity be organized "from below" in global supply chains? The case of ExChains

2018 ◽  
pp. 400-424 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nora Lohmeyer ◽  
Elke Schüßler ◽  
Markus Helfen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Working Conditions ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Social Space ◽  
Global Supply Chains ◽  
Transformative Potential ◽  
Empirical Context ◽  
Transnational Solidarity ◽  
Transnational Social Space

Global supply chains in the garment industry are marked by labour standard violations in factories as well as retail stores. Against this background it is important to strengthen the bargaining power of workers along the supply chain. Establishing direct relationships among workers along the supply chain could be one way to achieve this aim. This paper builds on extant literature on transnational solidarity and highlights the specific challenges of understanding solidarity in a transnational social space by looking at the empirical context of global garment supply chains. It hereby seeks to go beyond treating “solidarity” as a mere metaphor for any form of transnational union or worker cooperation, and instead engages with the cultural-normative dimensions of the concept as referring to mutual bonds among groups of workers. By looking at the case of the ExChains network, this paper examines some of the opportunities and challenges involved in establishing and maintaining transnational worker solidarity. The paper concludes by discussing the transformative potential, but also the limits of transnational labour solidarity regarding substandard working conditions in global supply chains.

scholarly journals Low carbon joint strategy and coordination for a dyadic supply chain with Nash bargaining fairness

2022 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Jianxin Chen ◽  
Lin Sun ◽  
Tonghua Zhang ◽  
Rui Hou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Unit Cost ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Joint Decision ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
Fairness Concern

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>In the paper, fairness concern criterion is utilized to explore the coordination of a dyadic supply chain with a fairness-concerned retailer (acting as a newsvendor), who is committed to low carbon efforts. Two models are developed for stochastic demand disturbances in the forms of multiplicative case and additive case, respectively. Firstly, the optimal joint decision of the retailer and the supply chain are proposed in two scenarios, i.e., decentralized decision and the centralized decision. Secondly, in order to realize channel coordination, the contract of revenue sharing combined with the mechanism of low-carbon cost sharing is designed. Moreover, the influences of the retailer's fairness concern and bargaining power on the joint decision and the contract parameters are also investigated. Finally, numerical examples are given to illustrate the theoretical results and some suggestions to supply chain management are also provided. The results show that the revenue sharing contract can make the supply chain achieved coordination with the cost sharing mechanism of low-carbon efforts. Furthermore, the optimal low-carbon effort level and ordering quantity decrease in terms of fairness-concerned parameter and Nash bargaining power parameter, which increases in unit cost. However, the optimal pricing makes the opposite change.</p>

scholarly journals Can cost sharing contracts coordinate green supply chains based on manufacturers’ overconfidence

2021 ◽  
Vol 236 ◽  
pp. 04014
Author(s):  
Hui Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Numerical Experimentation ◽  
Set Up ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Green Supply Chains ◽  
The Impact

Cost sharing contracts is one of the most common contracts to coordinate green supply chains. In this paper, we examine whether it can coordinate green supply chains in the set up of overconfidence. We assume that the manufacturer is overconfident and the retailer is rational. The manufacturer overestimates consumers’ sensitivity to product greenness and accurately estimates the uncertainty of demand. The overconfident manufacturer and the rational retailer cooperate through cost sharing contracts. Then, we construct a game theoretical model to analyze the impact of manufacturers’ overconfident on product greenness, pricing, profit and supply chain cooperation. At last, a numerical experimentation is presented. We find that, (1) the product greenness, wholesale price and retail price increase with the manufacturer’s overconfidence as well as the retailer’s cost sharing proportion. (2) no matter how much the cost sharing proportion is, the profit of manufacturers and retailers decreases with the manufacturer’s overconfidence level. (3) cost sharing contracts can achieve the green supply chain coordination in rational setting. But under manufacturers’ overconfidence, it cannot.

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