Supply chain competition model with customer preference: A theoretical perspective

Author(s):  
Guo Jie ◽  
Ding Zhang
2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaojing Liu

Based on network externalities and demand uncertainty environment, supply chain competition model is built; we identify the valid mechanism for the alternative range of profit-sharing contracts and also analyze the effect of product substitutability coefficient and network externalities on the alliance and profit-sharing contract. The results show that the vertical alliance contributes profit improvement to both the manufacturer and the retailer when the impact of network externalities on the product substitutability is not strong. However, vertical alliance will be out of operation when the effect of network externalities on the product substitutability is strong.


Author(s):  
Kosuke Ishii ◽  
Cheryl Juengel ◽  
C. Fritz Eubanks

Abstract This study develops a method to capture the broadest customer preference in a product line while minimizing the life-cycle cost of providing variety. The paper begins with an overview of product variety and its importance in overhead costs: supply chain, equipment and tooling, service, and recycling. After defining the product structure graph as a representation of variety, the paper introduces an approximate measure for the customer importance and life-cycle cost of product variety The cost measure utilizes the concept of late point identification which urges standardization early in the manufacturing process and differentiation at the end of the process. The variety importance-cost map allows engineers to identify cost drivers in the design of the product or the manufacturing system and seek improvements. The refrigerator door example illustrates the concept. On-going work seeks to validate and enhance the method with several companies from different industries.


Author(s):  
Junjun Liu ◽  
Yunting Feng ◽  
Qinghua Zhu ◽  
Joseph Sarkis

Purpose Green supply chain management (GSCM) and the circular economy (CE) overlap but also differ. The purpose of this paper is to clarify linkages between these two concepts. It identifies mutual theory applications used to study GSCM and CE. Design/methodology/approach A systematic literature review is conducted to identify theories from GSCM and CE studies. A critical analysis explores the theories that can provide mutual applications between GSCM and CE fields. Propositions are developed. Findings In all, 12 theories are applied in both GSCM and CE studies. Several theories are only applied in GSCM studies, but can help to advance CE study. These theories include complexity, transaction cost economics, agency, and information theories. Each of the eight theories only applied to CE can potentially advance GSCM study. Research limitations/implications The findings contribute to further theory development for both GSCM and CE study. A methodological review can advance theoretical development and cross-pollination in both fields. Originality/value This work is the first study to explicitly explore linkages of GSCM and CE from a theoretical perspective.


Author(s):  
Xi Li ◽  
Yanzhi Li ◽  
Ying-Ju Chen

Problem definition: We consider the effects of strategic inventory (SI) in the presence of chain-to-chain competition in a two-period model. Academic/practical relevance: Established findings suggest that SI may alleviate double marginalization and improve the efficiency of a decentralized distribution channel. However, no studies consider the role of SI under chain-to-chain competition. Methodology: We build a two-period model consisting of two competing supply chains, each with an upstream manufacturer and an exclusive retailer. The retailers compete on either price or quantity. We characterize the firms’ strategies under the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We consider cases where contracts are either observable or unobservable across supply chains. Results: (1) SI still exists under chain-to-chain competition. Retailers may carry more inventory when the competition becomes fiercer, which further intensifies the supply chain competition. (2) Different from the existing findings, SI may backfire and hurt all firms. Interestingly, firms may benefit from a higher inventory holding cost. (3) Under supply chain competition, the prisoner’s dilemma can arise if competition intensity is intermediate; in other words, manufacturers are better off without strategic inventory, and yet they cannot help allowing strategic inventory, which is the unique equilibrium. Managerial implications: Despite its appeal among firms of a single supply chain, the role of SI is altered or even reversed by chain-to-chain competition. Conventional wisdom on SI should be applied with caution.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document