A Strategy-Proof Budget Feasible Online Mechanism for Crowdsensing with Time-Discounting Values

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiapeng Xie ◽  
Shuo Yang ◽  
Fan Wu ◽  
Xiaofeng Gao ◽  
Guihai Chen
Keyword(s):  
Time Discounting ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Online Mechanism ◽  
Budget Feasible

scholarly journals Pure Nash Equilibria in Online Fair Division

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Aleksandrov ◽  
Toby Walsh
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Specific Property ◽  
Fair Division ◽  
Pareto Efficiency ◽  
Pure Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Group Strategy ◽  
Is Strategy ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Online Mechanism

We consider a fair division setting in which items arrive one by one and are allocated to agents via two existing mechanisms: LIKE and BALANCED LIKE. The LIKE mechanism is strategy-proof whereas the BALANCED LIKE mechanism is not. Whilst LIKE is strategy-proof, we show that it is not group strategy-proof. Indeed, our first main result is that no online mechanism is group strategy-proof. We then focus on pure Nash equilibria of these two mechanisms. Our second main result is that computing a pure Nash equilibrium is tractable for LIKE and intractable for BALANCED LIKE. Our third main result is that there could be multiple such profiles and counting them is also intractable even when we restrict our attention to equilibria with a specific property (e.g. envy-freeness, Pareto efficiency).

Cognitive Reflection Effects on Time Discounting

2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michał Białek ◽  
Przemysław Sawicki
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Individual Difference ◽  
Delay Discounting ◽  
Reference Point ◽  
Reference Points ◽  
Cognitive Reflection Test ◽  
Process Information ◽  
Time Discounting ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
The Way

Abstract. In this work, we investigated individual differences in cognitive reflection effects on delay discounting – a preference for smaller sooner over larger later payoff. People are claimed to prefer more these alternatives they considered first – so-called reference point – over the alternatives they considered later. Cognitive reflection affects the way individuals process information, with less reflective individuals relying predominantly on the first information they consider, thus, being more susceptible to reference points as compared to more reflective individuals. In Experiment 1, we confirmed that individuals who scored high on the Cognitive Reflection Test discount less strongly than less reflective individuals, but we also show that such individuals are less susceptible to imposed reference points. Experiment 2 replicated these findings additionally providing evidence that cognitive reflection predicts discounting strength and (in)dependency to reference points over and above individual difference in numeracy.

Strategy-proof mechanism for online resource allocation in cloud and edge collaboration

Computing ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jixian Zhang ◽  
Laixin Chi ◽  
Ning Xie ◽  
Xutao Yang ◽  
Xuejie Zhang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Online Resource ◽  
Strategy Proof
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