Strategy-Proof Mechanism Design with Boundedly Rational Agents

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katsuhiko Nishizaki
Author(s):  
Hervé Moulin

This article provides a brief overview of social choice. It concentrates on the interface between traditional notions of endstate justice and the more modern theme of strategic implementation. It outlines a general model of mechanism design and defines the classical notions of procedural and endstate justice in the context of that model. A survey of the extensive research of the last three decades that identify strategy-proof mechanisms in a variety of microeconomic problems is also included in the article.


2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aranyak Mehta
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 393
Author(s):  
Olga V. Egorova ◽  
Gennady A. Timofeev ◽  
Marina V. Samoilova

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