Uganda-Rwanda tensions will inflame regional relations

Subject Uganda-Rwanda bilateral relations. Significance Rwanda and Uganda have held a series of meetings aimed at defusing tensions following a string of controversial deportations of Rwandans from Uganda. The highest profile saw Rwandan President Paul Kagame meet Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni on the sidelines of the African Union Summit on January 28. Following the discussion, exchanges of hostile rhetoric have eased. However, relations remain fragile, and the recent friction has inflamed deep-seated antagonisms. Impacts Regional crises in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) could become a further point of contention. Uganda-Rwanda frictions may hamper consensus-building in the already-divided East African Community. A spike in tensions could impact cross-border trade and tourism.

Subject Rwanda-Burundi tensions. Significance Following months of angry exchanges, in late January, Rwanda issued a series of arrest warrants against individuals allegedly involved in armed opposition groups based in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). It accuses Burundi of supporting those groups. Burundi in turn accuses Rwanda of supporting Burundian armed opposition groups in the DRC. Impacts The tensions will put more strain on the East African Community, which has struggled to strengthen security and political integration. The tensions will be especially detrimental to Burundi’s economy, which has been crippled by years of turmoil and isolation. Rwanda-Uganda tensions have also risen over recent years, but there are indications that Rwanda may look to de-escalate here.


Significance This will significantly set back the peace process mediated by Uganda, the East African Community and the African Union (AU), with input from the UN, the United States and other donors. Impacts The reduction of donor aid flows -- which account for 54% of government revenue -- over repression concerns will deepen the fiscal deficit. The crisis will likely curtail business activity, probably leading to a second year of GDP contraction in 2016. The 240,000 Burundians refugees in neighbouring states could provide fertile ground for rebel recruitment.


Subject Rwandan foreign relations. Significance In October, France reopened investigations into the role of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the ruling government, in shooting down President Juvenal Habyarimana’s plane in 1994, the event that triggered the genocide. Then in late November, Rwanda began investigations into French complicity in the genocide, further souring relations between the two countries. In the lead-up to next year’s presidential election in Rwanda, a renewed spotlight will fall on Kigali’s relations with international donors and other foreign actors. Impacts Rwanda will feel little external pressure to alter the domestic political and human rights environment. Instability in the Great Lakes region will pose substantial foreign relations challenges. Rwanda should prove itself adept at navigating economic and conflict-mediation divisions within the East African Community (EAC). Ties with Tanzania will be key in restoring relations with South Africa and managing rebels in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).


Significance Relations had been openly hostile -- and the border between the two countries closed -- since late February until Presidents Paul Kagame and Yoweri Museveni agreed on August 21 to end the feud. Impacts The feud will accelerate ongoing shifts in regional trade dynamics, as both countries diversify away from bilateral trade. Bilateral competition will undermine efforts at deeper regional integration through the East African Community. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) could suffer spillover effects, as both countries focus on armed opposition groups based there.


Significance This may have a profound effect on East Africa’s two main regional blocs -- the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the East African Community (EAC). Impacts Trade tensions fuelled by incompatible COVID-19 strategies could ease after Burundi and Tanzania changed tack. Tanzanian re-engagement could help reinvigorate stalled regional infrastructure projects. Ethiopia may try to revive region-wide Nile Basin Initiative water talks, partly to isolate Egypt, partly to restore its own standing.


2020 ◽  
Vol 76 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Tochukwu Omenma ◽  
Moses Onyango

Attacks from violent extremist organisations have reached unprecedented levels in Africa. Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Islamic State and Sinai Peninsula activities account for the majority of high attacks and fatality rates. Their membership cuts across national borders; some have established a presence in local communities, while others are controlling territories in a number of states. This continues to happen despite regional measures such as the Algiers Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (2002) and the African Model Anti-Terrorism Law (2011) to contain the activities of violent extremist groups on the continent. The prevailing argument shows that the African Union has initiated several legislations and protocols to contain terrorism on the continent, but the Union lacks the capacity to enforce legislations. Relying on the cost–benefit theoretical explication, we conclude that member states of the East African Community prefer to partner with external organisations in counterterrorism programmes which result in conflicting cross-border rules and challenges in countering violent extremism in Africa.


Author(s):  
L. Muthoni Wanyeki

In recent years, and particularly since the 2013 general election and the ascent to power of the Jubilee Alliance, Kenya has sought to enhance its influence and standing beyond the regional economic communities of the East African Community (EAC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). This chapter explores Kenya’s foreign policy and changing relationship with the EAC and IGAD, the ways in which it has sought to expand its regional integration to include the African Union (AU), the reasons for this shift, and the implications for Kenya’s domestic economy and politics. It posits that, due to both internal and external factors—such as military involvement in Somalia and the LAPSSET corridor project—Kenya is now pursuing a far more aggressive and proactive bilateral and multilateral diplomatic strategy with both positive and negative effects.


Subject Outlook for Kenya's external relations. Significance Last week, Uganda overrode its oil pipeline agreement with Kenya by agreeing a rival deal with Tanzania in a major setback for Kenya's ambitions to lead economic integration in the East African Community (EAC), while boosting its own oil export plans. It comes amid several other external challenges, notably the deputy president's case at the International Criminal Court (ICC) and overspill from the Somali conflict. Impacts Deals signed during the president's visit to Israel will likely result in skills and technology transfer to improve Kenya's water security. Recent US airstrikes against an al-Shabaab training site in Somalia will boost the AMISOM mission. However, the EU decision to cut AMISOM funding by 20% will pose longer-term difficulties unless regional states find substitute funding.


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