Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood will stress moderation

Subject The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. Significance After facing fragmentation in 2015, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan (MBJ) sought to re-engage in local politics. The September 2016 electoral success of its political wing, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), revitalised its role as a leading opposition movement. Following reports that the new US administration was debating the designation of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB), its parent movement, as a terrorist organisation, the MBJ on January 23 announced an end to its 14-year boycott of dialogue with Washington. Impacts Jordanian authorities could be suspicious of the MBJ’s outreach to Washington, fearing it might become a conduit for US pressure. Radical ideologies may become more prevalent because of rising unemployment, outflanking the MBJ but enhancing its ‘moderate’ credentials. Regional and international instability could force the government and Brotherhood to work together to manage domestic dissent.

Significance This comes following high tensions with teachers, who engaged in a series of widespread protests after the Attorney-General ordered the closure of the Teachers' Union and forcible dissolution of its leadership on July 25. There were scores of arrests and an unprecedented reporting ban. Impacts The government will lack capacity to fulfil economic pledges made to public sector workers in 2019. Further setbacks to the much-delayed political reform process will complicate Western pledges of financial support. If November elections are compromised, the current government of Omar al-Razzaz could face dissolution. Negotiations for Emirati aid could lead to harsher measures against the Muslim Brotherhood and Turkish or Qatari influence.


Author(s):  
Kira D. Jumet

This chapter outlines the individual grievances arising from political, economic, social, and religious conditions under the government of Mohamed Morsi that became the foundations of opposition to his rule. It focuses on democracy in Egypt, the 2012 presidential elections, and the expectations and promises put forth by Morsi. The chapter also covers popular perceptions of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Freedom and Justice Party, grievances surrounding electricity and gas, security and sexual harassment, Morsi’s speeches and representation of Egypt on the international stage, and Morsi’s political appointments. The chapter relies on interview data and fieldwork conducted in Egypt during the year of Morsi’s presidency.


Urban Studies ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 004209802092534
Author(s):  
Michael Janoschka ◽  
Fabiola Mota

Local politics in Spain has triggered iconic shifts over the last few years, and the electoral success of new ‘movement parties’ in particular has dramatically challenged the political establishment. Between 2015 and 2019, many municipalities – including, crucially, the two biggest cities, Madrid and Barcelona – were governed by coalitions originating from anti-austerity, anti-eviction and pro-democracy struggles. This has significantly affected hegemonic and widely normalised discourses supporting the neoliberalisation of urban politics, and to some extent has also prompted novel governance approaches. Based on empirical research undertaken with local councillors, officials, consultants and activists, the article develops an in-depth analysis of governance transformations in the Spanish capital of Madrid. By doing so, it evaluates the ambiguities and contradictions that the government coalition Ahora Madrid was facing during the 2015–2019 legislative term. The debate stimulates critical reflections for academics, practitioners and movements on the transformative capacities that new municipalisms may enact, as well as the constraints faced by established multi-level urban governance regimes.


Significance King Mohammed VI has committed forces to the Saudi-led coalition conducing operations in Yemen to reinforce the alliance with Gulf states. It may be because of these ties that Morocco's Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD) survived the regional political backlash against the Muslim Brotherhood -- with which the PJD has some parallels, but no formal links. Prime Minister and PJD leader Abdelilah Benkirane has developed a close working relationship with King Mohammed and the royal court. With the economy performing well, Benkirane's chances of prolonging his mandate look promising. Impacts Local elections will signal the level of popular support for the PJD. If Benkirane retains the premiership post-2016, he may seek a more prominent role for the PJD -- in cabinet and the civil service. This could bring him into conflict with the king.


Significance The deal aims to create a 'Government of National Accord' to resolve the rivalry between the two competing parliaments, the Tripoli-based General National Congress (GNC) and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR). Although the HoR signed the deal, the GNC refused to accept it. Yet several other important GNC allies signed the agreement. This skirted outright failure of the UN peace process, but gives the mooted unity government a very shaky basis on which to proceed. Impacts Fissures within the Muslim Brotherhood and the GNC will likely dilute their influence in Libya. The UN Security Council will increase pressure on rejectionists to come into the fold or face sanctions and isolation. The deal may well result in peaceful, functioning areas, such as Misrata, keen to attract investment. However, other areas, such as Benghazi, will likely continue to see violence, which would cloud prospects for investment in stable areas.


Significance This will be followed by a second round on November 22-23, with run-off votes after each round to decide seats with no clear majority. Impacts With pro-business figures expected to dominate, parliament is likely to support legislation encouraging foreign investment. The election could aggravate popular disaffection with a political process seen as serving the security state and big business. In a stark contrast to previous parliaments, the Muslim Brotherhood will have next to no representation in the legislature.


Significance This followed Qatar's December 14 rejection of Egyptian charges that it had assisted the Islamist perpetrator of a bomb attack on a cathedral in Cairo. The accusation is the legacy of a pre-2013 era of activist foreign policy and support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Under pressure from Saudi Arabia and others, the country has since returned to the Gulf Arab fold, but relations with Egypt remain tense. Impacts Even if recovering energy prices ease the fiscal situation in 2017, foreign policy is likely to be cautious. The legacy of previous unsuccessful mediation efforts in Yemen could compromise Qatar’s role in conflict-resolution efforts. Qatar is not as strongly involved in Libya as before, but maintains low-profile ties with Tripolitanian, Islamist-leaning groups. Ties with Riyadh could strengthen further after a high-profile visit by King Salman on December 5.


Significance Seven years after the government of President Rafael Correa signalled its intention to make mining one of the key pillars of its economic and political programme, the sector remains underdeveloped. Nonetheless, activity in the sector has increased, suggesting that changes the government has introduced in the last few years have started to take effect. Impacts The balance of political power in the next government is likely to remain broadly favourable for mining companies. Nevertheless, local politics and opposition will slow development and could even prevent it. The government will focus on 'responsible mining' in an effort to create broad-based political support for sectoral development. The government's links with financial institutions and its free trade deal with the EU will reassure mining firms of their investments.


Significance The Qatar crisis in June 2017 was similarly sparked by a piece of ‘fake news’ planted on Doha’s national news agency showing the Qatari emir as expressing support for Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood movement. The incidents are part of a rising trend of offensive cyber actions and government-backed social media contestation in the region. They may also be the first examples of a combined cyber and physical strategy achieving core foreign policy goals just short of actual conflict. Impacts The GCC’s high online presence and draconian regulatory framework will make social media a key arena for covert state action. Interpretation of past events will fragment, meaning divisions such as the GCC split harden over time and become difficult to reverse. As GCC states’ attitudes to Iran diverge further, their Western allies will find regional diplomacy more labour-intensive.


Subject Nicaragua unrest. Significance Protests were held across Nicaragua on April 18 to mark the first anniversary of the beginning of demonstrations against President Daniel Ortega and his government. In the year since, the government has successfully consolidated its control through a combination of security crackdowns and legal challenges to the protests, effectively extinguishing the opposition movement for now. With Ortega’s position secure, he looks set to remain in power until the 2021 elections at least, ignoring opposition calls for early elections to resolve the conflict. Impacts Economic decline will fuel outward migration, with the effects being felt primarily by neighbouring Costa Rica. Recent sanctions citing the Nicaragua Canal may indicate that further investors or individuals involved in that project could be targeted. Companies with links to Caracas could also be targeted, with Washington using Nicaragua to put pressure on Venezuela and vice versa.


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