Al-Nour Party's influence in Egypt will be limited

Significance Al-Nour Party was the only Islamist political group to participate in the elections. However, the conservative Salafist party has seen its fortunes decline, from being the second most successful party in the relatively diverse political landscape of 2011-13, to an underperforming one in the current parliamentary elections. Impacts Al-Nour's lack of credibility among Egyptian Islamists will obstruct its development. As a result the Muslim Brotherhood will have greater influence as and when the regime reconciles with political Islamists. Supporters of the state, especially the media, will view al-Nour as an extension of the Brotherhood.

Significance At the beginning of 2021, the ZP coalition of the Law and Justice (PiS), Accord and United Poland (SP) parties is stable, but not as strong as it has been in previous years. This weakening in the PiS-led government’s condition is due to many factors, among which the coronavirus pandemic is one of the most important. Impacts The process will continue of subordinating any independent state institutions still left to party control. PiS will take further, similar steps regarding the media, academia and NGOs. After months of pandemic lockdown, the state of the economy is stable if not ideal, and will not lead to early elections.


2007 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 433a-433a
Author(s):  
Barbara Zollner

This article investigates the history of the Muslim Brotherhood from 1954 to 1971, when thousands of its members were imprisoned and tortured in Gamel Abdel Nasser's prisons. The period is marked by intervals of crisis, attempts at organizational reform, and ideological discourse, which was prompted by Sayyid Qutb's activist interpretation. However, the Muslim Brotherhood finally developed a moderate ideology, which countered radical Islamist leanings growing within its midst while remaining loyal to Qutb's legacy. This centrist approach to Islamist activism and opposition is epitomized by Duءat la Qudat, which was composed by a number of authors and issued in Hasan al-Hudaybi's name. Written as a joint project of leading Brothers and al-Azhar scholars, the text is evidence of the first steps toward reconciling with the state system during Nasser's presidency.


Author(s):  
Amy Austin Holmes

This book offers the first analysis of both the revolution and counterrevolution in Egypt, beginning in January 2011 until July 2018. The period of revolutionary upheaval played out in three uprisings against three distinct forms of authoritarian rule: the Mubarak regime and the police state that protected it, the unelected military junta known as the Supreme Council of Armed Forces, and the religious authoritarianism of the Muslim Brotherhood. The second part of the book analyzes the counterrevolution, which is divided into two periods: the first under Adly Mansour as interim president; and the second after Abdel Fattah El -Sisi was elected president. During the first wave, the regime imprisoned or killed the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood and many secular activists, while during the second wave the regime turned against civil society at large: nongovernmental organizations , charities, the media, academia, and minority groups. In addition to providing new and unprecedented empirical data, the book makes two theoretical contributions. First, a new framework is presented for analyzing the state apparatus in Egypt, which is based on four pillars of regime support that can either prop up or press upon those in power: the Egyptian military, the business elite, the United States, and the multiheaded opposition. Second , the book brings together the literature on bottom-up revolutionary movements and top-down military coups, and it introduces the concept of a coup from below in contrast to the revolution from above that took place under Gamal Abdel Nasser.


2020 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-52
Author(s):  
Mohammad Abu Rumman ◽  
Neven Bondokji

In the wake of the Arab Spring, many younger members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan left the movement, especially after 2015, establishing new political parties due to ideological shifts over the nature of the state and questions of civil liberties. Four factors influenced this transformation: identity crisis, the movement's organizational rigidity, members' personal experiences during and after the uprisings, and a growing desire to separate political campaigning from religious outreach.


Significance King Mohammed VI has committed forces to the Saudi-led coalition conducing operations in Yemen to reinforce the alliance with Gulf states. It may be because of these ties that Morocco's Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD) survived the regional political backlash against the Muslim Brotherhood -- with which the PJD has some parallels, but no formal links. Prime Minister and PJD leader Abdelilah Benkirane has developed a close working relationship with King Mohammed and the royal court. With the economy performing well, Benkirane's chances of prolonging his mandate look promising. Impacts Local elections will signal the level of popular support for the PJD. If Benkirane retains the premiership post-2016, he may seek a more prominent role for the PJD -- in cabinet and the civil service. This could bring him into conflict with the king.


Significance The deal aims to create a 'Government of National Accord' to resolve the rivalry between the two competing parliaments, the Tripoli-based General National Congress (GNC) and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR). Although the HoR signed the deal, the GNC refused to accept it. Yet several other important GNC allies signed the agreement. This skirted outright failure of the UN peace process, but gives the mooted unity government a very shaky basis on which to proceed. Impacts Fissures within the Muslim Brotherhood and the GNC will likely dilute their influence in Libya. The UN Security Council will increase pressure on rejectionists to come into the fold or face sanctions and isolation. The deal may well result in peaceful, functioning areas, such as Misrata, keen to attract investment. However, other areas, such as Benghazi, will likely continue to see violence, which would cloud prospects for investment in stable areas.


Significance This will be followed by a second round on November 22-23, with run-off votes after each round to decide seats with no clear majority. Impacts With pro-business figures expected to dominate, parliament is likely to support legislation encouraging foreign investment. The election could aggravate popular disaffection with a political process seen as serving the security state and big business. In a stark contrast to previous parliaments, the Muslim Brotherhood will have next to no representation in the legislature.


Significance This followed Qatar's December 14 rejection of Egyptian charges that it had assisted the Islamist perpetrator of a bomb attack on a cathedral in Cairo. The accusation is the legacy of a pre-2013 era of activist foreign policy and support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Under pressure from Saudi Arabia and others, the country has since returned to the Gulf Arab fold, but relations with Egypt remain tense. Impacts Even if recovering energy prices ease the fiscal situation in 2017, foreign policy is likely to be cautious. The legacy of previous unsuccessful mediation efforts in Yemen could compromise Qatar’s role in conflict-resolution efforts. Qatar is not as strongly involved in Libya as before, but maintains low-profile ties with Tripolitanian, Islamist-leaning groups. Ties with Riyadh could strengthen further after a high-profile visit by King Salman on December 5.


Subject The sale of the Erdenet mine. Significance The day before parliamentary elections in June last year, Prime Minister Saikhanbileg Chimed announced the sale of 49% of shares held by the Russian government in the Erdenet Mining Corporation and the Mongolrostsvetmet mining company to Mongolia Copper Corporation, an unknown private Mongolian company. Subsequent parliamentary inquiry concluded that the sale was unconstitutional and the government ordered the shares transferred to the state on February 16 this year. The government’s actions received wide public support while polls reveal that the electorate views corruption as the main obstacle to Mongolia’s development Impacts Talk of 'nationalisation' in the Western media threatens to derail Mongolia's efforts to fix its image and attract foreign investors. The unusual circumstances of the sale raise suspicions of corruption and collusion between Mongolia's previous government and largest bank. The new government's will to scrutinise sale demonstrates the strength of Mongolia’s democracy.


Significance The Qatar crisis in June 2017 was similarly sparked by a piece of ‘fake news’ planted on Doha’s national news agency showing the Qatari emir as expressing support for Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood movement. The incidents are part of a rising trend of offensive cyber actions and government-backed social media contestation in the region. They may also be the first examples of a combined cyber and physical strategy achieving core foreign policy goals just short of actual conflict. Impacts The GCC’s high online presence and draconian regulatory framework will make social media a key arena for covert state action. Interpretation of past events will fragment, meaning divisions such as the GCC split harden over time and become difficult to reverse. As GCC states’ attitudes to Iran diverge further, their Western allies will find regional diplomacy more labour-intensive.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document