scholarly journals Second-order freeriding on antisocial punishment restores the effectiveness of prosocial punishment

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Attila Szolnoki ◽  
Matjaž Perc
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Synergistic Effects ◽  
Evolutionary Stability ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Microscopic Mechanism ◽  
Spatial Pattern Formation ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Over Time

Economic experiments have shown that punishment can increase public goods game contributions over time. However, the effectiveness of punishment is challenged by second-order freeriding and antisocial punishment. The latter implies that non-cooperators punish cooperators, while the former implies unwillingness to shoulder the cost of punishment. Here we extend the theory of cooperation in the spatial public goods game by considering four competing strategies, which are traditional cooperators and defectors, as well as cooperators who punish defectors and defectors who punish cooperators. We show that if the synergistic effects are high enough to sustain cooperation based on network reciprocity alone, antisocial punishment does not deter public cooperation. Conversely, if synergistic effects are low and punishment is actively needed to sustain cooperation, antisocial punishment does act detrimental, but only if the cost-to-fine ratio is low. If the costs are relatively high, cooperation again dominates as a result of spatial pattern formation. Counterintuitively, defectors who do not punish cooperators, and are thus effectively second-order freeriding on antisocial punishment, form an active layer around punishing cooperators, which protects them against defectors that punish cooperators. A stable three-strategy phase that is sustained by the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance is also possible via the same route. The microscopic mechanism behind the reported evolutionary outcomes can be explained by the comparison of invasion rates that determine the stability of subsystem solutions. Our results reveal an unlikely evolutionary escape from adverse effects of antisocial punishment, and they provide a rationale for why second-order freeriding is not always an impediment to the evolutionary stability of punishment.

scholarly journals Punishment Strategies across Societies: Conventional Wisdoms Reconsidered

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Ramzi Suleiman ◽  
Yuval Samid
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Strong Predictor ◽  
Social Environments ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
The World ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Cost

Experiments using the public goods game have repeatedly shown that in cooperative social environments, punishment makes cooperation flourish, and withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where antisocial punishment has been detected, punishment was detrimental to cooperation. The success of punishment in enhancing cooperation was explained as deterrence of free riders by cooperative strong reciprocators, who were willing to pay the cost of punishing them, whereas in environments in which punishment diminished cooperation, antisocial punishment was explained as revenge by low cooperators against high cooperators suspected of punishing them in previous rounds. The present paper reconsiders the generality of both explanations. Using data from a public goods experiment with punishment, conducted by the authors on Israeli subjects (Study 1), and from a study published in Science using sixteen participant pools from cities around the world (Study 2), we found that: 1. The effect of punishment on the emergence of cooperation was mainly due to contributors increasing their cooperation, rather than from free riders being deterred. 2. Participants adhered to different contribution and punishment strategies. Some cooperated and did not punish (‘cooperators’); others cooperated and punished free riders (‘strong reciprocators’); a third subgroup punished upward and downward relative to their own contribution (‘norm-keepers’); and a small sub-group punished only cooperators (‘antisocial punishers’). 3. Clear societal differences emerged in the mix of the four participant types, with high-contributing pools characterized by higher ratios of ‘strong reciprocators’, and ‘cooperators’, and low-contributing pools characterized by a higher ratio of ‘norm keepers’. 4. The fraction of ‘strong reciprocators’ out of the total punishers emerged as a strong predictor of the groups’ level of cooperation and success in providing the public goods.

scholarly journals Brief communication: A fast vortex-based smearing correction for the actuator line

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 349-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander R. Meyer Forsting ◽  
Georg R. Pirrung ◽  
Néstor Ramos-García
Keyword(s):  
Computational Cost ◽  
Original Method ◽  
The Self ◽  
Original Formulation ◽  
Dynamic Correction ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Aerodynamic Surfaces ◽  
Lifting Line ◽  
Over Time

Abstract. The actuator line is a lifting line representation of aerodynamic surfaces in computational fluid dynamics applications but with non-singular forces, which reduces the self-induced velocities at the line. The vortex-based correction by Meyer Forsting et al. (2019a) recovers this missing induction and thus the intended lifting line behaviour of the actuator line. However, its computational cost exceeds that of existing tip corrections and quickly grows with blade discretization. Here we present different methods for reducing its computational cost to the level of existing corrections without jeopardizing the stability or accuracy of the original method. The cost is reduced by at least 98 %, whereas the power is maximally affected by 0.8 % with respect to the original formulation. This accelerated smearing correction remains a dynamic correction by modelling the variation in trailed vorticity over time. The correction is openly available (Meyer Forsting et al., 2019b).

Cooperation in the spatial public goods game with the second-order reputation evaluation

2019 ◽  
Vol 383 (11) ◽  
pp. 1157-1166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuetian Dong ◽  
Gang Hao ◽  
Juan Wang ◽  
Chen Liu ◽  
Chengyi Xia
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Public Goods Game

Stochastic evolutionary public goods game with first and second order costly punishments in finite populations

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (6) ◽  
pp. 060203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ji Quan ◽  
Yu-Qing Chu ◽  
Wei Liu ◽  
Xian-Jia Wang ◽  
Xiu-Kang Yang
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Finite Populations

scholarly journals Synergistic third-party rewarding and punishment in the public goods game

2019 ◽  
Vol 475 (2227) ◽  
pp. 20190349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yinhai Fang ◽  
Tina P. Benko ◽  
Matjaž Perc ◽  
Haiyan Xu ◽  
Qingmei Tan
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Synergistic Effects ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Public Intervention ◽  
The Third ◽  
Individual Incentive ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
The Impact

We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game in the presence of third-party rewarding and punishment. The third party executes public intervention, punishing groups where cooperation is weak and rewarding groups where cooperation is strong. We consider four different scenarios to determine what works best for cooperation, in particular, neither rewarding nor punishment, only rewarding, only punishment or both rewarding and punishment. We observe strong synergistic effects when rewarding and punishment are simultaneously applied, which are absent if neither of the two incentives or just each individual incentive is applied by the third party. We find that public cooperation can be sustained at comparatively low third-party costs under adverse conditions, which is impossible if just positive or negative incentives are applied. We also examine the impact of defection tolerance and application frequency, showing that the higher the tolerance and the frequency of rewarding and punishment, the more cooperation thrives. Phase diagrams and characteristic spatial distributions of strategies are presented to corroborate these results, which will hopefully prove useful for more efficient public policies in support of cooperation in social dilemmas.

scholarly journals Bilateral costly expulsions resolve the public goods dilemma

2021 ◽  
Vol 477 (2254) ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaofeng Wang ◽  
Matjaž Perc
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Mean Field ◽  
Field Analysis ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Expected Payoff ◽  
The Public ◽  
Personal Cost ◽  
Additional Burden ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
The Cost

Expulsion has been found to promote cooperation in social dilemmas, but only if it does not incur costs or is applied unilaterally. Here, we show that removing both conditions leads to a spontaneous resolution of the costly expulsion problem. Namely, by studying the public goods game where cooperators and defectors can expel others at a personal cost, we find that public cooperation thrives as expulsion costs increase. This is counterintuitive, as the cost of other-regarding behaviour typically places an additional burden on cooperation, which is in itself costly. Such scenarios are referred to as second-order free-rider problems, and they typically require an additional mechanism, such as network reciprocity, to be resolved. We perform a mean field analysis of the public goods game with bilateral costly expulsion, showing analytically that the expected payoff difference between cooperators and defectors increases with expulsion costs as long as players with the same strategy have, on average, a higher frequency to interact with each other. As the latter condition is often satisfied in social networks, our results thus reveal a fascinating new path to public cooperation, and they show that the costs of well-intended actions need not be low for them to be effective.

scholarly journals The Evaluation of Second- and Third-Party Punishers

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-9
Author(s):  
Nobuhiro Mifune ◽  
Yang Li ◽  
Narumi Okuda
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Undergraduate Students ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Negative Evaluation ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
The Cost

Although punishment can promote cooperative behavior, the evolution of punishment requires benefits which override the cost. One possible source of the benefit of punishing uncooperative behavior is obtaining a positive evaluation. This study compares evaluations of punishers and non-punishers. Two hundred and thirty-four undergraduate students participated in two studies. Study 1 revealed that, in the public goods game, punishers were not positively evaluated, while punishers were positively evaluated in the third-party punishment game. In Study 2, where the non-cooperator was a participant of a public goods game, we manipulated the punishers participation in the game. The results showed that punishers received no positive evaluations, regardless of their participation in the game, indicating that negative evaluation may not be a reaction toward aggression with retaliatory intentions.

scholarly journals An Entropic Gradient Structure in the Network Dynamics of a Slime Mold

Symmetry ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (8) ◽  
pp. 1385
Author(s):  
Vincenzo Bonifaci
Keyword(s):  
Relative Entropy ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Slime Mold ◽  
The State ◽  
Global Minimizer ◽  
Information Theoretic ◽  
Informational Divergence ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Over Time

The approach to equilibrium in certain dynamical systems can be usefully described in terms of information-theoretic functionals. Well-studied models of this kind are Markov processes, chemical reaction networks, and replicator dynamics, for all of which it can be proven, under suitable assumptions, that the relative entropy (informational divergence) of the state of the system with respect to an equilibrium is nonincreasing over time. This work reviews another recent result of this type, which emerged in the study of the network optimization dynamics of an acellular slime mold, Physarum polycephalum. In this setting, not only the relative entropy of the state is nonincreasing, but its evolution over time is crucial to the stability of the entire system, and the equilibrium towards which the dynamics is attracted proves to be a global minimizer of the cost of the network.

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