Cooperation in the spatial public goods game with the second-order reputation evaluation

2019 ◽  
Vol 383 (11) ◽  
pp. 1157-1166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuetian Dong ◽  
Gang Hao ◽  
Juan Wang ◽  
Chen Liu ◽  
Chengyi Xia
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Public Goods Game

Stochastic evolutionary public goods game with first and second order costly punishments in finite populations

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (6) ◽  
pp. 060203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ji Quan ◽  
Yu-Qing Chu ◽  
Wei Liu ◽  
Xian-Jia Wang ◽  
Xiu-Kang Yang
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Finite Populations

scholarly journals Second-order freeriding on antisocial punishment restores the effectiveness of prosocial punishment

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Attila Szolnoki ◽  
Matjaž Perc
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Synergistic Effects ◽  
Evolutionary Stability ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Microscopic Mechanism ◽  
Spatial Pattern Formation ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Over Time

Economic experiments have shown that punishment can increase public goods game contributions over time. However, the effectiveness of punishment is challenged by second-order freeriding and antisocial punishment. The latter implies that non-cooperators punish cooperators, while the former implies unwillingness to shoulder the cost of punishment. Here we extend the theory of cooperation in the spatial public goods game by considering four competing strategies, which are traditional cooperators and defectors, as well as cooperators who punish defectors and defectors who punish cooperators. We show that if the synergistic effects are high enough to sustain cooperation based on network reciprocity alone, antisocial punishment does not deter public cooperation. Conversely, if synergistic effects are low and punishment is actively needed to sustain cooperation, antisocial punishment does act detrimental, but only if the cost-to-fine ratio is low. If the costs are relatively high, cooperation again dominates as a result of spatial pattern formation. Counterintuitively, defectors who do not punish cooperators, and are thus effectively second-order freeriding on antisocial punishment, form an active layer around punishing cooperators, which protects them against defectors that punish cooperators. A stable three-strategy phase that is sustained by the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance is also possible via the same route. The microscopic mechanism behind the reported evolutionary outcomes can be explained by the comparison of invasion rates that determine the stability of subsystem solutions. Our results reveal an unlikely evolutionary escape from adverse effects of antisocial punishment, and they provide a rationale for why second-order freeriding is not always an impediment to the evolutionary stability of punishment.

Inter-group selection of strategy promotes cooperation in public goods game

2021 ◽  
pp. 126292
Author(s):  
Jianwei Wang ◽  
Wenshu Xu ◽  
Wei Chen ◽  
Fengyuan Yu ◽  
Jialu He
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Group Selection ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Selection Of

scholarly journals Bringing tax avoiders to light: moral framing and shaming in a public goods experiment

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Stefanos A. Tsikas
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Social Contagion ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Social Sanctions ◽  
Moral Framing ◽  
Public Goods Experiment

Abstract With a linear public goods game played in six different variants, this article studies two channels that might moderate social dilemmas and increase cooperation without using pecuniary incentives: moral framing and shaming. We find that cooperation is increased when noncontributing to a public good is framed as morally debatable and socially harmful tax avoidance, while the mere description of a tax context has no effect. However, without social sanctions in place, cooperation quickly deteriorates due to social contagion. We find ‘shaming’ free-riders by disclosing their misdemeanor to act as a strong social sanction, irrespective of the context in which it is applied. Moralizing tax avoidance significantly reinforces shaming, compared with a simple tax context.

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