scholarly journals The Evaluation of Second- and Third-Party Punishers

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-9
Author(s):  
Nobuhiro Mifune ◽  
Yang Li ◽  
Narumi Okuda
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Undergraduate Students ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Negative Evaluation ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
The Cost

Although punishment can promote cooperative behavior, the evolution of punishment requires benefits which override the cost. One possible source of the benefit of punishing uncooperative behavior is obtaining a positive evaluation. This study compares evaluations of punishers and non-punishers. Two hundred and thirty-four undergraduate students participated in two studies. Study 1 revealed that, in the public goods game, punishers were not positively evaluated, while punishers were positively evaluated in the third-party punishment game. In Study 2, where the non-cooperator was a participant of a public goods game, we manipulated the punishers participation in the game. The results showed that punishers received no positive evaluations, regardless of their participation in the game, indicating that negative evaluation may not be a reaction toward aggression with retaliatory intentions.

scholarly journals Synergistic third-party rewarding and punishment in the public goods game

2019 ◽  
Vol 475 (2227) ◽  
pp. 20190349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yinhai Fang ◽  
Tina P. Benko ◽  
Matjaž Perc ◽  
Haiyan Xu ◽  
Qingmei Tan
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Synergistic Effects ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Public Intervention ◽  
The Third ◽  
Individual Incentive ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
The Impact

We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game in the presence of third-party rewarding and punishment. The third party executes public intervention, punishing groups where cooperation is weak and rewarding groups where cooperation is strong. We consider four different scenarios to determine what works best for cooperation, in particular, neither rewarding nor punishment, only rewarding, only punishment or both rewarding and punishment. We observe strong synergistic effects when rewarding and punishment are simultaneously applied, which are absent if neither of the two incentives or just each individual incentive is applied by the third party. We find that public cooperation can be sustained at comparatively low third-party costs under adverse conditions, which is impossible if just positive or negative incentives are applied. We also examine the impact of defection tolerance and application frequency, showing that the higher the tolerance and the frequency of rewarding and punishment, the more cooperation thrives. Phase diagrams and characteristic spatial distributions of strategies are presented to corroborate these results, which will hopefully prove useful for more efficient public policies in support of cooperation in social dilemmas.

Query Authentication of Outsourced Spatial Database

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 539-547
Author(s):  
Jun Hong ◽  
Tao Wen ◽  
Quan Guo
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Data ◽  
Spatial Database ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Spatial Query ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Third ◽  
Data Owner ◽  
Spatial Data Management ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
The Cost

Outsourcing spatial database to a third party is becoming a common practice for more and more individuals and companies to save the cost of managing and maintaining database, where a data owner delegates its spatial data management tasks to a third party and grants it to provide query services. However, the third party is not full trusted. Thus, authentication information should be provided to the client for query authentication. In this paper, we introduce an efficient space authenticated data structure, called Verifiable Similarity Indexing tree (VSS-tree), to support authenticated spatial query. We build VSS-tree based on SS-tree which employs bounding sphere rather than bounding rectangle for region shape and extend it with authentication information. Based on VSS-tree, the third party finds query results and builds their corresponding verification object. The client performs query authentication using the verification object and the public key published. Finally, we evaluate the performance and validity of our algorithms, the experiment results show that VSS-tree can efficiently support spatial query and have better performance than Merkle R tree (MR-tree)

scholarly journals Punishment Strategies across Societies: Conventional Wisdoms Reconsidered

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Ramzi Suleiman ◽  
Yuval Samid
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Strong Predictor ◽  
Social Environments ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
The World ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Cost

Experiments using the public goods game have repeatedly shown that in cooperative social environments, punishment makes cooperation flourish, and withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where antisocial punishment has been detected, punishment was detrimental to cooperation. The success of punishment in enhancing cooperation was explained as deterrence of free riders by cooperative strong reciprocators, who were willing to pay the cost of punishing them, whereas in environments in which punishment diminished cooperation, antisocial punishment was explained as revenge by low cooperators against high cooperators suspected of punishing them in previous rounds. The present paper reconsiders the generality of both explanations. Using data from a public goods experiment with punishment, conducted by the authors on Israeli subjects (Study 1), and from a study published in Science using sixteen participant pools from cities around the world (Study 2), we found that: 1. The effect of punishment on the emergence of cooperation was mainly due to contributors increasing their cooperation, rather than from free riders being deterred. 2. Participants adhered to different contribution and punishment strategies. Some cooperated and did not punish (‘cooperators’); others cooperated and punished free riders (‘strong reciprocators’); a third subgroup punished upward and downward relative to their own contribution (‘norm-keepers’); and a small sub-group punished only cooperators (‘antisocial punishers’). 3. Clear societal differences emerged in the mix of the four participant types, with high-contributing pools characterized by higher ratios of ‘strong reciprocators’, and ‘cooperators’, and low-contributing pools characterized by a higher ratio of ‘norm keepers’. 4. The fraction of ‘strong reciprocators’ out of the total punishers emerged as a strong predictor of the groups’ level of cooperation and success in providing the public goods.

scholarly journals TANGGUNGJAWAB BLU TRANSJAKARTA TERHADAP PIHAK KETIGA DALAM HAL TERJADI KECELAKAAN MENURUT UU NO. 22 TAHUN 2009 TENTANG LALU LINTAS DAN ANGKUTAN JALAN

2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Elfrida R Gultom
Keyword(s):  
Public Service ◽  
Public Transport ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Service Agency ◽  
Transportation Services ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Ticket Prices

The objective of Busway development is to provide transportation services faster, safer, comfortable, and affordable for people in Jakarta. Ticket prices are subsidized by the local government busway. Busway given special line, however could not be separated from the accident. In a carriage, in the event of an accident then apply provisions of Law No. 22 of 2009 on Traffic and Transportation. If there is a loss that hit the third party then setting responsibilities Public Service Agency TransJakarta Busway to third parties refer to the provisions of Article 194 paragraph (1) which determines that the public transport companies are not responsible for any losses suffered by third parties, unless the third party may prove that the loss is caused by the fault of public transport company. Under these provisions, if the third party wants to sue for damages, ketigalah party must prove the fault of the carrier, the claim is based on the basis of tort or on the basis of error set forth in Article 1365 of the Civil Code which stipulates that any action unlawfully harming others, require the person who carries the loss offset. Keywords: transport, the responsibility of the carrier, a third party, transport law

10. Alternative Dispute Resolution

2020 ◽  
pp. 111-117
Author(s):  
Stuart Sime
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
Alternative Dispute Resolution ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
Early Settlement ◽  
Court Involvement ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
The Cost

Alternative dispute resolution (ADR), particularly mediation, plays a key role in reducing the costs of civil disputes by fomenting the early settlement of cases. This chapter discusses ADR processes; advantages or disadvantages of ADR and litigation; the cost of ADR; reference to ADR; and court involvement in ADR. Adjudicative ADR results in the third party neutral deciding the dispute or difference between the parties. Non-adjudicative ADR processes involve moving the parties towards reaching a compromise agreement between themselves. Rules of court require parties to consider using ADR. Sanctions may be imposed on parties who act unreasonably.

10. Alternative Dispute Resolution

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart Sime
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
Alternative Dispute Resolution ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
Early Settlement ◽  
Court Involvement ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
The Cost

Alternative dispute resolution (ADR), particularly mediation, plays a key role in reducing the costs of civil disputes by fomenting the early settlement of cases. This chapter discusses ADR processes; advantages or disadvantages of ADR and litigation; the cost of ADR; reference to ADR; and court involvement in ADR. Adjudicative ADR results in the third party neutral deciding the dispute or difference between the parties. Non-adjudicative ADR processes involve moving the parties towards reaching a compromise agreement between themselves. Rules of court require parties to consider using ADR. Sanctions may be imposed on parties who act unreasonably.

10. Alternative dispute resolution

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart Sime
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
Alternative Dispute Resolution ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
Early Settlement ◽  
Court Involvement ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
The Cost

Alternative dispute resolution (ADR), particularly mediation, plays a key role in reducing the costs of civil disputes by fomenting the early settlement of cases. This chapter discusses ADR processes; advantages or disadvantages of ADR and litigation; the cost of ADR; reference to ADR; and court involvement in ADR. Adjudicative ADR results in the third party neutral deciding the dispute or difference between the parties. Non-adjudicative ADR processes involve moving the parties towards reaching a compromise agreement between themselves. Rules of court require parties to consider using ADR. Sanctions may be imposed on parties who act unreasonably.

10. Alternative Dispute Resolution

2019 ◽  
pp. 111-117
Author(s):  
Stuart Sime
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
Alternative Dispute Resolution ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
Early Settlement ◽  
Court Involvement ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
The Cost

Alternative dispute resolution (ADR), particularly mediation, plays a key role in reducing the costs of civil disputes by fomenting the early settlement of cases. This chapter discusses ADR processes; advantages or disadvantages of ADR and litigation; the cost of ADR; reference to ADR; and court involvement in ADR. Adjudicative ADR results in the third party neutral deciding the dispute or difference between the parties. Non-adjudicative ADR processes involve moving the parties towards reaching a compromise agreement between themselves. Rules of court require parties to consider using ADR. Sanctions may be imposed on parties who act unreasonably.

Prosociality Beyond Big Five Agreeableness and HEXACO Honesty-Humility: Is Openness/Intellect Associated With Cooperativeness in the Public Goods Game?

2021 ◽  
pp. 089020702110281
Author(s):  
Erin C. R. Lawn ◽  
Kun Zhao ◽  
Simon M. Laham ◽  
Luke D. Smillie
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Big Five ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Analytic Formula ◽  
Strongly Correlated ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Charitable Behavior ◽  
The One

Who is cooperative? Although Big Five (B5) Agreeableness and HEXACO Honesty-Humility are correlates of charitable prosociality, distinctions between “charity” and “cooperation” suggest that additional traits could be associated with cooperative prosociality. Echoing prior theoretical and empirical indications that B5 Openness/Intellect may play a role in cooperation, Study 1 ( N = 119; exploratory) revealed a significant correlation between Openness/Intellect and cooperativeness in the one-shot Public Goods Game that did not generalize to charitableness in the Dictator Game. We therefore conducted three preregistered replications to discern the robustness of this Openness/Intellect–cooperativeness link. As expected, Openness/Intellect showed no consistent correlation with charitable behavior. Surprisingly, the predicted correlation between Openness/Intellect and cooperative behavior was also inconsistent, partially replicating in Study 3 ( N = 304) but not Studies 2 or 4 ( Ns = 131; 552). Across our replications, cooperative behavior was most strongly correlated with Honesty-Humility (internal meta-analytic [Formula: see text] = .15, p = .005). The correlation between Openness/Intellect and cooperative behavior across our replications was significant and identical in magnitude to that between Agreeableness and cooperative behavior, though this effect-size was weak (internal meta-analytic [Formula: see text] = .08, p < .001). We therefore conclude that Openness/Intellect is a nonnull but very modest correlate of cooperativeness.

scholarly journals Common Knowledge Promotes Cooperation in the Threshold Public Goods Game by Reducing Uncertainty

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Deutchman ◽  
Dorsa Amir ◽  
Katherine McAuliffe ◽  
Matthew Jordan
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Equation Modeling ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Threshold Public Goods

Recent work suggests that an important cognitive mechanism promoting coordination is common knowledge—a heuristic for representing recursive mental states. Yet, we know little about how common knowledge promotes coordination. We propose that common knowledge increases coordination by reducing uncertainty about others’ cooperative behavior. We examine how common knowledge increases cooperation in the context of a threshold public goods game, a public good game in which a minimum level of contribution—a threshold—is required. Across two preregistered studies (N = 4,111), we explored how varying (1) the information participants had regarding what their group members knew about the threshold and (2) the threshold level affected contributions. We found that participants were more likely to contribute to the public good when there was common knowledge of the threshold than private knowledge. Using structural equation modeling, we found that the predicted number of group members contributing to the public good and certainty about the predicted number of contributors mediated the effect of information condition on contributions. Our results suggest that common knowledge of the threshold increases public good contributions by reducing uncertainty around other people’s cooperative behavior. These findings point to the influential role of common knowledge in helping to solve large-scale cooperation problems.

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