scholarly journals A Peircean account of concepts: grounding abstraction in phylogeny through a comparative neuroscientific perspective

2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1752) ◽  
pp. 20170128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentina Cuccio ◽  
Vittorio Gallese
Keyword(s):  
Embodied Cognition ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Computational Theory Of Mind ◽  
Abstract Concepts ◽  
Embodied Simulation ◽  
Faculty Psychology ◽  
Link Type ◽  
The One ◽  
Concrete Concepts

The nature of concepts has always been a hotly debated topic in both philosophy and psychology and, more recently, also in cognitive neuroscience. Different accounts have been proposed of what concepts are. These accounts reflect deeply different conceptions of how the human mind works. In the last decades, two diametrically opposed theories of human cognition have been discussed and empirically investigated: the Computational Theory of Mind, on the one hand (Fodor 1983 The modularity of mind: an essay on faculty psychology ; Pylyshyn 1984 Computation and cognition: toward a foundation for cognitive science ), and Embodied Cognition (Barsalou 2008 Annu. Rev. Psychol. 59 , 617–645. ( doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093639 ); Gallese & Lakoff 2005 Cogn. Neuropsychol. 22 , 455–479 ( doi:10.1080/02643290442000310 ); Shapiro 2011 Embodied cognition ), on the other hand. The former proposes that concepts are abstract and amodal symbols in the language of thought, while the latter argues for the embodied nature of concepts that are conceived of as grounded in actions and perception. The embodiment of both concrete and abstract concepts has been challenged by many (e.g. Mahon & Caramazza 2008 J. Physiol. 102 , 59–70. ( doi:10.1016/j.jphysparis.2008.03.004 ); Caramazza et al . 2014 Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 37 , 1–15. ( doi:10.1146/annurev-neuro-071013-013950 )). These challenges will be here taken seriously and addressed from a comparative perspective. We will provide a phylogenetic and neurobiologically inspired account of the embodied nature of both abstract and concrete concepts. We will propose that, although differing in certain respect, they both might have a bodily foundation. Commonalities between abstract and concrete concepts will be explained by recurring to the Peircean notions of icon and abductive inference (CP 2.247). According to Peirce, icons are the kind of signs on which abductive inferences rest (Peirce CS 1931 in Collected papers of Charles S. Peirce, Hartshorne C, Weiss P, Burks AW. (eds), 40; Peirce CS 1997 In The 1903 Harvard lectures on pragmatism (ed. A. Turrisi)). It will be claimed that the mechanism of Embodied Simulation (Gallese & Sinigaglia 2011 Trends Cogn. Sci. 15 , 512–519. ( doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.09.003 )) can be described as an icon (Cuccio V & Caruana F. 2015 Il corpo come icona. Abduzione, strumenti ed Embodied Simulation. Versus, n. 119, 93–103), and it will then be suggested that on these, basic natural signs rest, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically, the capacity to conceptualize. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Varieties of abstract concepts: development, use and representation in the brain’.

Das Maßlose Begreifen. Gott als Gegenstand der Theologie bei vier scholastischen Autoren (13./14. Jahrhundert)

2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 160-175
Author(s):  
Florian Wöller
Keyword(s):  
Human Mind ◽  
Scientific Discipline ◽  
The Other ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
John Duns Scotus ◽  
Concept Of God ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The One ◽  
Proper Subject

AbstractThis article examines four medieval views on the subject of theology. Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, John Duns Scotus, and Peter Auriol were all confronted with an idea based on Aristotle’s theory of knowledge according to which any scientific discipline is unified by its proper subject. In defining this subject of theology, however, the theologians had to confront one thorny problem: God, whom they considered to be the subject of theology, cannot be grasped by any concept accessible to the human mind. In their respective discussions, two distinct strategies to solving this puzzle emerged. Aquinas and Giles, on the one hand, argued for a concept proportionate to human cognition. This concept or ratio functioned as a placeholder for the quidditative concept of God. Scotus and Auriol, on the other hand, elaborated on a concept which they believed grasped God’s quiddity, albeit in a somewhat approximative way. Their theories, therefore, figure as attempts to find a concept, that is, the concept of being, that in itself was as boundless as to grasp God’s immensity.

The strong versions of embodied cognition: Three challenges faced

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Omid Khatin-Zadeh ◽  
Zahra Eskandari ◽  
Sergio Cervera-Torres ◽  
Susana Ruiz-Fernandez ◽  
Reza Farzi ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Embodied Cognition ◽  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Mental Simulation ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
Context Dependency ◽  
Abstract Concepts ◽  
Theoretical Perspectives ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Sensory Processes ◽  
Concrete Concepts

The aim of this article is to discuss three challenges to the so-called “strong” versions of embodiment. The strong versions of embodied cognition (SVEC) have been successful in explaining how concrete concepts (e.g., pencil) may be understood based on sensory processes, yet they have failed to offer a comprehensive understanding of abstract concepts (e.g., freedom). In this regard, this article pinpoints three areas where the SVEC face limitations. First, the SVEC fail to fully support the active or passive perspective that an agent may assume when processing abstract concepts via embodied metaphorical representations. Second, the SVEC do not offer a compelling explanation for three different types of mental simulation proposed for the representation of non-actual motion semantics: enactive perception, perceptual scanning, and imagination. Third, the SVEC fail to account for inter-individual, cross-cultural, and context-dependency in the representation of abstract concepts. To summarize, we argue that the findings from the SVEC should be integrated into broader “weak” embodiment theoretical perspectives, which propose that sensory-motor and modality-independent systems are involved in conceptual representations. Finally, we discuss the implications of our core argument in cognitive neuroscience.

It’s in My Bones

2020 ◽  
pp. 131-149
Author(s):  
Iris Berent
Keyword(s):  
Embodied Cognition ◽  
The Body ◽  
Computational Theory Of Mind ◽  
Abstract Concepts ◽  
Computational Theory ◽  
Bodily Experiences ◽  
Abstract Notion ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Material Bodies

When I point to an object, you and I can agree on what it is (a red, round cup). How does our brain (matter) represent such notions? And how do we (distinct material bodies) apparently converge so we can talk about the same things? Cognitive scientists and philosophers have long assumed that people share abstract concepts (e.g., a cup); to explain how such abstract concepts can give rise to thinking, they further proposed the computational theory of mind. But theories of “embodied cognition” assert that cognition is all “in people’s bones.” What we know as a cup is not an abstract notion but rather the bodily experiences of our sensory and motor interactions with a cup—its shiny color, how it feels in our hands, the smoothness of its surface, its weight, and shape. I suggest that “Embodiment” is alluring because it promises to resolve the mysteries of Dualism (how can material bodies encode the immaterial notion of a cup?) and the origins of ideas (how do we all converge on an understanding that allows us to talk about the same things?). The solution is strikingly simple—just remove the “mind” from the equation. If there is no (immaterial) knowledge, then we no longer need to worry about how knowledge arises from the body and how knowledge can be learned. As discussed in the previous chapter, people erroneously believe that “if it’s in my body” then “it’s inborn.” Dualism and essentialism thus explain some of the lure of embodied cognition.

scholarly journals Concepts for which we need others more: The case of abstract concepts

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna M. Borghi
Keyword(s):  
Social Interaction ◽  
Word Meaning ◽  
Interactive Methods ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Abstract Concepts ◽  
Core Component ◽  
Concrete Concepts ◽  
Sensorimotor Processes

The capability to form and use concepts is a core component of human cognition. While all concepts are grounded in sensorimotor processes, more abstract concepts (e.g. “phantasy”) collect more heterogeneous and perceptually dissimilar exemplars; thus, linguistic and social interaction are particularly crucial for their acquisition and use. Due to their indeterminacy, abstract concepts generate more uncertainty than more concrete concepts; hence they induce people to monitor their inner knowledge longer and then to revert to others to ask for information and negotiate the word meaning. We propose that abstract concepts are concepts for which we need others more – other people are essential to acquire, process, and use them. Conceiving them in these terms requires the employment of novel, interactive methods to investigate their representation in use.

scholarly journals Is justice grounded? How expertise shapes conceptual representation of institutional concepts

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caterina Villani ◽  
Stefania D’Ascenzo ◽  
Anna M. Borghi ◽  
Corrado Roversi ◽  
Mariagrazia Benassi ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Social Institutions ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Conceptual Representation ◽  
Abstract Concepts ◽  
Inner Experiences ◽  
Fine Grained ◽  
Hand Involvement ◽  
Positive Valence ◽  
Concrete Concepts

AbstractUsing abstract concepts is a hallmark of human cognition. While multiple kinds of abstract concepts exist, they so far have been conceived as a unitary kind in opposition to concrete ones. Here, we focus on Institutional concepts, like justice or norm, investigating their fine-grained differences with respect to other kinds of abstract and concrete concepts, and exploring whether their representation varies according to individual proficiency. Specifically, we asked experts and non-experts in the legal field to evaluate four kinds of concepts (i.e., institutional, theoretical, food, artefact) on 16 dimensions: abstractness-concreteness; imageability; contextual availability; familiarity; age of acquisition; modality of acquisition; social valence; social metacognition; arousal; valence; interoception; metacognition; perceptual modality strength; body-object interaction; mouth and hand involvement. Results showed that Institutional concepts rely more than other categories on linguistic/social and inner experiences and are primarily characterized by positive valence. In addition, a more subtle characterization of the institutional domain emerged: Pure-institutional concepts (e.g., parliament) were perceived as more similar to technical tools, while Meta-institutional concepts (e.g., validity) were characterized mainly by abstract components. Importantly, for what concerns individual proficiency, we found that the level of expertise affects conceptual representation. Only law-experts associated Institutional concepts with exteroceptive and emotional experiences, showing also a more grounded and situated representation of the two types of institutional concepts. Overall, our finding highlights the richness and flexibility of abstract concepts and suggests that they differ in the degree of embodiment and grounding. Implications of the results for current theories of conceptual representation and social institutions are discussed.

Making it abstract, making it contestable: Gender/sex as a politicized concept

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudia Mazzuca ◽  
Matteo Santarelli
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Main Question ◽  
Abstract Concepts ◽  
Biological Feature ◽  
Dynamic Approach ◽  
Cognitive Sciences ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Cultural Construct ◽  
Science Framework ◽  
The One

The concept of gender has been the battleground of scientific and political speculations for a long time. On the one hand, some accounts contended that gender is a biological feature, while on the other hand some scholars maintained that gender is a socio-cultural construct (e.g., Butler, 1990; Risman, 2004). Some of the questions that animated the debate on gender over history are: how many genders are there? Is gender rooted in our biological asset? Are gender and sex the same thing? All of these questions entwine one more crucial, and often overlooked interrogative. How is it possible for a concept to be the purview of so many disagreements and conceptual redefinitions? The question that this paper addresses is therefore not which specific account of gender is preferable. Rather, the main question we will address is how and why is even possible to disagree on how gender should be considered. To provide partial answers to these questions, we suggest that gender/sex (van Anders, 2015; Fausto-Sterling, 2019) is an illustrative example of politicized concepts. We show that no concepts are political in themselves; instead, some concepts are subjected to a process involving a progressive detachment from their supposed concrete referent (i.e., abstractness), a tension to generalizability (i.e., abstraction), a partial indeterminacy (i.e., vagueness), and the possibility of being contested (i.e., contestability). All of these features differentially contribute to what we call the politicization of a concept. In short, we will claim that in order to politicize a concept, a possible strategy is to evidence its more abstract facets, without denying its more embodied and perceptual components (Borghi et al., 2019). So, we will first outline how gender has been treated in psychological and philosophical discussions, to evidence its essentially contestable character thereby showing how it became a politicized concept. Then we will review some of the most influential accounts of political concepts, arguing that currently they need to be integrated with more sophisticated distinctions (e.g., Koselleck, 2004). The notions gained from the analyses of some of the most important accounts of political concepts in social sciences and philosophy will allow us to implement a more dynamic approach to political concepts. Specifically, when translated into the cognitive science framework, these reflections will help us clarifying some crucial aspects of the nature of politicized concepts. Bridging together social and cognitive sciences, we will show how politicized concepts are abstract concepts, or better abstract conceptualizations.

Effects of Context on Processing Emotionally Neutral Abstract and Concrete Concepts

2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (7) ◽  
pp. 1191-1200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liusheng Wang ◽  
Hongmei Qiu ◽  
Jianjun Yin
Keyword(s):  
College Students ◽  
Lexical Decision ◽  
Lexical Decision Task ◽  
Emotional Valence ◽  
Decision Task ◽  
Abstract Concepts ◽  
Context Condition ◽  
Word Context ◽  
Concrete Concepts ◽  
Concrete Words

The abstractness effect describes the phenomenon of individuals processing abstract concepts faster and more accurately than they process concrete concepts. In this study, we explored the effects of context on how 43 college students processed words, controlling for the emotional valence of the words. The participants performed a lexical decision task in which they were shown individual abstract and concrete words, or abstract and concrete words embedded in sentences. The results showed that in the word-context condition the participants' processing of concrete concepts improved, whereas in the sentence-context condition their processing of abstract concepts improved. These findings support the embodied cognition theory of concept processing.

scholarly journals Nonconscious Cognitive Suffering: Considering Suffering Risks of Embodied Artificial Intelligence

Philosophies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 24
Author(s):  
Steven Umbrello ◽  
Stefan Lorenz Sorgner
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Embodied Cognition ◽  
Information Integration ◽  
Physical State ◽  
Conscious State ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Machine Consciousness

Strong arguments have been formulated that the computational limits of disembodied artificial intelligence (AI) will, sooner or later, be a problem that needs to be addressed. Similarly, convincing cases for how embodied forms of AI can exceed these limits makes for worthwhile research avenues. This paper discusses how embodied cognition brings with it other forms of information integration and decision-making consequences that typically involve discussions of machine cognition and similarly, machine consciousness. N. Katherine Hayles’s novel conception of nonconscious cognition in her analysis of the human cognition-consciousness connection is discussed in relation to how nonconscious cognition can be envisioned and exacerbated in embodied AI. Similarly, this paper offers a way of understanding the concept of suffering in a way that is different than the conventional sense of attributing it to either a purely physical state or a conscious state, instead of grounding at least a type of suffering in this form of cognition.

Towards a computational theory of social groups: A finite set of cognitive primitives for representing any and all social groups in the context of conflict

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-62
Author(s):  
David Pietraszewski
Keyword(s):  
Social Group ◽  
Group Representation ◽  
Social Groups ◽  
Study Groups ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Computational Theory ◽  
Mistaken Belief ◽  
Finite Set ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of

Abstract We don't yet have adequate theories of what the human mind is representing when it represents a social group. Worse still, many people think we do. This mistaken belief is a consequence of the state of play: Until now, researchers have relied on their own intuitions to link up the concept social group on the one hand, and the results of particular studies or models on the other. While necessary, this reliance on intuition has been purchased at considerable cost. When looked at soberly, existing theories of social groups are either (i) literal, but not remotely adequate (such as models built atop economic games), or (ii) simply metaphorical (typically a subsumption or containment metaphor). Intuition is filling in the gaps of an explicit theory. This paper presents a computational theory of what, literally, a group representation is in the context of conflict: it is the assignment of agents to specific roles within a small number of triadic interaction types. This “mental definition” of a group paves the way for a computational theory of social groups—in that it provides a theory of what exactly the information-processing problem of representing and reasoning about a group is. For psychologists, this paper offers a different way to conceptualize and study groups, and suggests that a non-tautological definition of a social group is possible. For cognitive scientists, this paper provides a computational benchmark against which natural and artificial intelligences can be held.

Voltaire, Philosopher of Human Progress

PMLA ◽  
1959 ◽  
Vol 74 (4-Part1) ◽  
pp. 356-364
Author(s):  
Virgil W. Topazio
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
The Other ◽  
Single Addition ◽  
The One ◽  
Natural Philosophers ◽  
Popular Consent ◽  
Positive Knowledge ◽  
Separate Discipline

With the emergence of philosophy in the nineteenth century as a separate discipline which stressed primarily questions insoluble by empirical or formal methods, Voltaire's reputation as a philosopher has gone into gradual eclipse. It has become unfashionable and degrading for philosophers to concern themselves with the practical aspects of philosophical enquiry. In eighteenth-century France, on the other hand, the identification of philosophy with science, which by twentieth-century standards had vitiated philosophical thought, produced the “philosophes” or natural philosophers who were on the whole more interested in human progress than in the progress of the human mind. And Voltaire was by popular consent the leader of this “philosophe” group, the one who had unquestionably contributed the most in the struggle to make man a happier and freer member of society. Yet, ironically, despite a lifelong effort in behalf of humanity, Voltaire's reputation as a destructive thinker has steadily grown even as the critics have pejoratively classified him as a “practical” rather than a “real” philosopher. Typical of this criticism of Voltaire is Macaulay's statement: “Voltaire could not build: he could only pull down: he was the very Vitruvius of ruin. He has bequeathed to us not a single doctrine to be called by his name, not a single addition to the stock of our positive knowledge.”

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