Petrus Thomae — an Early Follower of Duns Scotus, Minorite from Barcelona and Author of Metaphysical Treatises

The article serves as a historical-philosophical introduction to the Russian translation of the Latin text of the 11th question of the metaphysical treatise of Peter Thomae, OFM “De modis distinctionum” (written around 1325). We present therein the biography of this Franciscan theologian and philosopher from Barcelona, list and briefly characterize all his works that have come down to us (together with their respective editions). The article also shows why the metaphysical legacy of this early follower of John Duns Scotus is of particular importance. Then we outline and characterize the general structure of the whole treatise and of the quaestio to which the text we publish belongs. In conclusion, we describe the type of the Latin original that served as the basis for our translation, namely the collated text of three manuscripts from the 14th century and of one from the 15th century.

Interpreting Duns Scotus

John Duns Scotus is commonly recognized as one of the most original thinkers of medieval philosophy. His influence on subsequent philosophers and theologians is enormous and extends well beyond the limits of the Middle Ages. His thought, however, might be intimidating for the non-initiated, because of the sheer number of topics he touched on and the difficulty of his style. The eleven essays collected here, especially written for this volume by some of the leading scholars in the field, take the reader through various topics, including Duns Scotus's intellectual environment, his argument for the existence of God, and his conceptions of modality, order, causality, freedom, and human nature. This volume provides a reliable point of entrance to the thought of Duns Scotus while giving a snapshot of some of the best research that is now being done on this difficult but intellectually rewarding thinker.

Metaphysics of a forgotten tradition I. Introduction of the concept of “intrinsic modus of thing” by John Duns Scotus: From the theological explication of “infinity” to the metaphysical problem of “contraction of being”

The article is the first part of a study on the notion of the “intrinsic modus” of thing or reality in the metaphysics of the early Scotist tradition (first quarter of the 14th century). This part of the study analyses the circumstances of the first formulation of the notion of “modus intrinsecus” in the theological writings of John Duns Scotus and identifies two main (and one additional) contexts for Scotus’s explication of this concept, which will be important for the subsequent Scotistic tradition of meta[1]physics. The article then puts forward a hypothesis about a historical shift in the use of this concept based on an analysis of Scotus’s texts. Scotus initially introduces it solely for a theological explanation of the concept of “infinite being”, but later, in connection with his discussion of the reality of the concept of being, uses the concept of intrinsic mode as key to his own solution to the metaphysical problem of the “contraction” of the transcendental concept of being, which he thinks of as a particular “modification”. Finally, the article identifies the main structural elements in Scotus’s discussion of “intrinsic mode” and attempts to present the content of this concept by distinguishing between intrinsic mode and Scotus’s other related metaphysical concepts (quiddity, difference, property).

Medieval Modal Spaces

There is often said to be something peculiar about the history of modal theory up until the turn of the fourteenth century, when John Duns Scotus decisively reframed the issues. I wish to argue that this impression of dramatic discontinuity is almost entirely a misimpression. Premodern philosophers prescind from the wide-open modal space of all possible worlds because they seek to adapt their modal discourse to the explanatory and linguistic demands of their context.

Accounting for the Whole: Why Pantheism is on a Metaphysical Par with Complex Theism

Pantheists are often accused of lacking a sufficient account of the unity of the cosmos and its supposed priority over its many parts. I argue that complex theists, those who think that God has ontologically distinct parts or attributes, face the same problems. Current proposals for the metaphysics of complex theism do not offer any greater unity or ontological independence than pantheism, since they are modeled on priority monism. I then discuss whether the formal distinction of John Duns Scotus offers a way forward for complex theists. I show that only those classical theists who affirm divine simplicity are better off with respect to aseity and unity than pantheists. Only proponents of divine simplicity can fairly claim to have found a fully independent ultimate being.