Empirical Implications of Signaling Models: Estimation of Belief Updating in International Crisis Bargaining

2010 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 381-402 ◽  
Author(s):  
Taehee Whang

Signaling models are ubiquitous in political science. An essential characteristic of these models is that actors can update their beliefs about their opponents. An actor observes the behavior of his opponent, and this behavior functions as a signal that allows the actor to learn more about his opponent's true “type.” As a result, the actor is able to adapt his own behavior. Current statistical models of strategic choice based on perfect Bayesian equilibrium, however, allow for very little, if any, belief updating. I explain why current models allow for little updating and offer in their stead a new, fully strategic choice estimator that calculates the correct amount of belief updating.

2006 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Wand

Testing the fit of competing equilibrium solutions to extensive form games crucially depends on assumptions about the distribution of player types. To illustrate the importance of these assumptions for differentiating standard statistical models of strategic choice, I draw on a game previously analyzed by Lewis and Schultz (2003). The differences that they highlight between a pair of perfect Bayesian equilibrium and quantal response equilibrium models are not produced by signaling and updating dynamics as claimed, but are instead produced by different assumptions about the distribution of player types. The method of analysis developed and the issues raised are applicable to a broad range of structural models of conflict and bargaining.


2010 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 627-660 ◽  
Author(s):  
Todd S. Sechser

AbstractStates typically issue compellent threats against considerably weaker adversaries, yet their threats often fail. Why? Expanding on a standard model of international crisis bargaining, I argue that a theory of reputation-building can help shed light on this puzzle. The model casts reputation as a strategic problem, showing that challengers issuing compellent threats have incentives to anticipate the reputation costs that target states incur when appeasing aggressors. If challengers can recognize these costs and offset them with side payments or smaller demands, then even reputation-conscious targets will acquiesce. I argue, however, that military strength contributes to information problems that make challengers more likely to underestimate their targets' reputation costs and insufficiently compensate them. In this way, military power can undermine the effectiveness of compellent threats. The logic is illustrated by the 1939 Russo-Finnish crisis, and the argument's implications for the study of coercive diplomacy are explored.


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