scholarly journals On the Existence of Monotone Pure-Strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Games with Complementarities

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Mensch
Keyword(s):  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium ◽  
Bayesian Equilibrium

Comparing Models of Strategic Choice: The Role of Uncertainty and Signaling

2006 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Wand
Keyword(s):  
Statistical Models ◽  
Structural Models ◽  
Strategic Choice ◽  
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Equilibrium Models ◽  
Extensive Form ◽  
Bayesian Equilibrium

Testing the fit of competing equilibrium solutions to extensive form games crucially depends on assumptions about the distribution of player types. To illustrate the importance of these assumptions for differentiating standard statistical models of strategic choice, I draw on a game previously analyzed by Lewis and Schultz (2003). The differences that they highlight between a pair of perfect Bayesian equilibrium and quantal response equilibrium models are not produced by signaling and updating dynamics as claimed, but are instead produced by different assumptions about the distribution of player types. The method of analysis developed and the issues raised are applicable to a broad range of structural models of conflict and bargaining.

scholarly journals Outsourcing under incomplete information

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tarun Kabiraj ◽  
Uday Bhanu Sinha
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Fixed Cost ◽  
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Bayesian Equilibrium ◽  
Plant Level

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to show that outsourcing can occur as outcome of a separating or pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium although it is not profitable under complete information. Therefore, asymmetric information can itself be a reason for outsourcing. Design/methodology/approach The present paper constructs a model of two firms interacting in the product market under asymmetric information where one firm has private information about its technological capability, and it has the option to produce inputs in-house or buy inputs from an input market. However, using outsourced inputs involves a fixed cost at the plant level. The model solves for perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Findings There are situations when under complete information, outsourcing of the input will not occur, but, under incomplete information, either only the low-cost type or both high and low-cost types will go for outsourcing, and there always exist reasonable beliefs supporting these equilibria. In particular, when the fixed cost is neither too small not too large, a separating equilibrium occurs in which the low-cost type outsources inputs from the input market but the high-cost type produces in-house; hence, outsourcing signals the firm’s type. Outsourcing by only the high-cost type firm will never occur in equilibrium. Originality/value That incomplete or asymmetric information can itself be a reason for strategic outsourcing is never identified in the literature. The present paper is an attempt to fill this gap and raise the issue of outsourcing in an incomplete information environment.

scholarly journals A Discretionary Lane-Changing Decision-Making Mechanism Incorporating Drivers’ Heterogeneity: A Signalling Game-Based Approach

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Haipeng Shao ◽  
Miaoran Zhang ◽  
Tao Feng ◽  
Yifan Dong
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium ◽  
Lane Changing ◽  
Time To Collision ◽  
Mixed Traffic Flow ◽  
Bayesian Equilibrium ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
Payoff Functions ◽  
Comparative Results ◽  
Decision Making Model

This paper attempts to propose a discretionary lane-changing decision-making model based on signalling game in the context of mixed traffic flow of autonomous and regular vehicles. The effects of the heterogeneity among different drivers and the endogeneity of same drivers in lane-changing behaviours, e.g., aggressive or conservative, are incorporated through the specification of different payoff functions under different scenarios. The model is calibrated and validated using the NGSIM dataset with a bilevel calibration framework, including two kinds of methods, genetic algorithm and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Comparative results based on simulation show that the signalling game-based model outperforms the traditional space-based lane-changing model in the sense that the proposed model yields relatively stable reciprocal of time to collision and higher success rate of lane-changing under different traffic densities. Finally, a sensitivity analysis is performed to test the robustness of the proposed model, which indicates that the signalling game-based model is stable to the varying ratios of driver type.

scholarly journals Implementation Mechanism of Automated Reconciliation for Web Services Protocols

2011 ◽  
Vol 2-3 ◽  
pp. 604-607
Author(s):  
Hai Dong Yu ◽  
Ying Zou ◽  
Fang Liu
Keyword(s):  
Web Services ◽  
Web Service ◽  
Peer To Peer ◽  
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium ◽  
Dynamic Interactions ◽  
Full Characterization ◽  
Complex Interactions ◽  
Bayesian Equilibrium ◽  
Trading Partners

The paper mainly researched the game actions among partners in complex interactions supported by Web Service. It studied web service provider’s implementation decision satisfied with perfect Bayesian equilibrium thus results a controllable equilibrium route in voluntary implementation. It also contributes to the problem of voluntary implementation when the planner is also a player and finds out the full characterization of it. So the implementation mechanism can always get the reconciliation of web service, which is able to effectively facilitate dynamic interactions among trading partners in a peer to peer mode.

scholarly journals On the notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium

Top ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 128-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julio González-Díaz ◽  
Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez
Keyword(s):  
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium ◽  
Bayesian Equilibrium
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