Two Methodological Worlds Apart? Praises and Critiques from a European Comparativist

2006 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 332-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benoît Rihoux

Social scientists who strive to reflect on their research “while they're doing it” (Becker 1998) live in very fortunate times. On the one hand, it seems as if an increasing number of scholars want to do a little more than simply apply ready-made recipes. On the other hand, a few key volumes have recently been published that move beyond ready-made recipes. In my personal top three, I would most probably place Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003), George and Bennett (2005), and—last but not least—the volume discussed in this symposium. What distinguishes Rethinking Social Inquiry (RSI) from the two other volumes, in my view, is that it has a broader agenda and hence a broader ambition.

1929 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-221
Author(s):  
T. M. Lowry

Two alternative views have been expressed in regard to the configuration of quadrivalent atoms. On the one hand le Bel and van't Hoff assigned to quadrivalent carbon a tetrahedral configuration, which has since been confirmed by the X-ray analysis of the diamond. On the other hand, Werner in 1893 adopted an octahedral configuration for radicals of the type MA6, e.g. inand then suggested that “the molecules [MA4]X2 are incomplete molecules [MA6]X2. The radicals [MA4] result from the octahedrally-conceived radicals [MA6] by loss of two groups A, but with no function-change of the acid residue…. They behave as if the bivalent metallic atom in the centre of the octahedron could no longer bind all six of the groups A and lost two of them leaving behind the fragment [MA4]” (p. 303).


1862 ◽  
Vol 7 (40) ◽  
pp. 461-494 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry Maudsley

As it has ever been the custom of man to act as if he were eternal, and lavishly to scatter the limited force which he embodies as though the supply were inexhaustible, it produces no unaccustomed surprise to witness the useless expenditure of force which is so frequently made at the present time. It may even, perhaps, be deemed a token of some modesty, that the being, who since his first formation has been continually occupied in metaphysical regions with the investigation of the origin of all things, should be content for a while to amuse himself with physical theories concerning his own origin. That which is to be regretted in the new and comparatively praiseworthy occupation is the old evil of hasty theorizing on the one hand, and on the other hand, the evil, scarcely less ancient, of an impetuous eagerness to demolish any theory, however plausible, which comes athwart a favourite prejudice. What though the anatomist does discover a very close resemblance and very slight differences between the structure of a gorilla and the structure of a human being; there is no need, on that account, that mankind in a feeling of injured dignity should angrily rouse up and disclaim the undesired relationship. Whatever may be said or written, it is quite plain after all that a man is not a gorilla, and that a gorilla is not a man; it is furthermore manifest that gorillas do not breed men now-a-days, and that we have not the shadow of any evidence to guide us in forming; an opinion as to what they may have clone in times past. The negative testimony of Du Chaillu, who says that he searched in vain in the gorilla region for any intermediate race or link between it and man, scarcely adds anything to the conviction of the non-existence of any such link, which has long been universally entertained.*


Author(s):  
Michael Banton

The first theories of race were attempts to explain why the peoples of Europe (or sometimes particular peoples within Europe) had developed a higher civilization than the peoples of other regions. They attributed inequality in development to different biological inheritance, undervaluing the importance of the learning process. Between the world wars social scientists demonstrated how many apparently natural differences, and attitudes towards other groups, were not inherited but learned behaviour. They asked instead why people should entertain false ideas about members of other groups. As the twentieth century comes to an end, it is claimed on the one hand that processes of racial group formation can be explained in the same terms as those used for explaining group phenomena in general. On the other hand it is maintained that the only possible theories are those explaining why, in particular societies and at particular times, racism assumes a given form.


Author(s):  
Seth Brodsky

In the quarter century since the collapse of East Germany, the uncountable reflections that flower the media landscape inevitably turn to music. And when they do, they waffle. There is something untimely, and uncanny, about this waffling. It is as if the tensions structuring music's role in the heady days of the late 1960s were being therapeutically replayed twenty years later: 1968 yet again as the fetish object. On the one hand, music here is the fantasmatic sound of revolution itself, of truth speaking to power, and power falling to pieces under the weight of truth's irrefutable audibility, equal parts libido and righteousness. On the other hand, it is the traumatic reminder of failure, and the disenchanting premise that this “society of the spectacle” was not so powerful after all—that the revolution, in merely appearing, failed to show up. Judging from the examples of Hasselhoff, Rostropovich, and Bernstein, this chapter argues that music seems woven perfectly into a master's discourse: a process of shoring up a sovereign, of suturing itself to an empty signifier, producing a split subject, and precipitating an excessive enjoyment in the form of an object of desire.


2004 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reva Brown ◽  
Sean McCartney

All too often discussion of Capability proceeds as if it is clear what ‘Capability’ is: and that all that is required is the ascertaining of means for developing it. This paper seeks to explore the meanings of Capability. It provides two broad meanings, and discusses the paradoxes inherent in the application of these to the real world of management and business. On the one hand, Capability is defined as Potential, what the individual could achieve. Potential is an endowment, which is realised by the acquisition of skills and knowledge, i.e. the acquisition of Content. On the other hand, Capability is defined as Content: what the individual can (or has learned to) do. This Content has been acquired by, or input into, the individual, who then has the Potential to develop further. So there are different routes to Capability, depending on the definition of Capability one chooses. All of this impinges on the development of Capability. This leads us on to a consideration of whether the ‘Development of Capability’ is a meaningful concept.


Phainomenon ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-35
Author(s):  
Pedro M. S. Alves

Abstract In what follows, I intend to address an issue which is at the boundaries of the phenomenological method of reflective explication, and that, in this sense, points to some limitations of the phenomenological approach to consciousness and mind. I am referring to an aporetic situation that is at the heart of the phenomenological analysis of passivity. On the one hand, phenomenology shows, at least indirectly, a passive life that is beyond the first steps of the activity of the ego in the receptive, affective life. This is something that is beyond the rising of an ego, and from which a phenomenology of the ego-form of subjective life could be addressed. On the other hand, the analytic and conceptual tools of the phenomenological method have no grips on this basic realm of subjective life. As a result, Husserl’s analysis of passivity starts with the evidence of a pre-affective, pre-egoic realm, from which a phenomenology of the ego could be developed. However, Husserl’s analyses end up with the denegation of this dimension, as if it was invisible for the phenomenological method. As a consequence, the starting point of the analysis is not passivity proper, but rather the primitive forms of receptivity, which is already a first layer of the activity of the ego. Instead of an analysis of the ego-polarization (the “birth” of the ego), the egoic layer of conscious life is simply presupposed. A phenomenology of the ego-form is, thus, at the same time promised and denied. This aporetic situation is visible in the alteration of the concept of a passive pre-givenness in Husserl’s Analysis Concerning Passive Synthesis.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (8) ◽  
pp. 106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ferihan Polat ◽  
Ozlem Ozdesim Subay

Gezi Park Protests leaving its mark in the June of 2015, is understood from so many perspectives by national and international academicians. On the one hand, some social scientists recognize this movement as apolitical action by analyzing the identity of activist, on the other hand, some of them claims that this movement is a political one by pointing out that the aim of the movement is against the Ak Party Government especially Erdoğan himself. This study aiming to understand Gezi Park Protests puts forward that having apolitical identity of activists is not enough to recognize the movement as apolitical one and also claiming that having political action cannot be explained by the idea that the movement is just against the Ak Party Government. This study justifying that this movement cannot be explained by the idea of domestic political conflict and separation as Turkey is a part of global capitalist order, focuses on dimensions of crossing national borders. Beyond the evaluation of Gezi Park Protests as an international conspiracy, interpretation of this movement as a part of the growing public protests against the system on a global scale is a more plausible perspective to understand the multidimensional social reality.


2020 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Roland Végső

The task this essay set for itself is a reconsideration of the status of the “object” in contemporary forms of philosophical realism that postulate “flat ontologies.” I argue that the theoretical construction of the “object” often comes about in these ontologies through a fetishistic disavowal that effectively makes these objects speak. As a result, the construction of the generalized field of objectivity (according to which everything that exists is an object) passes through a double articulation. On the one hand, since contemporary realism defines itself as a rejection of all forms of linguistic idealism, it also tries to shift the focus away from human language as the primary medium of the construction of objectivity. On the other hand, however, this demotion of language proceeds in these works simultaneously with the elevation of the concept of “translation” to an ontological principle: these non-linguistic objects exist through their perpetual translations of each other. The fetishistic disavowal at work in realism (we know very well that objects do not speak, yet we act as if objectivity had to be construed as a field of translation) introduces the modality of fiction into the very heart of objectivity. This fictional dimension constitutive of objectivity can be described through an engagement of the Kantian notion of “purposiveness.” I argue that these translations that supposedly constitute objectivity rest on the fundamental presupposition that guides the entire Kantian system: we must presuppose purposiveness even where we can detect no evidence of it at all. Hence, today, the theory of the “democracy of objects” must be supplemented by its necessary correlate, a theory of the “conspiracy of objects.”


2017 ◽  
pp. 447-458
Author(s):  
Zeljko Radinkovic

This text primarily deals with Hans Vaihinger?s fiction theory. Emphasizing the central role of scientific fiction in that theory, it attempts to give a critical account of Vaihinger?s philosophical theory of ?As if?. On the one hand, this analysis of the philosophy of ?As if? includes conceptual delimitation between the notion of fiction and concepts of fantasy, hypothesis, and regulatory ideas. On the other hand, it points out to some problems related to Vaihinger?s constructivist-pragmatic approach to the problem of fiction, such as a tendency towards an unreasonable extension of the notion of fiction, and a tendency towards the integration of other forms of fictionality into scientific fiction.


2021 ◽  
pp. 96-108
Author(s):  
Karol Samsel

This article aims to reflect the potential connections between Cyprian Norwid, his literature and thoughts on Europe with the elements of the forthcoming concepts of Central Europeanism. On the one hand, the author of Vade-mecum can deliver a sensitized view of Central European multinationalism, especially in his Venetian short stories like Menego or Lord Singelworth’s Secret and meanwhile (in his political journalism, for example, Recit d’une peintre d’histoire) acts as if he was capable of efficiently understanding the first general XIX-century idea of Mitteleuropa. On the other hand, Norwid could react to the issues of Central Europeanism ambiguously and flamboyantly – among others by expressing the opinions about still primal and incestuous patriotism of Southern Slavs.


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