Duverger's Hypothesis, the Run-Off Rule, and Electoral Competition

2005 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 209-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Callander
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Principal Result ◽  
Precise Formulation ◽  
Run Off

I analyze a model of electoral competition with entry under the run-off rule. I consider both two- and multiple-party systems. The principal result is that two-party systems may prove stable under the run-off rule: I show that a continuum of equilibria exists in which only two parties enter and subsequent entry is deterred. This finding conflicts with the accepted wisdom on the run-off rule encapsulated by Duverger's Hypothesis. The results of the model are then reconciled with Duverger's Hypothesis and a more precise formulation is proposed.

Electoral Competition and the New Party System in Mexico

2005 ◽  
Vol 47 (02) ◽  
pp. 103-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph L. Klesner
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Local Level ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
The South ◽  
Opposition Party ◽  
The North ◽  
Social Bases ◽  
Ideological Differences ◽  
Opposition Parties

Abstract Mexico's former opposition parties had specific social bases that would not, on their own, have catapulted either opposition party into power. In the 1990s, specific regional bases of support developed for the parties, reflecting their efforts to develop their organizations more locally. Nationally, this led to the emergence of two parallel two-party systems, PAN-PRI competition in the north and center-west and PRD-PRI competition in the south. In parallel, a proregime-antiregime cleavage came to dominate the Mexican party system, which, combined with local-level opposition efforts to oust the PRI, created new incentives for the opposition parties to abandon past emphases on ideological differences and to act like catch-all parties instead. The regime cleavage fostered the dealignment of the Mexican electorate, a process that promoted the development of catch-all parties. Movement within the parties to behave like catch-all parties has not come without internal tensions, but electoral dynamics prove powerful inducements to catch-all behavior.

scholarly journals CENTRIST’S CURSE? AN ELECTORAL COMPETITION MODEL WITH CREDIBILITY CONSTRAINTS

2015 ◽  
Vol 60 (05) ◽  
pp. 1550055
Author(s):  
SELIM JÜRGEN ERGUN
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Competition Model ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
Policy Choice ◽  
Policy Space ◽  
Run Off ◽  
Wide Range

I analyze a model of electoral competition in which candidates’ need of credibility restricts their policy choice to a subset of the policy space, their ideology set. I focus on three party competition where candidates care about winning and their share of votes. I show that centrist parties are highly disadvantaged compared to leftist and rightist ones losing the election under a wide range of parameters. I also show that centrist parties’ winning opportunities increase under a run-off system.

You Have to Know Where to Look in Order to Find It: Competitiveness in Botswana's Dominant Party System

2012 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-126
Author(s):  
Stephanie Burchard
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
National Level ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Macro Level ◽  
Dominant Party ◽  
Electoral Outcomes ◽  
Multiparty Systems ◽  
Micro Level ◽  
Sub Saharan

Dominant party systems are defined by a lack of party alternation at the national level; however, dominant party systems do not inherently preclude electoral competition at the macro level, the micro level, or both. Nonetheless, little systematic work has documented the competitiveness of elections under a dominant party system. This article describes the nature of competition under one of sub-Saharan Africa's most enduring dominant party systems, Botswana. By examining electoral outcomes at the constituency level, this article demonstrates that elections in Botswana produce significant levels of competition, especially when compared to other sub-Saharan countries. Furthermore, electoral competitiveness appears unrelated to the party system at large: namely, competitiveness is no less or greater under dominant party systems than under multiparty systems.

scholarly journals Relationship Between Regional and National Level of Electoral Competition and Parameters of Party System Structuring in the Countries of the Visegrad Group

2019 ◽  
pp. 132-139
Author(s):  
Oleksandra Cholovska
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Political Process ◽  
National Level ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
National Elections ◽  
Regional Elections ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Visegrad Group

The vast majority of party and electoral researches, including the countries of the Visegrad Group,  focuses on the impact of elections and electoral systems on the institutionalization of parties and party systems, predominantly at the national level. However, the proposed article broadened this analysis mainly at the national level, in particular by analyzing regional elections and regional party systems. This is due to the fact that party-electoral interconnection is not one-tier, but instead is determined territorially, including territorial or administrative heterogeneity during elections. In other words, the study aims to show how region and regional elections (in the format of party system regionalization) affect the national political process, and, conversely, how national elections (in the format of party system nationalization) influence the regional political process in the context of the countries of the Visegrad Group. In this regard, the indicators of voter turnout, electoral volatility, influence of regional parties and coalitions, peculiarities and consequences of electoral blocsʼ and coalitionsʼ formation, parameters of territorial and socio-political cleavages and constructions of electoral systems and formulas were the directories of this relationship, both at national and regional levels, in the proposed study. Their use at the example of the Visegrad countries has made it possible to argue that the relationship between regional and national level of electoral competition and the parameters of the structuring of party systems in the analyzed region is largely reflected in nationalization processes at both national and regional level. Although it is theoretically found that such a relationship is bilateral and counter-dependent on the processes of regionalization of national elections and national electoral systems, or instead on nationalization of regional elections and regional party systems. Keywords: national elections, regional elections, party systems, nationalization and regionalization of party systems, the countries of the Visegrad Group.

Inequality under Authoritarian Rule

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terence K. Teo
Keyword(s):  
Income Inequality ◽  
Comparative Politics ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Turn Of The Century ◽  
Authoritarian Rule ◽  
Party Ideology ◽  
Party Institutionalization

AbstractSince the turn of the century, much comparative politics scholarship has examined whether and how income inequality affects the prospects of democratization and, to a lesser extent, whether democracy reduces inequality. What is lacking, however, is a close examination of the extent of income inequality in authoritarian regimes. This article examines the variation in inequality across authoritarian regimes and argues that electoral competition – in conjunction with party ideology and the extent of party institutionalization – helps explain the pattern of inequality under authoritarian rule. I find that electoral authoritarian (EA) regimes – regimes in which multiple parties legally compete in elections – have lower levels of inequality compared to non-EA regimes. I further find that inequality is lower in EA regimes with left-leaning ruling parties and more institutionalized party systems. This analysis highlights the value of exploring the dynamics and contingent effects of electoral competition in authoritarian regimes.

FRAGMENTATION OF REGIONALISM AS A FACTOR OF ITS DYNAMICS

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 35-45
Author(s):  
Mariya Isobchuk ◽  
Keyword(s):  
European Integration ◽  
Management System ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
The Other ◽  
Electoral Success ◽  
Niche Parties ◽  
Party Cohesion ◽  
Empirical Material ◽  
Qualitative Changes

The emergence of new arenas of representation in the context of increasing European integration and the complexity of a multilevel management system leads to qualitative changes in regionalist parties. Transforming from “niche” parties, regionalist parties acquire a new place in regional party systems, which affects the overall electoral success of the regionalist movement. At the same time, in many cases there is a fragmentation of regionalism, in some cases, the number of regionalist parties reaches ten or more. On the other hand, the tolerance of national parties towards decentralization further enhances electoral competition in the regionalist segment. The study is intended to answer the question of how the complexity of inter-party interactions affects the electoral dynamics of regionalism. Based on two competing theories (ethnic outbidding and the theory of "nested" competition "), a hypothesis is put forward on the diversification of supply as a factor favorable for the regionalism dynamics. It finds confirmation on the empirical material of the Italian autonomies (South Tyrol, Sardinia, Valle D'Aosta). At the same time, the study shows that some factors such as internal party cohesion, the coalition policy of regionalist parties, and their government status also have a significant impact on the dynamics of regionalism.

Political Competition, Partisanship, and Interpersonal Trust Under Party Dominance: Evidence from Post-Apartheid South Africa

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-111
Author(s):  
Ryan E. Carlin ◽  
Gregory J. Love ◽  
Daniel J. Young
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Political Competition ◽  
Interpersonal Trust ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Dominant Party ◽  
Opposition Party ◽  
Trust Games ◽  
Party Dominance

AbstractHow does single-party dominance influence interpersonal trust? We draw on evidence from trust games played by more than 2,000 subjects in South Africa, where, since Apartheid, race-based social enmity has persisted under democratic competition characterized by single-party dominance. We find that partisan-based trust discrimination is most pronounced for those who identify with the main opposition party and is driven by strong distrust of rival partisans. These findings underscore how electoral competition, in general, shapes trust across party lines and suggests one-sided competition, in particular, has asymmetrical effects between parties in dominant party systems. Moreover, this study provides additional evidence regarding the relative weights of trustworthiness stereotypes tied to partisanship and race.

Electoral competition in Canada among centre-left parties: liberals versus social democracts

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
David McGrane
Keyword(s):  
20Th Century ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
The Other ◽  
Policy Positions ◽  
Social Democratic ◽  
Western Countries ◽  
The Social ◽  
New Democratic Party

This chapter discusses the electoral competition in Canada among centre-left parties. In Canada, the concept of ‘centre-lefts’ has been particularly pertinent over the last decade. Roughly two-thirds of Canadian voters have values and policy positions that could be broadly defined as ‘left-of-centre’ or ‘progressive’ in Canadian parlance. Unlike other Western countries, where there is a more distinct left/right polarisation in party systems, Canada has two relatively large centre-left parties: the centrist Liberals, that has won successive majority governments during the 20th century, and the fledgling New Democratic Party (NDP), that often comes third in Canadian federal elections. The other two centre-left parties are the social democratic Bloc Québécois, who advocate for the separation of Québec from Canada, and run candidates only in that province, and the Canadian Greens, who run candidates in all constituencies but routinely struggle to elect even one MP and win more than 5 per cent of the national vote.

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