Inequality under Authoritarian Rule

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terence K. Teo
Keyword(s):  
Income Inequality ◽  
Comparative Politics ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Turn Of The Century ◽  
Authoritarian Rule ◽  
Party Ideology ◽  
Party Institutionalization

AbstractSince the turn of the century, much comparative politics scholarship has examined whether and how income inequality affects the prospects of democratization and, to a lesser extent, whether democracy reduces inequality. What is lacking, however, is a close examination of the extent of income inequality in authoritarian regimes. This article examines the variation in inequality across authoritarian regimes and argues that electoral competition – in conjunction with party ideology and the extent of party institutionalization – helps explain the pattern of inequality under authoritarian rule. I find that electoral authoritarian (EA) regimes – regimes in which multiple parties legally compete in elections – have lower levels of inequality compared to non-EA regimes. I further find that inequality is lower in EA regimes with left-leaning ruling parties and more institutionalized party systems. This analysis highlights the value of exploring the dynamics and contingent effects of electoral competition in authoritarian regimes.

scholarly journals Party System Institutionalization in Democracies

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Mainwaring ◽  
Fernando Bizzarro ◽  
Aaron Watanabe ◽  
María Victoria De Negri
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Party System ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Democratic Regimes ◽  
System Collapse ◽  
Party System Institutionalization ◽  
Party Institutionalization ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Democratic Elections

Party systems vary in many dimensions. Variation in the stability and predictability of the party system in democratic elections is captured by the concept of Party System Institutionalization (PSI). Where the party system is stable and predictable, it is institutionalized. Where it is in flux and major new contenders regularly appear, the party system lacks institutionalization. Fundamental differences among party systems revolve around the level of institutionalization. Institutionalized systems make governing easier, lower the probability of populists winning office, promote greater economic growth, and are associated with better public policy. Many scholars who work on Latin America, the post-Soviet region, Africa, and Asia have employed the concept “party system institutionalize” to analyze these regions. Because party systems do not develop in a linear way, in some cases this means the study of deinstitutionalization. When deinstitutionalization happens abruptly, it is called party system collapse or party collapse. The article focuses on PSI, erosion, and collapse in democratic regimes; a different literature analyzes party institutionalization under authoritarian regimes.

scholarly journals Inequality, policy polarization and the income gap in turnout

2021 ◽  
pp. 135406882110119
Author(s):  
Matthew Polacko
Keyword(s):  
Income Inequality ◽  
Low Income ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Income Gap ◽  
Income Groups ◽  
Logistic Regressions ◽  
Negative Impacts ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

Previous research into the relationship between income inequality and turnout inequality has produced mixed results, as consensus is lacking whether inequality reduces turnout for all income groups, low-income earners, or no one. Therefore, this paper builds on this literature by introducing supply-side logic, through the first individual-level test of the impact that income inequality (moderated by policy manifesto positions) has on turnout. It does so through multilevel logistic regressions utilizing mixed effects, on a sample of 30 advanced democracies in 102 elections from 1996 to 2016. It finds that higher levels of income inequality significantly reduce turnout and widen the turnout gap between rich and poor. However, it also finds that when party systems are more polarized, low-income earners are mobilized the greatest extent coupled with higher inequality, resulting in a significantly reduced income gap in turnout. The findings magnify the negative impacts income inequality can exert on political behavior and contribute to the study of policy offerings as a key moderating mechanism in the relationship.

scholarly journals Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism

1995 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 289-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Tsebelis
Keyword(s):  
Policy Change ◽  
Comparative Politics ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Veto Players ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Policy Positions ◽  
Veto Player ◽  
Collective Actors ◽  
Parliamentary Systems ◽  
Presidential Systems

The article compares different political systems with respect to one property: their capacity to produce policy change. I define the basic concept of the article, the ‘veto player’: veto players are individual or collective actors whose agreement (by majority rule for collective actors) is required for a change of the status quo. Two categories of veto players are identified in the article: institutional and partisan. Institutional veto players (president, chambers) exist in presidential systems while partisan veto players (parties) exist at least in parliamentary systems. Westminster systems, dominant party systems and single-party minority governments have only one veto player, while coalitions in parliamentary systems, presidential or federal systems have multiple veto players. The potential for policy change decreases with the number of veto players, the lack of congruence (dissimilarity of policy positions among veto players) and the cohesion (similarity of policy positions among the constituent units of each veto player) of these players. The veto player framework produces results different from existing theories in comparative politics, but congruent with existing empirical studies. In addition, it permits comparisons across different political and party systems. Finally, the veto player framework enables predictions about government instability (in parliamentary systems) or regime instability (in presidential systems); these predictions are supported by available evidence.

scholarly journals The State of Human Rights and Political Freedoms in Belarus: Was the Crisis Inevitable?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nina Kolarzik ◽  
◽  
Aram Terzyan
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
The State ◽  
Political Control ◽  
Political Crisis ◽  
The Political ◽  
Authoritarian Rule ◽  
Political Freedoms

The rule of Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus has created one of the most resilient authoritarian regimes in post-communist Europe. Meanwhile, the turmoil triggered by the 2020 presidential election has put in the spotlight the mounting challenges facing Lukashenko’s authoritarian rule. This paper investigates the state of human rights and political freedoms in Belarus, focusing on the main rationale behind the turmoil surrounding the 2020 presidential election. It concludes that the political crisis following the elections is the unsurprising consequence of Lukashenko’s diminishing ability to maintain power or concentrate political control by preserving elite unity, controlling elections, and/or using force against opponents.

Ethnic Group Inequality, Partisan Networks, and Political Clientelism

2018 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 329-341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi-ting Wang ◽  
Kiril Kolev
Keyword(s):  
Social Networks ◽  
Income Inequality ◽  
Ethnic Group ◽  
Ethnic Groups ◽  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Ethnic Organizations ◽  
Mere Presence ◽  
Electoral Mobilization ◽  
Group Inequality

How do ethnic group divisions affect parties’ linkage strategies? The provision of private or local club goods favoring co-ethnics by politicians has been well documented in the literature. However, whether clientelism tends to be more widespread in ethnically highly fragmented societies has not been systematically examined. Utilizing a dataset that includes information on more than 450 parties in eighty competitive party systems, we show that the mere presence of multiple ethnic groups does not lead to more clientelistic exchange. Nevertheless, in countries characterized by high levels of economic inequality between politically relevant ethnic groups, parties are more likely to rely on clientelistic strategies to attract votes. In addition, this positive relationship between ethnic income inequality and clientelism is contingent on parties’ ties to ethnic social networks. Specifically, in ethnically unequal societies, parties that can rely on existing ethnic organizations particularly engage in clientelistic modes of electoral mobilization.

Diminished Parties

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Comparative Politics ◽  
Political Representation ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Analytical Tool ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Developing Democracies ◽  
Party Organizations ◽  
Definition Of

Many contemporary party organizations are failing to fulfill their representational role in contemporary democracies. While political scientists tend to rely on a minimalist definition of political parties (groups of candidates that compete in elections), this volume argues that this misses how parties can differ not only in degree but also in kind. With a new typology of political parties, the authors provide a new analytical tool to address the role of political parties in democratic functioning and political representation. The empirical chapters apply the conceptual framework to analyze seventeen parties across Latin America. The authors are established scholars expert in comparative politics and in the cases included in the volume. The book sets an agenda for future research on parties and representation, and it will appeal to those concerned with the challenges of consolidating stable and programmatic party systems in developing democracies.

News reception and authoritarian control in a hybrid media system: Russian TV viewers and the Russia-Ukraine conflict

Politics ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 026339572110414
Author(s):  
Maxim Alyukov
Keyword(s):  
Digital Media ◽  
Television News ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Authoritarian Rule ◽  
Additional Information ◽  
Cross Media ◽  
Media System ◽  
Media Environments ◽  
Media Systems ◽  
Media Repertoires

Authoritarian regimes attempt to control the circulation of political information. Scholars have identified many mechanisms through which actors can use broadcast and digital media to challenge or sustain authoritarian rule. However, while contemporary media environments are characterised by the integration of older and newer forms of communication, little is known about how authoritarian regimes use different media simultaneously to shape citizens’ perceptions. In order to address this issue, this study relies on focus groups and investigates Russian TV viewers’ cross-media repertoires and their reception of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. It argues that some citizens evaluate state-aligned television narratives as more credible when they are reinforced by similar narratives in digital media. Citizens’ reactions to this synchronisation are predicated on their type of media use. For not very active news consumers, the reliance on digital media can verify the regime’s narratives in television news. Others can escape the synchronisation effect by actively searching online for additional information or not using digital media for news. These findings show how authoritarian regimes can utilise the advantages of hybrid media systems to shape citizens’ perceptions and specify the conditions under which citizens can escape the effects of the regime’s simultaneous use of different media.

Comparative authoritarian institutionalism, regime evolution, and stability in North Korea

2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 367-385 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick McEachern
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Literature ◽  
Comparative Politics ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Political Structure ◽  
Policy Choices ◽  
Regime Stability ◽  
Political Evolution ◽  
The One ◽  
Cross National

The cross-national comparative politics literature on authoritarian regimes has advanced rapidly in recent years, providing fresh insights into regime longevity, potential for successful democratization, and derivative policy choices. The study of North Korea’s politics has likewise advanced, albeit largely without reference to this budding literature. Given the paucity of data on North Korea, this article reviews and leverages the budding comparative literature to bring new perspectives on perennial debates on North Korean regime stability. The article argues the comparative literature fails to capture evolution in authoritarian regimes, including North Korea, suggesting areas for theoretical improvement. It documents political evolution in Kim Jong Un’s North Korea and draws upon cross-national findings to show how and why the one-party political structure, personalist elements, and hereditary succession identified in this analysis are stabilizing elements for the regime.

scholarly journals Policy Polarization, Income Inequality and Turnout

2020 ◽  
pp. 003232172090658
Author(s):  
Matthew Polacko ◽  
Oliver Heath ◽  
Michael S Lewis-Beck ◽  
Ruth Dassonneville
Keyword(s):  
Income Inequality ◽  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Party System ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Past Research ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
National Elections ◽  
Country Level ◽  
Established Democracies ◽  
The Relationship

Past research on the relationship between income inequality and turnout has produced mixed results, with some studies suggesting that income inequality leads to lower turnout while other studies find little or no significant effects. In this article, we investigate the extent to which these mixed results are due to the contingent nature of inequality on turnout, which depends upon the nature of the policy options that are presented to the electorate. We test these expectations on data from national elections in 30 established democracies from 1965 through 2017 covering 300 elections. Regression analysis using country-level fixed effects reveals consistent evidence in favor of our hypotheses: Inequality tends to have a negative impact on turnout, especially in depolarized party systems, but as party system polarization increases the negative impact of inequality is mitigated.

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