Immunity to Error through Misidentification: New Essays, edited by Simon Prosser and Francois Recanati

Mind ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 123 (492) ◽  
pp. 1228-1234
Author(s):  
K. Musholt
Keyword(s):  
François Recanati

PRAGMATICS: CRITICAL CONCEPTS. VOL. 1: DAWN AND DELINEATION. VOL. 2: SPEECH ACT THEORY AND PARTICULAR SPEECH ACTS. VOL. 3: INDEXICALS AND REFERENCE. VOL. 4: PRESUPPOSITION, IMPLICATURE, AND INDIRECT SPEECH ACTS. VOL. 5: COMMUNICATION, INTERACTION, AND DISCOURSE. VOL. 6: PRAGMATICS: GRAMMAR, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SOCIOLOGY.Asa Kasher (Ed.). London: Routledge, 1998. Vol. 1: Pp. xi + 154. Vol. 2: Pp. vi + 511. Vol. 3: Pp. 217. Vol. 4: Pp. vi + 722. Vol. 5: Pp. vi + 490. Vol. 6: Pp. vi + 559. $905.00 cloth.

2000 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 120-122
Author(s):  
Susan Foster-Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Second Language Acquisition ◽  
Language Acquisition ◽  
Speech Acts ◽  
First Language ◽  
Free Standing ◽  
Philosophical Approach ◽  
Indirect Speech Acts ◽  
Dan Sperber ◽  
Paul Grice ◽  
François Recanati

This six-volume, beautifully bound, boxed set contains 112 reprinted papers covering the history and development of modern theoretical pragmatics from its beginnings back in the 1940s and '50s with Charles Morris, Rudolf Camap, Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, via the major works in the 1970s of those such as Stalnaker, Bach and Hamish, J. L. Austin, John Searle, and Paul Grice, to the more recent contributions of, among many others, Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, François Recanati, and Anna Wierzbicka. The bulk of the contributions, either free-standing papers or sections from books, come out of what one might term a philosophical approach to pragmatics, but toward the end of the collection there is an attempt to cover more ethnographically rooted approaches and even to get into applied pragmatic issues related to aphasia, first language acquisition, second language acquisition (one paper), and politics.

scholarly journals Literal Meaning de François Recanati

2006 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 263
Author(s):  
Steven Davis
Keyword(s):  
Literal Meaning ◽  
François Recanati

scholarly journals What Can Modes Do for (Moderate) Relativism?

2010 ◽  
Vol 42 (124) ◽  
pp. 77-100
Author(s):  
Teresa Marques
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
François Recanati ◽  
Oxford University Press

François Recanati, Perspectival Thought: A Plea for (Moderate) Relativism, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, 308 pp.

Jules Vuillemin et la philosophie analytique

2020 ◽  
Vol 141 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 11-33
Author(s):  
François Recanati
Keyword(s):  
Il Y A ◽  
François Recanati

Résumé Dans cette communication, qui reprend en partie les idées exposées il y a trente ans dans un article de Critique, François Recanati entreprend de caractériser la philosophie analytique en discutant une demi-douzaine de traits supposés distinctifs de la discipline : l’usage de la logique, l’importance de la philosophie du langage considérée comme philosophie première, le refus de réduire la philosophie à l’histoire de la philosophie, l’idée que la philosophie est une discipline de second niveau, l’idée qu’un progrès est possible en philosophie, ou encore – trait fondamental selon l’auteur – le caractère intersubjectif de la pratique analytique, qui rappelle la pratique scientifique et constitue ce que François Recanati appelle « l’esprit scientifique » de la philosophie analytique. A chaque étape du parcours, l’auteur s’interroge sur les aspects de cette philosophie qui pouvaient susciter des réserves de la part de Jules Vuillemin, malgré son admiration globale pour ce courant.

Truth-Conditional Pragmatics, by Francois Recanati

Mind ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 123 (492) ◽  
pp. 1234-1238 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Lewis
Keyword(s):  
Truth Conditional ◽  
François Recanati

scholarly journals Local pragmatics: Issues and reflection

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 118
Author(s):  
Qiao Huang
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Development ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Conversational Implicature ◽  
Semantics And Pragmatics ◽  
Embedded Structure ◽  
François Recanati ◽  
Shed Light

Pragmatic effects triggered by embedded structure have caused problems to Grice’s Theory of Conversational Implicature. This long-standing view is challenged by local pragmatics proposed by Mandy Simons. As to the theoretical development, Robyn Carston, Francois Recanati, and Emma Borg respectively raise their comments, while Simons positively responds to these commentaries and further elaborates her stance. In this article, the argumentation among these scholars is presented first, and much attention is paid to the value and influence of the argumentation, which would shed light on the current debate between semantics and pragmatics.

Reply to François Recanati

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Question ◽  
Present Contribution ◽  
Post War ◽  
Detailed Work ◽  
François Recanati

In his present contribution François Recanati has said some very kind things about me and some very astute things about language. He recognizes something new and important which came into prominence, and enjoyed its heyday, at least in Anglophone philosophy, roughly in a post-war period stretching up to around Austin’s death in 1962. This was a period marked by a new sort of conception of what a philosophical question might be, and how one might coherently be formulated—of what philosophy ought to look like. He recognizes, too, those waiting in the wings to turn the clock back to a time of what they saw as a less complicated, more straightforward, and more comfortable form of philosophy; one in which we need not question ourselves, and our own ability to find our way about, to the extent that Austin and Wittgenstein asked us to do. Austin’s death was a signal to such philosophers to launch their attack. And Recanati has done much detailed work to show how such attacks—ones deploying such things as ‘the Geach point’ and Grice’s deployment of the notion implicature—come up short. What I will aim for here is to place what he sees in a somewhat wider setting. In it some of his main points can be supported in a slightly different way. I will also come to one point, at the end, on which, as frequent allies as we are, we part company....

Descriptive Names and Singular Thought

2020 ◽  
pp. 38-51
Author(s):  
Marga Reimer
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Singular Thought ◽  
Mental File ◽  
Gareth Evans ◽  
David Kaplan ◽  
Potential Sources ◽  
Descriptive Names ◽  
François Recanati ◽  
Apparent Disagreement ◽  
Singular Thoughts

This chapter is concerned with an apparent disagreement between Gareth Evans (1982) and David Kaplan (1989) with regard to the capacities of names introduced into the language by describing their referents. The question at issue is whether such expressions are potential sources of novel singular thought. While Evans’ response is an emphatic “no,” Kaplan’s response is an equally emphatic “yes.” The chapter attempts to resolve (or rather dissolve) this apparent dispute by suggesting that the two philosophers have importantly different phenomena in mind when they talk of “thoughts”—including (and in particular) singular thoughts. Whereas Evans construes thoughts as mental states, Kaplan construes them as semantic contents. Before concluding, it argues for the superiority of the proposed resolution of the Evans/Kaplan debate over that of Francois Recanati (2012), who invokes his Mental File Framework in an attempt to reconcile the seemingly contrary views of Evans and Kaplan.

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