Truth-Conditional Pragmatics, by Francois Recanati

This book gives a compositional, truth‐conditional, crosslinguistic semantics for evidentials set in a theory of the semantics for sentential mood. Central to this semantics is a proposal about a distinction between what propositional content is at‐issue, roughly primary or proffered, and what content is not‐at‐issue. Evidentials contribute not‐at‐issue content, more specifically what I will call a not‐at‐issue restriction. In addition, evidentials can affect the level of commitment a sentence makes to the main proposition, contributed by sentential mood. Building on recent work in the formal semantics of evidentials and related phenomena, the proposed semantics does not appeal to separate dimensions of illocutionary meaning. Instead, I argue that all sentences make three contributions: at‐issue content, not‐at‐issue content, and an illocutionary relation. At‐issue content is presented, made available for subsequent anaphora, but is not directly added to the common ground. Not‐at‐issue content directly updates the common ground. The illocutionary relation uses the at‐issue content to impose structure on the common ground, which, depending on the clause type (e.g., declarative, interrogative), can trigger further updates. Empirical support for this proposal comes from Cheyenne (Algonquian, primary data from the author’s fieldwork), English, and a wide variety of languages that have been discussed in the literature on evidentials.

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Slurs, Assertion, and Predication

The Oxford Handbook of Assertion ◽

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.32 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 286-305

Author(s):

Christopher Hom

Keyword(s):

Careful Examination ◽

Conventional Implicature ◽

Literal Truth ◽

Truth Conditional

A multidimensional account of the meanings of slurs holds that a slur has both literal, truth-conditional content (which is neutral) and conventional implicature (which is derogatory). This chapter offers a careful examination of the motivations and commitments for a multidimensional account and argues that the theoretic costs for such a view are prohibitive. One of the primary motivations for a multidimensional account over a purely truth-conditional account is the apparent wide-scoping phenomenon of slurs (e.g., that derogatory content does not seem cancellable under negation). The chapter argues that carefully distinguishing between predication and assertion not only dispels the misconception that the phenomena in question is centrally about scope but also vindicates the purely truth-conditional account as a more general and unified explanation.

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Expressivism and Crossed Disagreements

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement ◽

10.1017/s1358246119000092 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 86 ◽

pp. 111-132

Author(s):

Javier Osorio ◽

Neftali Villanueva

Keyword(s):

Semantic Theory ◽

Semantic Level ◽

Semantic Account ◽

Evaluative Language ◽

Truth Conditional ◽

Pragmatic Strategies

AbstractThe purpose of this paper is to explore the connection between expressivism and disagreement. More in particular, the aim is to defend that one of the desiderata that can be derived from the study of disagreement, the explanation of ‘crossed disagreements’, can only be accommodated within a semantic theory that respects, at the meta-semantic level, certain expressivistic restrictions. We will compare contemporary dynamic expressivism with three different varieties of contextualist strategies to accommodate the specificities of evaluative language –indexical contextualism – truth-conditional pragmatics –, pragmatic strategies using implicatures, and presuppositional accounts. Our conclusion will be that certain assumptions of expressivism are necessary in order to provide a semantic account of evaluative uses of language that can allow us to detect and prevent crossed disagreements.

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Remarks on Impure Quotation

Belgian Journal of Linguistics ◽

10.1075/bjl.17.08gom ◽

2003 ◽

Vol 17 ◽

pp. 129-151 ◽

Cited By ~ 7

Author(s):

Mario Gómez-Torrente

Keyword(s):

Singular Term ◽

Simple Rule ◽

Exact Nature ◽

Truth Conditional

Quotation marks are ambiguous, although the conventional rules that govern their different uses are similar in that they contain quantifications over quotable expressions. Pure uses are governed by a simple rule: by enclosing any expression within quotation marks one gets a singular term, the quotation, that stands for the enclosed expression. Impure uses are far less simple. In a series of uses the quotation marks conventionally indicate that (part of) the enclosed expression is a contextually appropriate version of expressions uttered by some relevant agent. When the quotation marks have this meaning, it is tempting to think of them as contributing that indication to the truth-conditional content of the utterance. I adopt a cautious attitude towards this hypothesis, for the evidence in its favor is inconclusive. In other uses the quotation marks conventionally indicate that the enclosed expression should be used not “plainly” but in some broadly speaking “distanced” way, or that it is being so used by the utterer, and typically context makes clear the exact nature of the “distance” at stake. In these cases the quotation marks do not even appear to contribute that indication to the truth-conditional content of the utterance.

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Epítetos e insultos de grupo en español: Sobre una ambigüedad y sus implicaciones sintáctico-semánticas

Studies in Hispanic and Lusophone Linguistics ◽

10.1515/shll-2021-2043 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 14 (1) ◽

pp. 161-205

Author(s):

Andrés Saab ◽

Eleonora Orlando

Keyword(s):

Analytic Philosophy ◽

Syntactic Ambiguity ◽

Structural Ambiguity ◽

Truth Conditional ◽

Expressive Content ◽

Conventional Implicatures ◽

Expressive Dimension ◽

In Virtue Of ◽

Proper Analysis ◽

The Way

Abstract In this paper, we further elaborate on a syntactic ambiguity between slurs and epithets first noticed in Orlando, Eleonora & Andrés Saab. 2020b. A stereotype semantics for syntactically ambiguous slurs. Analytic Philosophy 61(2). 101–129. Here, we discuss in detail the large theoretical implications of such an ambiguity both for the proper analysis of binominal constructions in Spanish (e.g., el idiota de Juan) and for the way in which it is advisable to model the expressive content slurs and certain epithets (those deriving from slurs) have. As for the first aspect, we contend that mainstream approaches in terms of predicate inversion for binominal constructions cannot account for why slurs lose their predicative import when occurring as epithets in binominal environments. In consequence, we propose a new analysis for epithets both in simple occurrences and in binominal constructions. This analysis derives the above-mentioned ambiguity as a type of structural ambiguity, according to which certain slurs can occur in predicative and in non-predicative positions. When they occur as predicates, they have a mixed semantics (McCready, Eric. 2010. Varieties of conventional implicatures. Semantics & Pragmatics 3. 1–57) reflected both in the truth-conditional and the expressive dimensions, but when they occur as epithets, the truth-conditional dimension is lost and only the expressive content survives. As for the second aspect, we defend a stereotype semantics, according to which stereotypes are modeled as Kratzerian modal bases (i.e., set of propositions) in virtue of which stigmatizing theories of human groups are reflected in a parallel, expressive dimension of meaning. This way of modeling some kinds of expressive contents explains how different slurs and epithets manage to communicate different theories about particular human groups, which are the target of derogation.

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Naming and Indexicality

10.1017/9781316999073 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Gregory Bochner

Keyword(s):

Philosophy Of Language ◽

Word Meaning ◽

Context Dependency ◽

Critical Survey ◽

Advanced Students ◽

Semantics And Pragmatics ◽

History Of ◽

Truth Conditional ◽

Epistemic Constraints ◽

Theories Of Meaning

How do words stand for things? Taking ideas from philosophical semantics and pragmatics, this book offers a unique, detailed, and critical survey of central debates concerning linguistic reference in the twentieth century. It then uses the survey to identify and argue for a novel version of current 'two-dimensional' theories of meaning, which generalise the context-dependency of indexical expressions. The survey highlights the history of tensions between semantic and epistemic constraints on plausible theories of word meaning, from analytic philosophy and modern truth-conditional semantics, to the Referentialist and Externalist revolutions in theories of meaning, to the more recent reconciliatory ambition of two-dimensionalists. It clearly introduces technical semantical notions, theses, and arguments, with easy-to-follow, step-by-step guides. Wide-ranging in its scope, yet offering an accessible route into literature that can seem complex and technical, this will be essential reading for advanced students, and academic researchers in semantics, pragmatics, and philosophy of language.

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Lying and Fiction

The Oxford Handbook of Lying ◽

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198736578.013.23 ◽

2018 ◽

pp. 302-314

Author(s):

Emar Maier

Keyword(s):

Speech Acts ◽

Common Ground ◽

Semantic Framework ◽

Pragmatic Analysis ◽

Truth Conditional ◽

The Common ◽

Maxim Of Quality

Lying and fiction both involve the deliberate production of statements that fail to obey Grice’s first Maxim of Quality (“do not say what you believe to be false”). The question thus arises if we can provide a uniform analysis for fiction and lies. This chapter discusses the similarities, but also some fundamental differences between lying and fiction. It argues that there is little hope for a satisfying account within a traditional truth-conditional semantic framework. Rather than immediately moving to a fully pragmatic analysis involving distinct speech acts of fiction-making and lying, the chapter first explores how far we get with the assumption that both are simply assertions, analyzed in a Stalnakerian framework, i.e., as proposals to update the common ground.

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The grammar of discourse: The case of then

Semantics and Linguistic Theory ◽

10.3765/salt.v24i0.2444 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 24 ◽

pp. 373 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Maria Biezma

Keyword(s):

Title Page ◽

The Other ◽

Discourse Structure ◽

Key Factor ◽

Truth Conditional

<div class="page" title="Page 1"><div class="layoutArea"><div class="column"><p>This paper presents an analysis of <em>then</em> that appeals to discourse structure. I argue that <em>then</em> does not make any truth-conditional contribution but rather coordinates an anaphoric relation between consecutive discourse-moves. The meaning contribution of <em>then</em> is captured in terms of felicity conditions: <em>then</em> requires that two propositions enter into a ‘causal explanatory claim’-relation in which one (the antecedent) provides the ‘reasons’ for the other (the consequent). This proposal targets <em>then</em> within conditionals and across discourse and considers discourse structure as a key factor in explaining its behavior.</p></div></div></div>

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Adults’ and Children’s Comprehension of Linguistic Disjunction

Collabra Psychology ◽

10.1525/collabra.27702 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 7 (1) ◽

Author(s):

Masoud Jasbi ◽

Michael C. Frank

Keyword(s):

Forced Choice ◽

Task Demands ◽

Mutual Knowledge ◽

Existential Sentences ◽

Alternative Hypotheses ◽

Pragmatic Reasoning ◽

Truth Conditional ◽

Forced Choice Tasks ◽

Choice Tasks ◽

Pragmatic Knowledge

Disjunction has played a major role in advancing theories of logic, language, and cognition, featuring as the centerpiece of debates on the origins and development of logical thought. Recent studies have argued that due to non-adult-like pragmatic reasoning, preschool children’s comprehension of linguistic disjunction differs from adults in two ways. First, children are more likely to interpret “or” as “and” (conjunctive interpretations); Second, children are more likely to consider a disjunction as inclusive (lack of exclusivity implicatures). We tested adults and children’s comprehension of disjunction in existential sentences using two and three-alternative forced choice tasks, and analyzed children’s spontaneous verbal reactions prior to their forced-choice judgments. Overall our results are compatible with studies that suggest children understand the basic truth-conditional semantics of disjunction. Children did not interpret “or” as “and”, supporting studies that argue conjunctive interpretations are due to task demands. In addition, even though our forced-choice tasks suggest children interpreted disjunction as inclusive, spontaneous verbal reactions showed that children were sensitive to the adult-like pragmatics of disjunction. Theoretically, these studies provide evidence against previous developmental accounts, and lend themselves to two alternative hypotheses. First, that preschool children’s pragmatic knowledge is more adult-like than previously assumed, but forced-choice judgments are not sensitive enough to capture this knowledge. Second, children may have the knowledge of the relevant lexical scale themselves, but be uncertain whether a new speaker also has this knowledge (mutual knowledge of the scale).

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