scholarly journals Get Rid of Unanimity Rule: The Superiority of Majority Rules with Veto Power

2018 ◽  
Vol 126 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laurent Bouton ◽  
Aniol Llorente-Saguer ◽  
Frédéric Malherbe
Keyword(s):  
Veto Power ◽  
Unanimity Rule ◽  
Majority Rules

scholarly journals Self-Enforcing Voting in International Organizations

2006 ◽  
Vol 96 (4) ◽  
pp. 1137-1158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giovanni Maggi ◽  
Massimo Morelli
Keyword(s):  
International Organizations ◽  
Comparative Statics ◽  
Widespread Occurrence ◽  
Unanimity Rule ◽  
Hard Time ◽  
Qualified Majority ◽  
Voting System ◽  
Majority Rules ◽  
Enforcement Mechanisms ◽  
Voting Models

Some international organizations are governed by unanimity rule, others by (simple or qualified) majority rules. Standard voting models, which assume that the decisions made by voting are perfectly enforceable, have a hard time explaining the observed variation in governance mode, and in particular the widespread occurrence of the unanimity system. We present a model whose main departure from standard voting models is that the organization cannot rely on external enforcement mechanisms: each country is sovereign and cannot be forced to comply with the collective decision or, in other words, the voting system must be self-enforcing. The model identifies conditions under which the organization adopts the unanimity rule, and yields rich comparative-statics predictions on the determinants of the mode of governance.

Executive Veto Power and Constitutional Design

2019 ◽  
pp. 93-113
Author(s):  
Nicholas R. Miller
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Model ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Constitutional Design ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Executive Veto

A “separation of powers” system provides for an executive and legislature with independent powers. While only the legislature can pass bills, executive approval is commonly required for them to become law. The executive exercises veto power by withholding approval. Executive veto power is simple if the executive can only approve a bill or reject it in its entirety; it is constructive if he can amend a bill in certain ways. It is qualified if the legislature can override a veto; it is unqualified otherwise. Any such system creates a gamelike strategic interaction between the legislature and executive. The chapter provides an expository sketch of a variety of such veto games. The analysis is based on a one-dimensional spatial model given three different behavioral assumptions: sincere behavior by both the legislature and executive, strategic behavior by both, and strategic behavior coupled with the possibility of a credible veto threat by the executive. Several extensions and qualifications are briefly noted.

The ADA and the Veto Power

1946 ◽  
Vol 1 (12) ◽  
pp. 15-16
Author(s):  
David R. Inglis
Keyword(s):  
Veto Power

Weak independence and veto power

2000 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald E. Campbell ◽  
Jerry S. Kelly
Keyword(s):  
Veto Power ◽  
Weak Independence

Integrating Power and Gradual Institutional Change in Public Relations History: The Case of the People’s University in North Carolina After the Civil War

2022 ◽  
pp. 107769902110665
Author(s):  
Tae Ho Lee
Keyword(s):  
North Carolina ◽  
Civil War ◽  
Public Relations ◽  
Institutional Change ◽  
College Education ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Education For All ◽  
Low Level ◽  
Value Of Education

Drawing on the theory of gradual institutional change, this study analyzed the post-Civil War college reform efforts in North Carolina, integrating power with public relations history. Reformers worked under harsh institutional circumstances where resident elites held high veto power, while reformers had a low level of discretion for interpreting college education. Notwithstanding, reformers adopted layering tactics, introducing new rules of education for all alongside existing ones of education as legacy, for gradual institutional change. Specifically, reformers maintained a calm and objective tone, focusing on the universal value of education, both publicly and through anonymous publications in hostile press venues.

Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Role of Agent Veto in Two-Level Games

1995 ◽  
Vol 89 (4) ◽  
pp. 914-924 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jongryn Mo
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Foreign Country ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Domestic Institutions ◽  
Veto Player ◽  
Domestic Constraints ◽  
International Bargaining ◽  
Informational Effect

Putnam's (1988) conjecture that negotiators can benefit from their domestic constraints implies that they may want to impose domestic constraints on themselves by granting veto power to an agent. I show that a negotiator's decision to employ an agent as veto player depends on the kinds of information available to the foreign country and the alignment of preferences between the negotiator and the agent. When the foreign country has incomplete information about the negotiator's preferences and the negotiator has preferences too divergent from those of the agent, the negotiator will not give veto power to the agent. However, this applies only to an agent with extreme preferences, and a surprisingly large number of agent types will receive veto power. The attractiveness of the agent veto to the negotiator is in part due to its informational effect. By granting veto power to an agent, the negotiator can transmit more information to the foreign country and capture informational gains that would be lost in the absence of the agent veto.

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