Double Implementation without No-Veto-Power

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Makoto Hagiwara
Keyword(s):  
Veto Power ◽  
No Veto Power

On Nash Implementability in Allotment Economies under Domain Restrictions with Indifference

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmed Doghmi
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Full Characterization ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Private Values ◽  
Domain Restrictions ◽  
Social Choice Correspondences ◽  
No Veto Power

AbstractIn this paper we give a full characterization of Nash implementability of social choice correspondences (SCCs) in allotment economies on preference domains with private values and different types of indifference. We focus on single-peaked/single-plateaued preferences with worst indifferent allocations, single-troughed preferences and single-troughed preferences with best indifferent allocations. We begin by introducing a weak variant of no-veto power, called

scholarly journals No Veto Power Needed

1947 ◽  
Vol 25 (39) ◽  
pp. 2805
Author(s):  
WALTER J. MURPHY
Keyword(s):  
Veto Power ◽  
No Veto Power

On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition

2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 415-428 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmed Doghmi ◽  
Abderrahmane Ziad
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Fair Division ◽  
Private Good ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Game Form ◽  
Nash Implementation ◽  
All Solutions ◽  
Restricted Domains ◽  
No Veto Power

AbstractIn this article, we study the problem of Nash implementation in private good economies with single-peaked, single-plateaued, and single-dipped preferences in the presence of at least one minimally honest agent. We prove that all solutions of the problem of fair division satisfying unanimity can be implemented in Nash equilibria as long as there are at least three agents participating in the mechanism (game form). To justify this result, we provide a list of solutions which violate the condition of no-veto power.

Nash implementation without no-veto power

2008 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Pierre Benoît ◽  
Efe A. Ok
Keyword(s):  
Veto Power ◽  
Nash Implementation ◽  
No Veto Power

scholarly journals Population Monotonicity in Public Good Economies with Single Dipped Preferences

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 80
Author(s):  
Ipek Gursel Tapki
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Pareto Efficiency ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Population Monotonicity ◽  
Variable Population ◽  
No Veto Power

<p>We study public good economies with variable population. We consider the problem of locating a single public good along a segment when agents have single dipped preferences. We analyze population monotonicity along with the standard properties Pareto efficiency, continuity and no-veto power. We show that there is no rule satisfying these properties together.</p>

Executive Veto Power and Constitutional Design

2019 ◽  
pp. 93-113
Author(s):  
Nicholas R. Miller
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Model ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Constitutional Design ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Executive Veto

A “separation of powers” system provides for an executive and legislature with independent powers. While only the legislature can pass bills, executive approval is commonly required for them to become law. The executive exercises veto power by withholding approval. Executive veto power is simple if the executive can only approve a bill or reject it in its entirety; it is constructive if he can amend a bill in certain ways. It is qualified if the legislature can override a veto; it is unqualified otherwise. Any such system creates a gamelike strategic interaction between the legislature and executive. The chapter provides an expository sketch of a variety of such veto games. The analysis is based on a one-dimensional spatial model given three different behavioral assumptions: sincere behavior by both the legislature and executive, strategic behavior by both, and strategic behavior coupled with the possibility of a credible veto threat by the executive. Several extensions and qualifications are briefly noted.

The ADA and the Veto Power

1946 ◽  
Vol 1 (12) ◽  
pp. 15-16
Author(s):  
David R. Inglis
Keyword(s):  
Veto Power

Weak independence and veto power

2000 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald E. Campbell ◽  
Jerry S. Kelly
Keyword(s):  
Veto Power ◽  
Weak Independence
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document