Public Policy and the Private Provision of Public Goods under Heterogeneous Preferences

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 243-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Jacobsen ◽  
Jacob LaRiviere ◽  
Michael Price
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Heterogeneous Preferences ◽  
Private Provision

A Model of Inequality Aversion and Private Provision of Public Goods

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hide-Fumi Yokoo
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Theoretical Foundation ◽  
Inequality Aversion ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Marginal Rate ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
Marginal Rate Of Substitution ◽  
Good Provision ◽  
Corner Solutions

AbstractI develop a model of inequality aversion and public goods that allows the marginal rate of substitution to be variable. As a theoretical foundation, utility function of the standard public goods model is nested in the Fehr-Schmidt model. An individual’s contribution function for a public good is derived by solving the problem of kinky preference and examining both interior and corner solutions. Results show that the derived contribution function is not monotonic with respect to the other individual’s provision. Thus, the model can be used to explain empirical evidence for the effect of social comparison on public-good provision.

Strategic transfers and private provision of public goods

1995 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 489-505 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Buchholz ◽  
Kai A. Konrad
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Private Provision

scholarly journals Optimal Policy with Heterogeneous Preferences

2008 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis Kaplow
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Optimal Policy ◽  
Income Tax ◽  
Social Welfare Function ◽  
Income Taxation ◽  
Heterogeneous Preferences ◽  
Commodity Taxation ◽  
Policy Rules ◽  
The Social

Abstract Optimal policy rules—including those regarding income taxation, commodity taxation, public goods, and externalities—are typically derived in models with homogeneous preferences. This article reconsiders many central results for the case in which preferences for commodities, public goods, and externalities are heterogeneous. When preference differences are observable, standard second-best results in basic settings are unaffected, except those for the optimal income tax. Optimal levels of income taxation may be higher, the same, or lower on types who derive more utility from various goods, depending on the nature of preference differences and the concavity of the social welfare function. When preference differences are unobservable, all policy rules may change. The determinants of even the direction of optimal rule adjustments are many and subtle.

A Case for Private Provision but Collective Ownership of Public Goods

1998 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 90-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
William D. Gerdes
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
The Public ◽  
Collective Ownership ◽  
Free Ride ◽  
Voluntary Exchange

One strategy for generating Pareto results in a public good model is to create an environment where traders internalize the public good externality. The model presented here accomplishes this by separating the provision and ownership of public goods. Such goods are privately provided but collectively owned. Under this arrangement, Lindahl prices are generated through the voluntary exchange activities of consumers. Persistent attempts to free ride are not consistent with maximizing behavior which leads to internalization.

On the Private Provision of Intertemporal Public Goods with Stock Effects

2012 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anke Gerber ◽  
Philipp C. Wichardt
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Private Provision
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