Optimization of Microeconomics Teaching—Collective Action and Private Provision of Public Goods in Traditional China

AbstractI develop a model of inequality aversion and public goods that allows the marginal rate of substitution to be variable. As a theoretical foundation, utility function of the standard public goods model is nested in the Fehr-Schmidt model. An individual’s contribution function for a public good is derived by solving the problem of kinky preference and examining both interior and corner solutions. Results show that the derived contribution function is not monotonic with respect to the other individual’s provision. Thus, the model can be used to explain empirical evidence for the effect of social comparison on public-good provision.

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Refounding the African state and local self-governance: the neglected foundation

The Journal of Modern African Studies ◽

10.1017/s0022278x00003438 ◽

2000 ◽

Vol 38 (3) ◽

pp. 487-509 ◽

Cited By ~ 16

Author(s):

James S. Wunsch

Keyword(s):

Collective Action ◽

Public Goods ◽

Local Governance ◽

African State ◽

Institutional Development ◽

Political Relationships ◽

State And Local ◽

The 1960S ◽

Rule Systems ◽

Local Leaders

The political revolution of contemporary Africa has so far largely been limited to the centre and to re-establishing the same institutional forms and processes which failed Africa in the 1960s. These regimes are already showing signs of erosion. This problem can be understood through the theory of public goods. Key collective or ‘public’ goods problems impede the collective action necessary for institutional development. Top-down strategies cannot surmount these problems because they cannot integrate and unify the population or structure consensual and sustained collective action.As currently constituted, national levels of government in Africa will be poor partners with local communities in development, be it of democracy or of the economy. In many cases, national regimes only exist at all because minimal contributing sets or political monopolists controlled, were given, or mobilised the resources to establish constituting rule systems which they used to sustain their existing relative advantages during the break-up of imperial systems. As this advantage is usually at the expense of the majority which lives outside the capitals, resources and policies to improve these areas are slow in coming. The slow, bottom-up process by which a true public constitution is built, one which reflects and elaborates generally held values, is built on existing political relationships, and protects social diversity, has never been allowed to develop.Refounding the African state must resolve these problems if it is to succeed. Ethnically and religiously diverse peoples will rule themselves better under federal and consociational systems which give local leaders space to lead local institutional development, authority to play a role in national governance, a process to develop consensus on central policy and to check the centre when there is no consensus. This requires a foundation of viable, real, developed structures of local governance if it is to succeed.

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Strategic transfers and private provision of public goods

Journal of Public Economics ◽

10.1016/0047-2727(95)80008-w ◽

1995 ◽

Vol 57 (3) ◽

pp. 489-505 ◽

Cited By ~ 54

Author(s):

Wolfgang Buchholz ◽

Kai A. Konrad

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Private Provision

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Cumulative advantage in collective action groups: How competition for group members alters the provision of public goods

Social Science Research ◽

10.1016/j.ssresearch.2017.03.001 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 66 ◽

pp. 1-21 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Brent Simpson ◽

Ozan Aksoy

Keyword(s):

Collective Action ◽

Public Goods ◽

Cumulative Advantage ◽

Group Members ◽

Action Groups

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A Case for Private Provision but Collective Ownership of Public Goods

The American Economist ◽

10.1177/056943459804200110 ◽

1998 ◽

Vol 42 (1) ◽

pp. 90-94 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

William D. Gerdes

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Public Good ◽

Private Provision ◽

The Public ◽

Collective Ownership ◽

Free Ride ◽

Voluntary Exchange

One strategy for generating Pareto results in a public good model is to create an environment where traders internalize the public good externality. The model presented here accomplishes this by separating the provision and ownership of public goods. Such goods are privately provided but collectively owned. Under this arrangement, Lindahl prices are generated through the voluntary exchange activities of consumers. Persistent attempts to free ride are not consistent with maximizing behavior which leads to internalization.

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