Increasing Private Provision of Public Goods Through a Lottery Policy: An Application to Sales Tax Evasion

AbstractI develop a model of inequality aversion and public goods that allows the marginal rate of substitution to be variable. As a theoretical foundation, utility function of the standard public goods model is nested in the Fehr-Schmidt model. An individual’s contribution function for a public good is derived by solving the problem of kinky preference and examining both interior and corner solutions. Results show that the derived contribution function is not monotonic with respect to the other individual’s provision. Thus, the model can be used to explain empirical evidence for the effect of social comparison on public-good provision.

Download Full-text

Strategic transfers and private provision of public goods

Journal of Public Economics ◽

10.1016/0047-2727(95)80008-w ◽

1995 ◽

Vol 57 (3) ◽

pp. 489-505 ◽

Cited By ~ 54

Author(s):

Wolfgang Buchholz ◽

Kai A. Konrad

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Private Provision

Download Full-text

A Case for Private Provision but Collective Ownership of Public Goods

The American Economist ◽

10.1177/056943459804200110 ◽

1998 ◽

Vol 42 (1) ◽

pp. 90-94 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

William D. Gerdes

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Public Good ◽

Private Provision ◽

The Public ◽

Collective Ownership ◽

Free Ride ◽

Voluntary Exchange

One strategy for generating Pareto results in a public good model is to create an environment where traders internalize the public good externality. The model presented here accomplishes this by separating the provision and ownership of public goods. Such goods are privately provided but collectively owned. Under this arrangement, Lindahl prices are generated through the voluntary exchange activities of consumers. Persistent attempts to free ride are not consistent with maximizing behavior which leads to internalization.

Download Full-text

On the Private Provision of Intertemporal Public Goods with Stock Effects

Environmental and Resource Economics ◽

10.1007/s10640-012-9624-9 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 55 (2) ◽

pp. 245-255 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Anke Gerber ◽

Philipp C. Wichardt

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Private Provision

Download Full-text

EFFICIENCY OF THE TAX SYSTEM ON THE BASIS OF TRANSPARENCY AND REFORM

HERALD of Khmelnytskyi national university ◽

10.31891/2307-5740-2021-298-5(1)-38 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 298 (5 Part 1) ◽

pp. 219-222

Author(s):

Ludmila Oleinikova ◽

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Tax Evasion ◽

Small Businesses ◽

National Level ◽

Tax Base ◽

Tax System ◽

Tax Legislation ◽

Improve Compliance ◽

Factors Of Production ◽

The Government

The expediency is reasoned of creating a competitive environment in the context of globalization and limited factors of production, forcing countries to compete with each other and take measures to attract owners of factors of production by forming the optimal combination of institutional, public goods and tax preferences, where only tax preferences are not the key to success in competition, as opposed to general conditions of taxation in combination with infrastructural, institutional and public goods. Emphasis is placed on the rapid digitalization of economic processes and the globalization of even small businesses through online platforms that will significantly affect the struggle in the field of economic and institutional competition. It has been proven that it is already necessary to respond to new challenges which are associated with tax evasion, erosion of the tax base, a significant geographical gap between the location of factors of production and the jurisdiction of profit. It is established that the answers to these risks lie both in the plane of institutional readiness and in the plane of the effectiveness of the application of tax administration tools, including control, as well as the synergy of measures at the macro and micro levels. The variety of tools used in world practice to improve compliance with tax legislation is studied and their division into categories is indicated. The expediency of using mechanisms to ensure the transparency of the tax system is substantiated, along with measures to assure the transparency of taxpayers before the tax authorities at the national level, as well as mechanisms to provide accountability and transparency of the tax authorities themselves to the government, parliament and taxpayers. It is proposed, taking into account foreign experience, in addition to quantitative indicators of tax effectiveness, to use supplementary indicators that characterize the work of tax authorities, considering economy, effectiveness, efficiency, which will deepen the level of tax system performance.

Download Full-text