French Import Quotas. F. A. Haight

Depending on how one classifies market intervention, trade liberalization disciplines can be lenient or strict. Perhaps the most important distinction in this respect is that between government intervention labeled as a ‘market access restriction’ and that defined as ‘domestic regulation’. Both the GATT and the GATS declare market access restrictions (such as import quotas or limitations on the number of service suppliers) to be, in principle, prohibited. In contrast, domestic regulations (such as internal taxes, health standards, and safety requirements) are treated with much more deference. They are, in essence, only prohibited when discriminatory or more trade restrictive than necessary. Notwithstanding these major legal consequences, the distinction between market access and domestic regulation remains unclear. Based on a recent WTO dispute condemning the United States for banning online gambling, this article is an attempt to clarify the distinction. Starting from broad similarities, it finds crucial differences in this respect between GATT and GATS. For both, however, the paper's basic point is that a domestic regulation should not be regarded as a market access restriction simply because it has the effect of banning certain imports. To do otherwise risks seriously undermining the regulatory autonomy of WTO Members beyond anything imagined by the drafters of the WTO treaty.

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Import Quotas and Industrial Performance

Welfare aspects of industrial markets ◽

10.1007/978-1-4613-4231-1_9 ◽

1977 ◽

pp. 153-181 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Walter Adams ◽

Joel B. Dirlam

Keyword(s):

Industrial Performance ◽

Import Quotas

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The Economics of Administering Import Quotas with Licenses‐on‐Demand in Agriculture

American Journal of Agricultural Economics ◽

10.1111/j.1467-8276.2006.00862.x ◽

2006 ◽

Vol 88 (2) ◽

pp. 338-350 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Jana Hranaiova ◽

Harry Gorter ◽

James Falk

Keyword(s):

On Demand ◽

Import Quotas

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Import quotas and voluntary export restraints: focusing on exporting countries

The Political Economy of Manufacturing Protection ◽

10.4324/9781315098357-9 ◽

2017 ◽

pp. 214-234

Author(s):

Carl Hamilton

Keyword(s):

Voluntary Export Restraints ◽

Import Quotas

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The Economics of Two-Tier Tariff-Rate Import Quotas in Agriculture

Agricultural and Resource Economics Review ◽

10.1017/s1068280500001441 ◽

2000 ◽

Vol 29 (1) ◽

pp. 58-69 ◽

Cited By ~ 20

Author(s):

Devry S. Boughner ◽

Harry de Gorter ◽

Ian M. Sheldon

Keyword(s):

Trade Liberalization ◽

Uruguay Round ◽

Policy Instrument ◽

Trade Flows ◽

Protective Mechanism ◽

Nontariff Barriers ◽

Alternative Trade ◽

Second Tier ◽

Agreement On Agriculture ◽

Import Quotas

This paper analyzes the economics of two-tier tariff import quotas (TRQs) and implications of alternative trade liberalization scenarios. The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture had tariffs replace nontariff barriers as the protective mechanism while quotas ensured minimum trade flows. Our framework isolates the effects of changes either in the second-tier tariff, and first-tier tariff, or the quota. We show how market conditions or relative policy instrument levels determine which tariff or quota affects trade and domestic and world prices. Whether or not exporting countries have been allocated export quotas and the procedures for the distribution of the rights to export and import also influences the efficiency of TRQs.

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