Social Science Principles in the Light of Scientific Method, with Particular Application to Modern Economic Thought.Joseph Mayer

1942 ◽  
Vol 47 (6) ◽  
pp. 999-1000
Author(s):  
Floyd N. House

Our quest for prosperity has produced great output but not always great outcomes. The list of concerns is growing and familiar. Fundamentally, when it comes to well-being, fairness, and the scope of our humanity, the modern economic system still leaves much to be desired. In turn, trust in business and the liberal market system (aka “capitalism”) has been declining and regulation has been rising. A variety of forces—civic, economic, and intellectual—have been probing for better alternatives. The contributions in this volume, coauthored by eminent philosophers, social scientists, and a handful of thoughtful business leaders, are submitted in this spirit. The thrust of the work is conveyed in the volume’s titular question: Capitalism Beyond Mutuality? Mutuality, or the exchange of benefits, has been established as the prime principle of interaction in addressing the chronic dilemma of human interdependence. Mutuality is a fundament in the social contract approach and it serves us well. Yet, to address the concerns outlined here, we must help evolve an economic paradigm where mutuality is more systematically complemented by reasoned and elective morality. Otherwise the state will remain the sole (if inadequate) protector and buffer between market and society. Hence, rather than just regulate power we must also educate power. Philosophy has a natural role, especially when education is the preferred vehicle of transformation. Accordingly, the essays in this volume integrate philosophy and social science to outline and explore concrete approaches to these important concerns emanating from business practice and theory.


Author(s):  
Harold Kincaid

Positivism originated from separate movements in nineteenth-century social science and early twentieth-century philosophy. Key positivist ideas were that philosophy should be scientific, that metaphysical speculations are meaningless, that there is a universal and a priori scientific method, that a main function of philosophy is to analyse that method, that this basic scientific method is the same in both the natural and social sciences, that the various sciences should be reducible to physics, and that the theoretical parts of good science must be translatable into statements about observations. In the social sciences and the philosophy of the social sciences, positivism has supported the emphasis on quantitative data and precisely formulated theories, the doctrines of behaviourism, operationalism and methodological individualism, the doubts among philosophers that meaning and interpretation can be scientifically adequate, and an approach to the philosophy of social science that focuses on conceptual analysis rather than on the actual practice of social research. Influential criticisms have denied that scientific method is a priori or universal, that theories can or must be translatable into observational terms, and that reduction to physics is the way to unify the sciences. These criticisms have undercut the motivations for behaviourism and methodological individualism in the social sciences. They have also led many to conclude, somewhat implausibly, that any standards of good social science are merely matters of rhetorical persuasion and social convention.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document