What's Stopping You?: The Sources of Political Constraints on International Conflict Behavior in Parliamentary Democracies

2004 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Glenn Palmer ◽  
Tamar London ◽  
Patrick Regan
Keyword(s):  
International Conflict ◽  
Conflict Behavior ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Political Constraints

Ties that Bind?

1998 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
WILL H. MOORE ◽  
DAVID R. DAVIS
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Statistical Analysis ◽  
General Model ◽  
International Conflict ◽  
Conflict Behavior ◽  
Structural Constraints ◽  
Structural Factors ◽  
International Interactions ◽  
The Impact

In this article, the authors develop and empirically evaluate a general model of the linkages between domestic and international conflict behavior. Much of the literature on domestic international interactions has focused on the structural constraints of the international and domestic systems on leaders' foreign policy decisions. Rather than focusing on structural constraints, the present authors model the influence of the behavior of domestic and international rivals on leader decision making. The impact of rivals' behavior on conflict across the domestic-international nexus has been neglected relative to the role of structural factors. This study helps redress that imbalance. The authors test their model with a statistical analysis of Zaire during the period 1975 to 1992 and find substantial support for the model.

War, Trade, and Distrust: Why Trade Agreements Don’t Always Keep the Peace

2012 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 257-278 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emilie M. Hafner-Burton ◽  
Alexander H. Montgomery
Keyword(s):  
Social Network ◽  
Social Network Analysis ◽  
Network Analysis ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
International Conflict ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Preferential Trade Agreements ◽  
Conflict Behavior ◽  
Preferential Trade ◽  
Hierarchical Relations

There is growing evidence that preferential trade agreements (PTAs) provide strong institutional incentives to prevent international conflict among member states, often creating the conditions of trust that can help prevent militarized aggression. We provide an approach to the study of how international institutions influence conflict behavior that considers how PTAs exclude as well as include members and create asymmetrical relationships among members that could exacerbate conflict. PTAs do more than create expectations of economic gains and reduce opportunism; they also create hierarchical relations between states, which can encourage conflict under different conditions due to distrust. We theorize these conditions for militarized international disputes, develop appropriate measures using social network analysis, and test our expectations on new PTA data during the period 1950 to 2000.

Long-Term Effects in Models with Temporal Dependence

2016 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 243-262 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laron K. Williams
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Behavior ◽  
Binary Outcomes ◽  
International Studies ◽  
Long Term Effects ◽  
Temporal Dependence ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Explanatory Variables ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Repeated Events

A dominant trend in models with binary outcomes is to control for unmodeled duration dependence by including temporal dependence variables. A second, distinct trend is to interpret both the short- and long-term effects of explanatory variables in autoregressive models. While the first trend is nearly ubiquitous in models with binary outcomes, the second trend has yet to be applied consistently beyond models with continuous outcomes. While scholars use temporal splines and cubic polynomials to model the underlying hazard rate, they have neglected the fact that this causes the explanatory variables to have a long-term effect (LTE) by modifying the future values of the temporal dependence variables. In this article, I propose a simple technique that estimates a wide range of probabilistic LTEs in models with temporal dependence variables. These effects can range from simple LTEs for a one-time change in an explanatory variable to more complex scenarios where effects change in magnitude with time and compound across repeated events. I then replicate Clare's (2010, Ideological fractionalization and the international conflict behavior of parliamentary democracies.International Studies Quarterly54:965–87) examination of the influence of government fractionalization on conflict behavior to show that failing to interpret the results within the context of temporal dependence underestimates the total impact of fractionalization by neglecting LTEs.

Leader Survival, Sources of Political Insecurity, and International Conflict

2018 ◽  
Vol 72 (3) ◽  
pp. 596-609
Author(s):  
Matthew DiLorenzo
Keyword(s):  
Natural Disasters ◽  
International Conflict ◽  
Conflict Behavior ◽  
International Conflicts ◽  
Conflict Initiation ◽  
Institutional Contexts ◽  
Leader Survival ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Do So

Recent research identifies the risk and consequences of losing office as important factors in leaders’ decisions to initiate international conflicts. This paper argues that the institutional source of a domestic threat to a leader should condition the relationship between political insecurity and international conflict. Specifically, existing theoretical mechanisms linking international conflict to security in office should not apply to threats that come from outside a leader’s selectorate. Natural disasters provide a convenient opportunity to test this argument since others have argued that disasters not only affect the risk that all types of leaders lose office but that they do so by creating threats that operate through different mechanisms in different domestic institutional contexts. I find that deaths from disasters are positively associated with conflict initiation among large-coalition leaders throughout the period of 1950 to 2007. I also find that neither disaster deaths nor events are related to conflict behavior for small-coalition leaders. In arguing that not all threats to leader survival matter for international conflict, the paper offers an important qualification to theories of leader survival and international conflict.

Votes and violence: Electoral vote share and international conflict in democratic states

2020 ◽  
pp. 136914812097639
Author(s):  
Kyle Haynes
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
International Conflict ◽  
Vote Share ◽  
Common Denominator ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Electoral Vote ◽  
Presidential Democracies ◽  
Presidential Systems ◽  
Present Possibility

This article argues that the effect of a democratic leader’s electoral margin of victory on their conflict behaviour once in office is highly dependent upon the state’s institutional structure. I show that, uniquely in parliamentary democracies, governments that win a larger share of the vote are significantly less likely to initiate disputes abroad. Such governments entail broad coalitions that, combined with the ever-present possibility of governmental collapse and new elections, require leaders to pursue a more cautious, lowest-common-denominator foreign policy. This effect is significantly stronger for right-wing governments. Conversely, in presidential democracies, I find that electoral vote share has no effect on a leader’s subsequent conflict propensity. Vote shares thus function very differently in parliamentary and presidential systems, with important implications for conflict behaviour abroad.

A Foreign Conflict Behavior Code Sheet

1966 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. J. Rummel
Keyword(s):  
International Conflict ◽  
Violent Behavior ◽  
Scientific Investigation ◽  
Conflict Behavior ◽  
Aggregate Form ◽  
Behavior Code

Foreign conflict behavior data covering long periods of time are urgently needed for the scientific investigation of international conflict. Except in the case of the most violent behavior, war, such data in aggregate form generally are not available to researchers.

Progress and its problems in the study of war

Res Publica ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 327-343
Author(s):  
Gustaaf Geeraerst
Keyword(s):  
International Conflict ◽  
Political Process ◽  
Basic Research ◽  
Conflict Behavior ◽  
Rare Form ◽  
Theoretical Progress ◽  
Supportive Behavior ◽  
Conflict Regulation ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
Significant Effort

Although the knowledge of war and international conflict has definitely increased, we do not as yet have much insight into why and how wars come about, and especially how war as a certain and comparably rare form of conflict regulation is connected to conflict behavior at lower levels of intensity as military disputes and international conflict behavior in general. Theoretical progress in the study of war demands a significant effort at the level of basic research. It is imperative to spend more energy at the rigorous deduction of testable propositions from general explanatory principles or mechanisms. For the success of such an endeavour it is essential to adopt both a dynamic and systems-theoretic perspective. This implies a vision of war as a certain and one of possible phases in the international political process, concurrently with other injuriousforms of interaction as serious disputes and low level conflict behavior, but also supportive behavior like trade and cooperation. Yet, if we are to analyze and understand the war phenomenon from this perspective, clearly more formalized approaches and techniques are imperative.

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