Informal Local Taxation in Developing Countries

1992 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
R Prud'homme

In this paper an attempt has been made to apply to the area of local taxation in developing countries the concept of ‘informality’ which has been so successfully utilized in other areas. Information taxation is defined as the mobilization of resources outside normal tax channels for the provision of public goods and services. A typology of informal taxes is offered that distinguishes between (1) ‘pinch’, (2) extortions, (3) requisitions, (4) contributions, (5) gifts, and (6) donations. In the case of Zaire, an order of magnitude of the importance of informal taxation is offered. A reassessment of the merit and demerits of informal taxation is then proposed.

Author(s):  
Guy Grossman ◽  
Tara Slough

When and how do governments deliver public goods and services in response to citizen preferences? We review the current literature on government responsiveness, with a focus on public goods and service delivery in developing countries. We identify three types of actors that are commonly present in these accounts: politicians, bureaucrats, and citizens. Much of this literature examines interactions between dyads of these actors. The study of electoral accountability and constituency services emphasizes relationships between citizens (or voters) and politicians. Studies of bureaucratic incentives and political oversight of bureaucrats emphasize interactions between politicians and bureaucrats. Finally, studies of bureaucratic embeddedness and citizen oversight of bureaucrats elaborate the interactions between bureaucrats and citizens. We argue that an emerging literature that considers interactions between all three types of actors provides rich theoretical and empirical terrain for developing our understanding of responsiveness and accountability in low- and middle-income countries and beyond. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Political Science, Volume 25 is May 2022. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.


2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 180-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Coxhead ◽  
Corbett Grainger

Fossil fuel subsidies are widespread in developing countries, where reform efforts are often derailed by disputes over the likely distribution of gains and losses. The impacts of subsidy reform are transmitted to households through changes in energy prices and prices of other goods and services, as well as through factor earnings. Most empirical studies focus on consumer expenditures alone, and computable general equilibrium analyses typically report only total effects without decomposing them by source. Meanwhile, analytical models neglect important open-economy characteristics relevant to developing countries. In this paper, we develop an analytical model of a small open economy with a preexisting fossil fuel subsidy and identify direct and indirect impacts of subsidy reform on real household incomes. Our results, illustrated with data from Viet Nam, highlight two important drivers of distributional change: (i) the mix of tradable and nontradable goods, reflecting the structure of a trade-dependent economy; and (ii) household heterogeneity in sources of factor income.


2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
John Casey

The growth of the nonprofit sector in the last decades and its greater salience in the delivery of public goods and services has been accompanied by the development of new institutions and processes for managing the relations between nonprofits and governments. This article documents a number of recent initiatives to strengthen government-nonprofit relations in the U.S. and analyzes the policy agendas that are driving them.


2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Schiek ◽  
Guy Hareau ◽  
Yona Baguma ◽  
Akshat Medakker ◽  
David Douches ◽  
...  

2000 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-153
Author(s):  
Joan Rosselló Villalonga

Abstract Spain has advanced significantly regarding die assignment of responsibilities on public expenditure and tax powers across regional governments. However, regions do not participate significantly in the decentralization process. The lack of federal insitutions in which regions are represented motivates non-cooperative behaviours and fosters competition between all levels of government. The consequence is that the provision of public goods and services is rather inefficient.We illustrate our argument using a very simple static model with externalities in which the normative recommendation of decentralization does not guarantee the efficient provision of public goods. The adequate design of federal institutions would allow reducing such inefficiencies.Finally we try to identify die political characteristics of the Spanish regime that may explain the lack of institutional mechanisms of cooperation-coordination between governments. This type of analysis could be easily extended to the present situation in Italy.


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