Gaming in Spatial Expansion Tracks: The Case of the Swedish Brewery Industry

1992 ◽  
Vol 24 (7) ◽  
pp. 1021-1037 ◽  
Author(s):  
S Finne ◽  
R Laulajainen

Two competitors try to maximize their respective market shares by acquiring smaller, passive companies. The heavy logistics bill and inherent scale economies in production recommend contagious expansion. This process is channeled by physical barriers and population distribution. Rationalization of production and distribution is postponed. The historical example is derived from the Swedish brewery industry. It may be seen as a game with a set of rules and some probabilistic parameters. The game is played thirty-seven times, by two persons at a time. The results span a spectrum of spatial strategies, dominated by three main types, one of which corresponds to the historical outcome. To get a firmer hold of ‘good’ strategies, the probabilistic elements are replaced by a simple indicator, the territory is abstracted into a network, and the decisionmaking sequence is analyzed deductively. The same three main types of strategy reemerge. One of them is tentatively considered to be a Nash equilibrium.

Author(s):  
Sarah Perrin ◽  
Mathieu Laurière ◽  
Julien Pérolat ◽  
Matthieu Geist ◽  
Romuald Élie ◽  
...  

We present a method enabling a large number of agents to learn how to flock. This problem has drawn a lot of interest but requires many structural assumptions and is tractable only in small dimensions. We phrase this problem as a Mean Field Game (MFG), where each individual chooses its own acceleration depending on the population behavior. Combining Deep Reinforcement Learning (RL) and Normalizing Flows (NF), we obtain a tractable solution requiring only very weak assumptions. Our algorithm finds a Nash Equilibrium and the agents adapt their velocity to match the neighboring flock’s average one. We use Fictitious Play and alternate: (1) computing an approximate best response with Deep RL, and (2) estimating the next population distribution with NF. We show numerically that our algorithm can learn multi-group or high-dimensional flocking with obstacles.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 552-568
Author(s):  
Jewaidu Rilwan ◽  
◽  
Poom Kumam ◽  
Idris Ahmed ◽  
◽  
...  

<abstract><p>In this paper, advertising competition among $ m $ firms is studied in a discrete-time dynamic game framework. Firms maximize the present value of their profits which depends on their advertising strategy and their market share. The evolution of market shares is determined by the firms' advertising activities. By employing the concept of the discrete-time potential games of González-Sánchez and Hernández-Lerma (2013), we derived an explicit formula for the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game and obtained conditions for which the NE is an overtaking optimal. Moreover, we analyze the asymptotic behavior of the overtaking NE where the convergence towards a unique steady state (turnpike) is established.</p></abstract>


1983 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 461-474 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malcolm R. Burns

The survivor technique is applied to a virtually complete set of plant and output data to determine the extent of scale economies in the plug, smoking, snuff, and fine-cut branches of the tobacco industry between 1897 and 1910. The data indicate that the relative cost advantage of large tobacco factories was substantial, with facilities of minimum efficient size often requiring market shares approaching 10 per cent of U. S. output. These results support one of the principal themes of The Visible Hand—that the realization of scale economies motivated the consolidation movement in American manufacturing at the turn of the century.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nagarajan Krishnamurthy ◽  
Biswanath Swain ◽  
Jayasankar Ramanathan

Purpose Can industrial marketers afford to choose unethical strategies? To answer this question, this study aims to use game theory to analyze whether an industrial marketer choosing and implementing an unethical strategy is successful in maximizing her market share across her strategies. Design/methodology/approach The competition between two industrial marketers is modeled as a strategic game for the market share of a product that is identical in all attributes except the production process. Each industrial marketer’s objective is to choose to implement either the ethical or the unethical production process to maximize her market share. Findings The study finds that both industrial marketers choosing to implement ethical strategies is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. That is, an industrial marketer choosing to implement an unethical strategy in the production process will be unsuccessful in maximizing her market share when both the industrial marketers are rational. Research limitations/implications The study contributes to the literature on industrial marketing ethics, particularly that on product ethics, by showing that industrial marketers gain market share if they choose ethical strategies. Practical implications The study has implications for industrial marketing executives, as organizational consumers are increasingly aware of the strategies of industrial marketers. Failure to implement ethical strategies will cause industrial marketers to forgo their best possible market shares. Originality/value This study’s novelty lies in using a game theoretic approach to demonstrate the positive implications of ethical strategies for industrial marketers.


Liquidity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 142-152
Author(s):  
Mukhaer Pakkanna

Political democracy should be equivalent to the economic development of the quality of democracy, economic democracy if not upright, even the owner of the ruling power and money, which is parallel to force global corporatocracy. Consequently, the economic oligarchy preservation reinforces control of production and distribution from upstream to downstream and power monopoly of the market. The implication, increasingly sharp economic disparities, exclusive owner of the money and power become fertile, and the end could jeopardize the harmony of the national economy. The loss of national economic identity that makes people feel lost the “pilot of the state”. What happens then is the autopilot state. Viewing unclear direction of the economy, the national economy should clarify the true figure.


2013 ◽  
pp. 109-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Rühl

This paper presents the highlights of the third annual edition of the BP Energy Outlook, which sets out BP’s view of the most likely developments in global energy markets to 2030, based on up-to-date analysis and taking into account developments of the past year. The Outlook’s overall expectation for growth in global energy demand is to be 36% higher in 2030 than in 2011 and almost all the growth coming from emerging economies. It also reflects shifting expectations of the pattern of supply, with unconventional sources — shale gas and tight oil together with heavy oil and biofuels — playing an increasingly important role and, in particular, transforming the energy balance of the US. While the fuel mix is evolving, fossil fuels will continue to be dominant. Oil, gas and coal are expected to converge on market shares of around 26—28% each by 2030, and non-fossil fuels — nuclear, hydro and renewables — on a share of around 6—7% each. By 2030, increasing production and moderating demand will result in the US being 99% self-sufficient in net energy. Meanwhile, with continuing steep economic growth, major emerging economies such as China and India will become increasingly reliant on energy imports. These shifts will have major impacts on trade balances.


2020 ◽  
pp. 133-158
Author(s):  
K. A. Kholodilin ◽  
Y. I. Yanzhimaeva

A relative uniformity of population distribution on the territory of the country is of importance from socio-economic and strategic perspectives. It is especially important in the case of Russia with its densely populated West and underpopulated East. This paper considers changes in population density in Russian regions, which occurred between 1897 and 2017. It explores whether there was convergence in population density and what factors influenced it. For this purpose, it uses the data both at county and regional levels, which are brought to common borders for comparability purposes. Further, the models of unconditional and conditional β-convergence are estimated, taking into account the spatial dependence. The paper concludes that the population density equalization took place in 1897-2017 at the county level and in 1926—1970 at the regional level. In addition, the population density increase is shown to be influenced not only by spatial effects, but also by political and geographical factors such as climate, number of GULAG camps, and the distance from the capital city.


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