Overtaking optimality in a discrete-time advertising game

<abstract><p>In this paper, advertising competition among $ m $ firms is studied in a discrete-time dynamic game framework. Firms maximize the present value of their profits which depends on their advertising strategy and their market share. The evolution of market shares is determined by the firms' advertising activities. By employing the concept of the discrete-time potential games of González-Sánchez and Hernández-Lerma (2013), we derived an explicit formula for the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game and obtained conditions for which the NE is an overtaking optimal. Moreover, we analyze the asymptotic behavior of the overtaking NE where the convergence towards a unique steady state (turnpike) is established.</p></abstract>

Bias and Overtaking Optimality for Continuous-Time Jump Markov Decision Processes in Polish Spaces

In this paper we study the bias and the overtaking optimality criteria for continuous-time jump Markov decision processes in general state and action spaces. The corresponding transition rates are allowed to be unbounded, and the reward rates may have neither upper nor lower bounds. Under appropriate hypotheses, we prove the existence of solutions to the bias optimality equations, the existence of bias optimal policies, and an equivalence relation between bias and overtaking optimality.

Bias and Overtaking Optimality for Continuous-Time Jump Markov Decision Processes in Polish Spaces

In this paper we study the bias and the overtaking optimality criteria for continuous-time jump Markov decision processes in general state and action spaces. The corresponding transition rates are allowed to be unbounded, and the reward rates may have neither upper nor lower bounds. Under appropriate hypotheses, we prove the existence of solutions to the bias optimality equations, the existence of bias optimal policies, and an equivalence relation between bias and overtaking optimality.