scholarly journals Optimal pricing strategies under co-existence of price-takers and bargainers in a supply chain

2012 ◽  
Vol 63 (7) ◽  
pp. 865-882 ◽  
Author(s):  
C-W Kuo ◽  
R-S Guo ◽  
Y-F Wu
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Du Zhao ◽  
Xumei Zhang ◽  
Tinghai Ren ◽  
Hongyong Fu

This paper examines optimal pricing in a two-tier product and service supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer in the context of vertical competition in extended warranty in two cases: one considering the retailer’s fairness concerns and one without considering the retailer’s fairness concerns. A manufacturer-dominated product and service supply chain game-theoretic model on the Stackelberg model is developed to analyse how the level of vertical competition in extended warranty service and the intensity of a retailer’s fairness concerns influence the optimal pricing of products and extended warranties for the manufacturer and retailer. This study finds the following: (i) Two parties of the supply chain employ differential pricing strategies for extended warranties when the retailer has fairness concerns. (ii) Compared to the same pricing strategies for extended warranty service when the retailer has no fairness concerns, the increase of competition intensity of vertical extended warranty service will enlarge the price difference of extended warranty service. Meanwhile, it is the intensity of fairness concerns that determines the influences of retailer’s fairness concerns on the price difference of extended warranties. (iii) If no fairness concerns are raised, an increase in the level of vertical competition in extended warranty service would benefit both supply chain parties, rather than hurting their profit. If the retailer is fair-minded, its fairness utility increases when the intensity of the fairness concerns rises in a reasonable range and decreases when the intensity exceeds the reasonable range, but for the manufacturer, its profits will be damaged as long as the retailer raises fairness concerns.


2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rui Shen ◽  
Zhiqing Meng ◽  
Xinsheng Xu ◽  
Min Jiang

Risk-averse suppliers’ optimal pricing strategies in two-stage supply chains under competitive environment are discussed. The suppliers in this paper focus more on losses as compared to profits, and they care their long-term relationship with their customers. We introduce for the suppliers a loss function, which covers both current loss and future loss. The optimal wholesale price is solved under situations of risk neutral, risk averse, and a combination of minimizing loss and controlling risk, respectively. Besides, some properties of and relations among these optimal wholesale prices are given as well. A numerical example is given to illustrate the performance of the proposed method.


2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qi Xu ◽  
Zheng Liu ◽  
Bin Shen

Recently, price comparison service (PCS) websites are more and more popular due to its features in facilitating transparent price and promoting rational purchase decision. Motivated by the industrial practices, in this study, we examine the pricing strategies of retailers and supplier in a dual-channel supply chain influenced by the signals of PCS. We categorize and discuss three situations according to the signal availability of PCS, under which the optimal pricing strategies are derived. Finally, we conduct a numerical study and find that in fact the retailers and supplier are all more willing to avoid the existence of PCS with the objective of profit maximization. When both of retailers are affected by the PCS, the supplier is more willing to reduce the availability of price information. Important managerial insights are discussed.


2012 ◽  
Vol 29 (01) ◽  
pp. 1240003 ◽  
Author(s):  
JIE WEI ◽  
JING ZHAO ◽  
YONGJIAN LI

This paper studies pricing problem for a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer in a fuzzy environment. The purpose of this paper is to explore how the manufacturer makes his decisions about wholesale price and transfer price and how the retailer makes her decisions about retail price and collecting price in the expected value standard. Each firm's optimal pricing strategies are established by using game theory under the centralized and decentralized decision cases, respectively. Managerial insights into the economic behavior of firms are also investigated, which can serve as the basis for empirical study in the future. Moreover, we analyze numerically the results and give some insights on the influence of some parameters.


Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Zhenyang Pi ◽  
Weiguo Fang

This paper studies the implication of channel discrepancy between the retail and direct channels in a dual-channel supply chain consisting of one common retailer and two manufacturers in which the manufacturers may have different market powers. Each manufacturer provides a substitutable product and opens an online channel to customers directly. We develop an analytical model to derive the optimal pricing strategies by using game theory and the backward induction method, and we examine related properties under three market power structures while considering channel discrepancy, including the Nash equilibrium, the Manufacturers leader Stackelberg, and the M1 leader Stackelberg models (denoted as the N, MS, and M1S models, respectively). Numerical simulations are examined to reveal and verify the effect of channel discrepancy on optimal prices, demands, and profits. We find that a higher level of channel discrepancy induces higher prices, demands, and profits for each member in both channels, while this kind of stimulating impact for the leader manufacturer who obtains a higher level of channel discrepancy will be more significant than it is for the other members in the three models. In addition, the profit of the supply chain in the N model is always higher than it is in the MS model, while it may be higher or lower than it is in the M1S model depending on the level of channel discrepancy.


2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jie Wei ◽  
Guoying Pang ◽  
Yongjun Liu ◽  
Qian Ma

Pricing decisions of a two-echelon supply chain with one manufacturer and duopolistic retailers in fuzzy environment are considered in this paper. The manufacturer produces a product and sells it to the two retailers, who in turn retail it to end customers. The fuzziness is associated with the customers’ demand and the manufacturing cost. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of two retailers’ different pricing strategies on the optimal pricing decisions of the manufacturer and the two retailers themselves in MS Game scenario. As a reference model, the centralized decision scenario is also considered. The closed-form optimal pricing decisions of the manufacturer and the two retailers are derived in the above decision scenarios. Some insights into how pricing decisions vary with decision scenarios and the two retailers’ pricing strategies in fuzzy environment are also investigated, which can serve as the basis for empirical study in the future.


Algorithms ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (11) ◽  
pp. 186
Author(s):  
Tao Li ◽  
Yan Chen ◽  
Taoying Li

The problem of pricing distribution services is challenging due to the loss in value of product during its distribution process. Four logistics service pricing strategies are constructed in this study, including fixed pricing model, fixed pricing model with time constraints, dynamic pricing model, and dynamic pricing model with time constraints in combination with factors, such as the distribution time, customer satisfaction, optimal pricing, etc. By analyzing the relationship between optimal pricing and key parameters (such as the value of the decay index, the satisfaction of consumers, dispatch time, and the storage cost of the commodity), it is found that the larger the value of the attenuation coefficient, the easier the perishable goods become spoilage, which leads to lower distribution prices and impacts consumer satisfaction. Moreover, the analysis of the average profit of the logistics service providers in these four pricing models shows that the average profit in the dynamic pricing model with time constraints is better. Finally, a numerical experiment is given to support the findings.


2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-41
Author(s):  
Nicolas Dupuis ◽  
Marc Ivaldi ◽  
Jerome Pouyet

AbstractWe study the welfare impact of revenue management, a practice which is widely spread in the transport industry, but whose impact on consumer surplus remains unclear. We develop a theoretical model of revenue management allowing for heterogeneity in product characteristics, capacity constraints, consumer preferences, and probabilities of arrival. We also introduce dynamic competition between revenue managers. We solve this model computationally and recover the optimal pricing strategies. We find that revenue management is generally welfare enhancing as it raises the number of sales.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document