scholarly journals Pricing Decisions for a Sustainable Supply Chain in the Presence of Potential Strategic Customers

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1655 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xinmin Liu ◽  
Kangkang Lin ◽  
Lei Wang ◽  
Lili Ding
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Purchase Behavior ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Sustainable Supply Chain ◽  
Purchasing Decisions ◽  
Strategic Customers ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Leading Role ◽  
Will Force

In service to sustainable development, consumers have begun to prefer green products for their special environmental characteristics, and many enterprises are introducing new products to improve their competitiveness, but this tactic may not work if customers are strategic, as they might choose to defer purchasing decisions while prices are high and wait for lower prices in the future. Considering the differences in purchase behavior, we divided customers into two groups—strategic customers and myopic customers. Furthermore, we distinguished three types of strategic customers according to their different preferences to analyze the optimal pricing and greenness strategies in sustainable supply chain in strategic customer scenarios. Our results led to the following conclusions. (1) Strategic customers’ individual preferences can affect optimum equilibrium and that a higher purchase price threshold can stimulate the manufacturer to improve greenness and set a higher price, while a higher greenness purchase threshold and purchase value threshold will force manufacturer to set a lower price. (2) We observed that strategic customers can increase demand and vender profit. As the number of strategic customers increases, selling price and greenness will experience downward trends in a price threshold scenario but upward trends in greenness threshold and value threshold scenarios. (3) A firm can take measures to mitigate the effects of strategic customers by adjusting price and greenness dynamically according to price and greenness sensitivity, which can play a leading role in actively influencing strategic customer behavior.

Optimal Integrated Inventory Policy for Deteriorating Units Under Selling-Price-Dependent Demand When Holding Cost Is Capacity-Utilization Dependent

2018 ◽  
pp. 74-89
Author(s):  
Ishaben Talati ◽  
Poonam Prakash Mishra
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Capacity Utilization ◽  
Optimal Number ◽  
Sensitivity Analyses ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Sustainable Supply Chain ◽  
Modern Approach ◽  
Holding Cost

Conventional EOQ models always discussed profit maximization for one player at a time. But modern approach of supply chain suggests that growing and sustainable supply chain is possible only when benefits of all members of chain are protected. This chapter proposes an integrated model of supply chain where units in inventory are subjected to time dependent deterioration. Since demand is inversely proportional to selling price of the item, it is assumed selling price dependent. To make it more practical and feasible permissible delay on payments is offered only on purchase of a certain amount of quantity. This chapter helps to offer an algorithm to attain optimal number of orders, quantity, selling price and trade credit to maximize the joint profit of supply chain. Isolated profit of supply chain is compared with overall system profit. Results are validated by numerical examples and further sensitivity analyses of important parameters are discussed. Conclusion obtained from the chapter is useful to supply chains involved with FMCGs, Drugs, Fashion goods and home decor textile.

Two-Period Pricing with Selling Effort in the Presence of Strategic Customers

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (03) ◽  
pp. 1950011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Feng Yang ◽  
Junjun Kong ◽  
Minyue Jin
Keyword(s):  
Future Price ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Enhancement Effect ◽  
Direct Impact ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Strategic Customers ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Price Discounts ◽  
Selling Effort ◽  
Second Period

This paper investigates the implications of selling effort upon a monopolistic seller’s optimal pricing decisions and its performance in the presence of strategic customers. In our model, strategic customers can anticipate future price discounts and decide on when to purchase products from the seller over two periods. The direct impact of selling effort is to induce more customers to purchase in the first period. Two pricing policies are under consideration: (i) preannounced pricing under which the seller commits to a price path over two periods in advance; (ii) contingent pricing under which the seller can dynamically set a price in each period. The analytical results demonstrate that preannounced pricing always dominates contingent pricing from the seller’s perspective. Moreover, compared with the results under contingent pricing, selling effort is enhanced but market demand is shrunk under preannounced pricing. Through sensitivity analysis, we further find that when customers become more willing to postpone their purchases to the second period, the seller should reduce its selling effort in the first period if the demand-enhancement effect of selling effort is sufficiently low.

scholarly journals Competitive pricing strategies of multi channel supply chain under direct servicing by the manufacturer

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amit Sarkar ◽  
Brojeswar Pal
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Strategic Alliance ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Optimum Level ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
The People ◽  
Demand Rate ◽  
Competitive Pricing

Internet and its accessible devices (e.g., mobiles, computers) are the unmitigated blessings to the people. Nowadays, internet connectivity almost eliminates all kinds of blockades for the verification of authentication, comparison of prices, and services for a product. Consequently, the market has been becoming more competitive compared to decision making.  In this paper, we construct a multi-channel supply chain (MCSC) frameworks with traditional channels as well as a direct channel (DC), where the manufacturer provides services to the customers for both the cases. Then the optimal decisions of the manufacturer and the retailers are examined. The optimal pricing decisions and services are discussed and also compared the profits with one another under various cases (Stackelberg Settings, Strategic Alliance, and two types of NO Improved Service). Then the sensitivity of the service cost coefficients and the cross-channel price coefficients on the profits for each player and the supply chain is analyzed. We find out the best profitable strategies under the parameters such as service costs and the positive effects of the service on the demand rate. We also mark out the optimum level of the services so that the profit will be maximized for each player. Finally, we define an interval such that if the service costs belong to that interval, then the selling price of the DC would be lesser than the wholesale price. These findings help companies such as automobiles, electronic goods, etc. to implement the best strategies to increase their profit.

Study on Discrimination Pricing Model of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Product Remanufacturing

2012 ◽  
Vol 452-453 ◽  
pp. 663-668 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong Wei Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
New Product ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Pricing Model ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions

With awareness of environmental protection strengthens and constraints of regulations and laws to environmental protection increasing, more and more enterprises focus on the closed-loop supply chain management. Considering difference between new product and remanufactured product, this paper constructs closed-loop supply chain system with manufacturers recycling used products directly from the consumers based on game theory. The optimal pricing decisions and the optimal profit of centralized and decentralized closed-loop supply chain are obtained. It is found that the efficiency of decentralized closed-loop supply chain decreases by 25%. At last, the coordination mechanism is designed to solve the profit conflict in the decentralized closed-loop supply chain by the two-part tariff contract.

Research on Coordination in the Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Remanufacturing

2012 ◽  
Vol 220-223 ◽  
pp. 319-322
Author(s):  
Hong Wei Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
New Product ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions

Based on game theory, this paper constructs closed-loop supply chain system with retailer recycling used products from the consumers incorporating difference between new product and remanufactured product. The optimal pricing decisions and the optimal profits of centralized coordinated and decentralized closed-loop supply chain are obtained. It is found that the efficiency of decentralized closed-loop supply chain decreases by 25%. Finally, the coordination mechanism is designed to solve the profit conflict in the decentralized closed-loop supply chain by the profit sharing contract.

scholarly journals Energy-saving and pricing decisions in a sustainable supply chain considering behavioral concerns

PLoS ONE ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (8) ◽  
pp. e0236354
Author(s):  
Bin Chen ◽  
Wenying Xie ◽  
Fuyou Huang ◽  
Xinyang Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Energy Saving ◽  
Sustainable Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Behavioral Concerns

scholarly journals Pricing and Allotment in a Sea-Cargo Supply Chain with Reference Effect: A Dynamic Game Approach

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Xu ◽  
Govindan Kannan ◽  
Xiaoli Yang ◽  
Jian Li ◽  
Xiukun Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Closed Form Solution ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Spot Market ◽  
Form Solution ◽  
Purchasing Decisions ◽  
Purchasing Decision ◽  
Pricing Decisions

The contract between the carrier and forwarder is a long-term issue, and the repeated contract business makes the forwarder develop a reference point based on the contract prices, and this reference effect, to a large extent, affects the forwarder’s contract purchasing decisions. Based on that, this paper introduces the reference effect in the sea-cargo supply chain and studies a multiple-period contract problem between the carrier and the forwarder. It is found that when the capacity price in the spot market is less than the forwarder’s willingness-to-pay, the forwarder’s contract purchasing decision is not affected by the reference effect, only by the capacity price in the spot market, and the multiple-period contract problem can be simplified into a single-period game. In addition, the carrier’s optimal contract wholesale price approaches the capacity price in the spot market. Although, the forwarder’s contract purchasing decision depends upon the reference effect, it is difficult to derive the closed-form solution. Moreover, because of the risk in the spot market, the carrier tends to sell his/her capacity in the contract market. Finally, we employ the numerical simulation to study the carrier’s contract pricing decisions and the forwarder’s capacity purchasing decisions in two cases.

scholarly journals Pricing and Logistics Service Decisions in Platform-Led Electronic Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Remanufacturing

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (20) ◽  
pp. 11357
Author(s):  
Kai Liu ◽  
Chunfa Li ◽  
Runde Gu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Optimal Choice ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Logistics Service ◽  
The Third

With the continuous development of e-commerce, it has become normal for the manufacturer to sell products and to collect used products through e-commerce platforms (platform for short). We consider an electronic closed-loop supply chain (E-CLSC) where we composed a manufacturer with remanufacturing capability and a platform that can provide logistics services. The purpose of this paper is to address whether the manufacturer should directly collect used products from the consumer under the platform. Specifically, we have developed four game models, namely model N (no collection), model M (the manufacturer collects), model E (the platform collects), and model T (the third-party collects) and derived the optimal pricing decisions, logistics service level, and collection rate for E-CLSC members. We found that remanufacturing used products is conducive to increasing the profits of the manufacturer and the platform as well as to increasing the utility of the consumer. Under the same conditions, for the manufacturer, the platform, and the consumer, the optimal choice is that the manufacturer directly collects the used products from the consumer. If the manufacturer is unable to establish an effective collection channel, he should consider outsourcing to a contractor and should consider the platform to be under the same conditions. Numerical examples are also given to verify the proposed results.

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