Equilibrium and incentives for supervisor–postgraduate collaborations: A game-theoretic approach

2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (5) ◽  
pp. 1729-1747 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qinglong Gou ◽  
Xinyu Wang ◽  
Juzhi Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Educational System ◽  
Collaborative Work ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Joint Work ◽  
Postgraduate Students ◽  
Incentive Strategies ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

In most universities, supervisors collaborate with their postgraduate students in writing papers. As a consequence, the relationship between supervisors and postgraduates in the collaborative work becomes the most important one among various relationships between them. In this paper, using a game model, we show that in the current educational system of China, there is a dilemma between supervisors and their postgraduates for their collaborative work – in most cases, either the supervisor or the students will not spend any effort in their joint work. After that, we also investigate whether the two common incentive strategies, i.e., (i) incentives to students, and (ii) incentives to faculties, can solve this dilemma. Our results show that a university can solve the problem by either (i) just using strong incentives to postgraduate students, or (ii) by using a combination of a normal incentive to students and a strong incentive to faculties. Also, we find that when the incentives to the students and to the faculties are below a certain level, all incentives will be just in vain – neither can they improve the serious relationship between supervisors and their postgraduates, nor can they improve the paper quality.

scholarly journals Research on manufacturer encroachment with advertising and design of incentive advertising: A game-theoretic approach

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Yalan Hong
Keyword(s):  
Advertising Effectiveness ◽  
Cooperative Advertising ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Direct Selling ◽  
First Mover Advantage ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach ◽  
Decision Power ◽  
First Mover

This paper studies the advertising decision regarding a supply chain with manufacturer encroachment. It is assumed that the manufacturer and the retailer have different quantity decision power so as to explore how the first-mover advantage affect the advertising decision and the manufacturer encroachment. It is known that the manufacturer encroachment usually makes the retailer worse off. Our results show that (1) the retailer can benefit from encroachment when the manufacturer’s direct selling cost is high and the manufacturer does not have first-mover advantage of quantity decision; (2) the manufacturer can benefit from encroachment if his advertising effectiveness is high; (3) the encroachment may lead to a lose-lose result if the manufacturer has the first-mover advantage and his advertising effectiveness is not relative high; (4) the manufacturer may be worse off if his direct selling cost is intermediate no matter who has the first-mover advantage of quantity decision. Thus, the manufacturer should be more careful about the relationship between him and the retailer. Additionally, we consider two ways of advertising cooperation. Results shows that which type of cooperation is better depends on the relative advertising effectiveness. Furthermore, we propose an incentive cooperative advertising scheme which makes all players get higher profits.

scholarly journals Teorie principála a agenta a její využití při popisu vztahu volič–zástupce

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 215-242
Author(s):  
Jaroslava Pospíšilová
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Political Reality ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
New Research ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Theory Of Democracy ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

This review article is focused on the rising framework of principal-agent analysis in political science. It aims to map the most influential studies and answer the question of whether this concept is adequate to describe the quality of the relationship between voters and their representatives. It is obvious that using the principal-agent framework leads to oversimplification. The economic theory of democracy is not a new model; nevertheless, using the game theoretic approach requires several adjustments. The adaptation of the main premises of the concept to the political reality should open new research questions with respect to the voter–elected officials relationship. Most principal–agent studies in empirical political science are focused on all links in the delegation chain but the first one. In my opinion, the link between voters and their representatives in a democracy is the fundamental one. Describing it using the tools of principal-agent theory could help scholars better understand current changes in the structure of political parties and voter behaviour.

A GAME THEORETIC APPROACH TO STUDY THE QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION BB84 PROTOCOL

2011 ◽  
Vol 09 (04) ◽  
pp. 1133-1146
Author(s):  
MAHBOOBEH HOUSHMAND ◽  
MONIREH HOUSHMAND ◽  
HABIB RAJABI MASHHADI
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Key Distribution ◽  
Secure Communication ◽  
Key Distribution ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Previous Approach ◽  
Bb84 Protocol ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Amount Of Knowledge ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

Quantum cryptography uses quantum mechanics to guarantee secure communication. BB84 is a widely used quantum key distribution that provides a way for two parties, a sender, Alice, and a receiver, Bob, to share an unconditionally secure key in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve. Three different criteria can be assumed to study the BB84 protocol. They are the efficiency of the protocol, the probability that Eve remains undetected, and the amount of knowledge Eve has about Alice's bit sequence. In a previous approach, we only considered the probability that Eve remains undetected. We viewed this protocol as a three player static game in which Alice and Bob were two cooperative players and Eve was a competitive one. In our game model, Alice's and Bob's objective was to maximize the probability of detecting Eve, while Eve's objective was to minimize this probability. In this paper, our previous effort is extended and we also consider the other two criteria, i.e. the efficiency of the protocol and the amount of knowledge Eve has about Alice's bit sequence. Using these models, we show how game theory can be used to find the strategies for Alice, Bob and Eve.

scholarly journals Balancing Large-Scale Wildlife Protection and Forest Management Goals with a Game-Theoretic Approach

Forests ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 809
Author(s):  
Denys Yemshanov ◽  
Robert G. Haight ◽  
Ning Liu ◽  
Rob Rempel ◽  
Frank H. Koch ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Wildlife Protection ◽  
Economic Agents ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Profit Maximizing ◽  
Forest Lands ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

When adopted, wildlife protection policies in Canadian forests typically cover large areas and affect multiple economic agents working in these landscapes. Such measures are likely to increase the costs of timber for forestry companies operating in the area, which may hinder their acceptance of the policies unless harvesting remains profitable. We propose a bi-level wildlife protection problem that accounts for the profit-maximizing behavior of forestry companies operating in an area subject to protection. We consider the regulator with a wildlife protection mandate and forestry companies licensed to harvest public forest lands. We depict the relationship between the regulator and forestry companies as a leader-follower Stackelberg game. The leader sets the protected area target for each license area and the followers adjust their strategies to maximize payoffs while meeting the protection target set by the leader. The leader’s objective is to maximize the area-wide protection of spatially contiguous habitat while accounting for the followers’ profit-maximizing behavior. We apply the approach to investigate habitat protection policies for woodland caribou in the Churchill range, Ontario, Canada. We compare the game-theoretic solutions with solutions that do not consider the forest companies’ objectives and also with solutions equalizing the revenue losses among the companies.

A Game Theoretic Approach to Cash Management

1982 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 367 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl Alan Batlin ◽  
Susan Hinko
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Cash Management ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach
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