scholarly journals Balancing Large-Scale Wildlife Protection and Forest Management Goals with a Game-Theoretic Approach

Forests ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 809
Author(s):  
Denys Yemshanov ◽  
Robert G. Haight ◽  
Ning Liu ◽  
Rob Rempel ◽  
Frank H. Koch ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Wildlife Protection ◽  
Economic Agents ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Profit Maximizing ◽  
Forest Lands ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

When adopted, wildlife protection policies in Canadian forests typically cover large areas and affect multiple economic agents working in these landscapes. Such measures are likely to increase the costs of timber for forestry companies operating in the area, which may hinder their acceptance of the policies unless harvesting remains profitable. We propose a bi-level wildlife protection problem that accounts for the profit-maximizing behavior of forestry companies operating in an area subject to protection. We consider the regulator with a wildlife protection mandate and forestry companies licensed to harvest public forest lands. We depict the relationship between the regulator and forestry companies as a leader-follower Stackelberg game. The leader sets the protected area target for each license area and the followers adjust their strategies to maximize payoffs while meeting the protection target set by the leader. The leader’s objective is to maximize the area-wide protection of spatially contiguous habitat while accounting for the followers’ profit-maximizing behavior. We apply the approach to investigate habitat protection policies for woodland caribou in the Churchill range, Ontario, Canada. We compare the game-theoretic solutions with solutions that do not consider the forest companies’ objectives and also with solutions equalizing the revenue losses among the companies.

Equilibrium and incentives for supervisor–postgraduate collaborations: A game-theoretic approach

2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (5) ◽  
pp. 1729-1747 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qinglong Gou ◽  
Xinyu Wang ◽  
Juzhi Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Educational System ◽  
Collaborative Work ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Joint Work ◽  
Postgraduate Students ◽  
Incentive Strategies ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

In most universities, supervisors collaborate with their postgraduate students in writing papers. As a consequence, the relationship between supervisors and postgraduates in the collaborative work becomes the most important one among various relationships between them. In this paper, using a game model, we show that in the current educational system of China, there is a dilemma between supervisors and their postgraduates for their collaborative work – in most cases, either the supervisor or the students will not spend any effort in their joint work. After that, we also investigate whether the two common incentive strategies, i.e., (i) incentives to students, and (ii) incentives to faculties, can solve this dilemma. Our results show that a university can solve the problem by either (i) just using strong incentives to postgraduate students, or (ii) by using a combination of a normal incentive to students and a strong incentive to faculties. Also, we find that when the incentives to the students and to the faculties are below a certain level, all incentives will be just in vain – neither can they improve the serious relationship between supervisors and their postgraduates, nor can they improve the paper quality.

scholarly journals A Game Theoretic Approach for Eco-Design and Remanufacturing Considering Take-Back Policy

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (17) ◽  
pp. 7174
Author(s):  
Xiaoxiao Chang ◽  
Guangye Xu ◽  
Qian Wang ◽  
Yongguang Zhong
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Impact ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
Monetary Value ◽  
Game Equilibrium ◽  
Take Back ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Government ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

This paper mainly aims at investigating the governments’ take-back policy of penalty or subsidy that motivates eco-design or remanufacturing. For this purpose, we consider a two-stage Stackelberg game between a government and a manufacturer. The government first decides to impose a take-back penalty or offer a take-back subsidy, and then the manufacturer selects to remanufacture or invest in eco-design as a response to the take-back policy. Upon analyzing and comparing game equilibrium, we find that the government prefers to offer a subsidy policy for eco-design and to impose a penalty policy for remanufacturing. The manufacturer will decide on investing in eco-design when the monetary value of the environmental impact of landfill and eco-design coefficient is medium. However, if the eco-design coefficient is high, the manufacturer practices remanufacturing instead of eco-design whether penalized and subsidized. The present study provides a set of guidelines in practical managerial recommendations for governments and manufacturers.

scholarly journals Research on manufacturer encroachment with advertising and design of incentive advertising: A game-theoretic approach

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Yalan Hong
Keyword(s):  
Advertising Effectiveness ◽  
Cooperative Advertising ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Direct Selling ◽  
First Mover Advantage ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach ◽  
Decision Power ◽  
First Mover

This paper studies the advertising decision regarding a supply chain with manufacturer encroachment. It is assumed that the manufacturer and the retailer have different quantity decision power so as to explore how the first-mover advantage affect the advertising decision and the manufacturer encroachment. It is known that the manufacturer encroachment usually makes the retailer worse off. Our results show that (1) the retailer can benefit from encroachment when the manufacturer’s direct selling cost is high and the manufacturer does not have first-mover advantage of quantity decision; (2) the manufacturer can benefit from encroachment if his advertising effectiveness is high; (3) the encroachment may lead to a lose-lose result if the manufacturer has the first-mover advantage and his advertising effectiveness is not relative high; (4) the manufacturer may be worse off if his direct selling cost is intermediate no matter who has the first-mover advantage of quantity decision. Thus, the manufacturer should be more careful about the relationship between him and the retailer. Additionally, we consider two ways of advertising cooperation. Results shows that which type of cooperation is better depends on the relative advertising effectiveness. Furthermore, we propose an incentive cooperative advertising scheme which makes all players get higher profits.

A Stackelberg game theoretic approach to resilient control of an islanded microgrid

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Prashant Bansode ◽  
Aniket Deshpande ◽  
Sushant Bahadure ◽  
Pratik Bajaria ◽  
Faruk Kazi ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Resilient Control ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Islanded Microgrid ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach
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