Evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game among mobile players with random-pairing and reinforcement learning

2013 ◽  
Vol 392 (22) ◽  
pp. 5700-5710 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ning Jia ◽  
Shoufeng Ma
Keyword(s):  
Reinforcement Learning ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Snowdrift Game ◽  
Random Pairing

Effect of Growing Size of Interaction Neighbors on the Evolution of Cooperation in Spatial Snowdrift Game

2012 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 541-546 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan-Juan Zhang ◽  
Juan Wang ◽  
Shi-Wen Sun ◽  
Li Wang ◽  
Zhen Wang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Snowdrift Game

scholarly journals Stochasticity, Selection, and the Evolution of Cooperation in a Two-Level Moran Model of the Snowdrift Game

Complexity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian McLoone ◽  
Wai-Tong Louis Fan ◽  
Adam Pham ◽  
Rory Smead ◽  
Laurence Loewe
Keyword(s):  
Stochastic Dynamics ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Threshold Effect ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Multilevel Selection ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Interior Equilibrium ◽  
Moran Model ◽  
Snowdrift Game

The Snowdrift Game, also known as the Hawk-Dove Game, is a social dilemma in which an individual can participate (cooperate) or not (defect) in producing a public good. It is relevant to a number of collective action problems in biology. In a population of individuals playing this game, traditional evolutionary models, in which the dynamics are continuous and deterministic, predict a stable, interior equilibrium frequency of cooperators. Here, we examine how finite population size and multilevel selection affect the evolution of cooperation in this game using a two-level Moran process, which involves discrete, stochastic dynamics. Our analysis has two main results. First, we find that multilevel selection in this model can yield significantly higher levels of cooperation than one finds in traditional models. Second, we identify a threshold effect for the payoff matrix in the Snowdrift Game, such that below (above) a determinate cost-to-benefit ratio, cooperation will almost surely fix (go extinct) in the population. This second result calls into question the explanatory reach of traditional continuous models and suggests a possible alternative explanation for high levels of cooperative behavior in nature.

scholarly journals Heterogeneity and Environmental Preferences Shape the Evolution of Cooperation in Supply Networks

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Dong Mu ◽  
Xiongping Yue
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Environmental Preferences ◽  
Supply Networks ◽  
Snowdrift Game ◽  
Environmental Preference ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
The Impact

Supply networks as complex systems are significant challenges for decision-makers in predicting the evolution of cooperation among firms. The impact of environmental heterogeneity on firms is critical. Environment-based preference selection plays a pivotal role in clarifying the existence and maintenance of cooperation in supply networks. This paper explores the implication of the heterogeneity of environment and environment-based preference on the evolution of cooperation in supply networks. Cellular automata are considered to examine the synchronized evolution of cooperation and defection across supply networks. The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game and Snowdrift Game reward schemes have been formed, and the heterogeneous environment and environmental preference have been applied. The results show that the heterogeneous environment’s degree leads to higher cooperation for both Prisoner’s Dilemma Game and Snowdrift Game. We also probe into the impact of the environmental preference on the evolution of cooperation, and the results of which confirm the usefulness of preference of environment. This work offers a valuable perspective to improve the level of cooperation among firms and understand the evolution of cooperation in supply networks.

HERDING EFFECT FOR THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION IN THE SNOWDRIFT GAME

2008 ◽  
Vol 22 (27) ◽  
pp. 4909-4916 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. QIU ◽  
C. F. FU ◽  
G. CHEN
Keyword(s):  
Group Selection ◽  
Critical Value ◽  
Intermediate Level ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Herding Behavior ◽  
Snowdrift Game ◽  
Large Clusters

We study the herding mechanism for the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game. By controlling the herding parameter a, which measures the herding behavior of players, we investigate the cooperative frequency fc on the payoff r. It is found that, for a small a, large clusters are formed and the system shows an intermediate level cooperation up to a big payoff r. However, as a increases, clusters become smaller, and cooperation decreases faster. When a is large, up to a critical value of about a* = 0.5, most players stay alone, each as a separate cluster, and no cooperation occurs. This phenomenon indicates that an individual favors defection, while group selection favors cooperation.

scholarly journals Instability of cooperation in finite populations

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chai Molina ◽  
David J. D. Earn
Keyword(s):  
Finite Population ◽  
Selection Process ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Implicit Assumption ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Infinite Population ◽  
Snowdrift Game ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

AbstractEvolutionary game theory has been developed primarily under the implicit assumption of an infinite population. We rigorously analyze a standard model for the evolution of cooperation (the multi-player snowdrift game) and show that in many situations in which there is a cooperative evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) if the population is infinite, there is no cooperative ESS if the population is finite (no matter how large). In these cases, contributing nothing is a globally convergently stable finite-population ESS, implying that apparent evolution of cooperation in such games is an artifact of the infinite population approximation. The key issue is that if the size of groups that play the game exceeds a critical proportion of the population then the infinite-population approximation predicts the wrong evolutionary outcome (in addition, the critical proportion itself depends on the population size). Our results are robust to the underlying selection process.

EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION IN THE SNOWDRIFT GAME WITH HETEROGENEOUS POPULATION

2013 ◽  
Vol 16 (08) ◽  
pp. 1350036 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDRÉ BARREIRA DA SILVA ROCHA ◽  
ANNICK LARUELLE
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Heterogeneous Population ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Stability Conditions ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Snowdrift Game

Different from previous studies of tag-based cooperation, we assume that individuals fail to recognize their own tag. Due to such incomplete information, the action taken against the opponent cannot be based on similarity, although it is still motivated by the tag displayed by the opponent. We present stability conditions for the case when individuals play unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection or conditional cooperation. We then consider the removal of one or two strategies. Results show that conditional cooperators are the most resilient agents against extinction and that the removal of unconditional cooperators may lead to the extinction of unconditional defectors.

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