A discrepancy theory of perceptual attention and learning

1976 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert B. McCall
2019 ◽  
Vol 145 (4) ◽  
pp. 372-389 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tyler B. Mason ◽  
Kathryn E. Smith ◽  
Allison Engwall ◽  
Alisson Lass ◽  
Michael Mead ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Jonardon Ganeri

Conscious attention performs two distinct roles in experience, a role of placing and a role of focusing, roles which match a distinction between selection and access endorsed in recent theories of attention. The intentionality of conscious experience consists in two sorts of attentional action, a focusing at and a placing on, the first lending to experience a perspectival categorical content and the second structuring its phenomenal character. Placing should be thought of more like opening a window for consciousness than as shining a spotlight, and focusing has to do with accessing the properties of whatever the window opens onto. A window is an aperture whose boundaries are defined by what is excluded—in this case, distractors.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Cagnoli Fiecconi

Abstract I argue that a study of the Nicomachean Ethics and of the Parva Naturalia shows that Aristotle had a notion of attention. This notion captures the common aspects of apparently different phenomena like perceiving something vividly, being distracted by a loud sound or by a musical piece, focusing on a geometrical problem. For Aristotle, these phenomena involve a specific selectivity that is the outcome of the competition between different cognitive stimuli. This selectivity is attention. I argue that Aristotle studied the common aspects of the physiological processes at the basis of attention and its connection with pleasure. His notion can explain perceptual attention and intellectual attention as voluntary or involuntary phenomena. In addition, it sheds light on how attention and enjoyment can enhance our cognitive activities.


1985 ◽  
Vol 78 (S1) ◽  
pp. S83-S83
Author(s):  
Howard C. Nusbaum ◽  
Steven L. Greenspan ◽  
David B. Pisoni

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Javier Cembrano ◽  
José Correa ◽  
Victor Verdugo
Keyword(s):  

1988 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wesley C. King ◽  
James M. Lahiff ◽  
John D. Hatfield

Author(s):  
E. Tory Higgins ◽  
Emily Nakkawita

Self-discrepancy theory and regulatory focus theory are two related motivational theories. Self-discrepancy theory describes the associations between self and affect, positing that the relations among different sets of self-concepts influence a person’s emotional experience. A discrepancy between a person’s ideal self-guide (e.g., hopes and aspirations) and his or her actual self-concept produces dejection-related emotions (e.g., sadness), whereas a discrepancy between a person’s ought self-guide (e.g., duties and obligations) and his or her actual self-concept produces agitation-related emotions (e.g., anxiety). The intensity of these emotional experiences depends upon the magnitude and accessibility of the associated discrepancy. Regulatory focus theory builds on self-discrepancy theory, positing that distinct self-regulatory systems are reflected in the two types of self-guides proposed in self-discrepancy theory. The promotion system is motivated by ideal end-states, by pursuing hopes and aspirations; as a result, it is primarily concerned with the presence or absence of positive outcomes—with gains and non-gains. Given this focus on gains and non-gains, the promotion system is motivated by fundamental needs for nurturance and growth. In contrast, the prevention system is motivated by ought end-states, by fulfilling duties and obligations; as a result, it is primarily concerned with the presence or absence of negative outcomes—with losses and non-losses. Given this focus on losses and non-losses, the prevention system is motivated by fundamental needs for safety and security. The promotion and prevention systems predict a range of important variables relating to cognition, performance, and decision-making.


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