Informal Customary Institutions, Collective Action, and Submunicipal Public Goods Provision in Mexico

Latin American Politics and Society ◽

10.1017/lap.2021.26 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 1-25

Author(s):

Mart E. Trasberg

Keyword(s):

Collective Action ◽

Public Goods ◽

Qualitative Interviews ◽

Small Scale ◽

Social Infrastructure ◽

Public Goods Provision ◽

Theoretical Mechanism ◽

Village Communities ◽

Development Outcomes ◽

Original Survey

ABSTRACT This article explores the role of informal customary institutions (usos y costumbres) in local public goods provision in Mexico. It argues that the presence of informal customary institutions offers submunicipal village communities considerable advantages in local distributive politics. Hamlet communities with dense customary institutions have higher collective action capacity to organize their citizens for small-scale protests in municipal centers, which grants them access to more social infrastructure projects controlled by municipal politicians. This article therefore suggests a novel theoretical mechanism through which customary institutions affect development outcomes: collective contentious action. The study tests the main empirical implications of this theory, drawing on an original survey of submunicipal community presidents in the states of Puebla and Tlaxcala and qualitative interviews.

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Political Solutions to the Collective Action Problem

Political Studies ◽

10.1111/j.1467-9248.1980.tb01245.x ◽

1980 ◽

Vol 28 (2) ◽

pp. 195-209 ◽

Cited By ~ 12

Author(s):

Michael Laver

Keyword(s):

Collective Action ◽

Public Goods ◽

Public Goods Provision ◽

Collective Action Problem ◽

The Core ◽

Political Entrepreneurs ◽

Production Problems

This paper juxtaposes two important political solutions to the collective action problem in the context of a common set of core assumptions. Once the core assumptions have been discussed, the distinction between the consumption and the production problems associated with public goods provision is elaborated. These assumptions and this distinction are applied to a comparison between a theory of individualistic anarchy, and a theory of competitive political entrepreneurs. Revisions of both are required to enable them to be placed within this framework. While the two theories are neither exclusive nor exhaustive they can, between them, be used to understand public goods provision in a number of different circumstances.

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Political instability and discontinuity in Nigeria: The pre-colonial past and public goods provision under colonial and post-colonial political orders.

The Economics of Peace and Security Journal ◽

10.15355/epsj.10.1.40 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 10 (1) ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Kostadis Jason Papaioannou ◽

Angus Edwin Dalrymple-Smith

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Political Stability ◽

Institutional Capacity ◽

Public Works ◽

Public Goods Provision ◽

Military Dictatorship ◽

Colonial Era ◽

Post Colonial ◽

Development Outcomes ◽

Second World

This article explores the relative importance of pre-colonial institutional capacity and the effects of periods of peace and stability on long-term development outcomes in Nigeria. We use data on education, health, and public works at a provincial level from a variety of colonial and Nigerian state sources to apply a decade-by-decade analysis of public goods provision in Nigeria from 1900 to 2010. Using a newly constructed measure of pre-colonial institutional capacity our results suggest that colonial-era investments were influenced by pre-colonial conditions and that the pax colonia allowed for a strong path dependency until the second world war. Contrary to other studies, which find evidence of pre-colonial centralization affecting current outcomes. In particular, we find that the post-1945 era saw a break in the pattern developed earlier in the century. Rising regionalism from the 1950s led to violent conflict and military dictatorship and caused decades of unstable and unpredictable patterns of investment which ended only with the reestablishment of democracy in the 1990s. Therefore, a key explanatory variable to understanding patterns of public goods provision seems to be the level of political stability which the Nigerian state experienced at different points during the 20th century. [JEL codes: N00, O1, H4]

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Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China

American Political Science Review ◽

10.1017/s0003055407070153 ◽

2007 ◽

Vol 101 (2) ◽

pp. 355-372 ◽

Cited By ~ 212

Author(s):

LILY L. TSAI

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Rural China ◽

Case Study Research ◽

Government Officials ◽

Public Goods Provision ◽

Local Officials ◽

Original Survey ◽

Bureaucratic Institutions ◽

Informal Accountability

Why would government officials in authoritarian and transitional systems where formal democratic and bureaucratic institutions of accountability are often weak ever provide more than the minimum level of public goods needed to maintain social stability? Findings from a unique combination of in-depth case study research and an original survey of 316 villages in rural China indicate that even when formal accountability is weak, local officials can be subject to unofficial rules and norms that establish and enforce their public obligations. These informal institutions of accountability can be provided by encompassing and embedding solidary groups. Villages where these types of groups exist are more likely to have better local governmental public goods provision than villages without these solidary groups, all other things being equal.

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