How the Undemocratic Political Institutions Affect Public Goods Provision under Elections in Rural China: A Formal Theory

Why are many of China’s successful rural enterprises publically owned by local communities? Using a set of provincial data, we find that the share of community public firms (Township-Village Enterprises, or TVEs) relative to private enterprises is higher where the central government’s influence is greater, the community government’s power is stronger, and the level of market development is lower. We also find that TVEs help achieve the community government’s goals of increasing government revenue, rural nonfarm employment, and rural income. However, TVEs do not increase rural income given the levels of non-farm employment and/or local public goods provision, indicating possible inefficiency as compared to private enterprises.

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Local governance and public goods provision in rural China

Journal of Public Economics ◽

10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.07.004 ◽

2004 ◽

Vol 88 (12) ◽

pp. 2857-2871 ◽

Cited By ~ 107

Author(s):

Xiaobo Zhang ◽

Shenggen Fan ◽

Linxiu Zhang ◽

Jikun Huang

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Local Governance ◽

Rural China ◽

Public Goods Provision

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Public Finance, Public Goods Provision, and Government Responsiveness: Evidence from Rural China

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.3348778 ◽

2019 ◽

Author(s):

Zhenhuan Lei

Keyword(s):

Public Finance ◽

Public Goods ◽

Rural China ◽

Public Goods Provision ◽

Government Responsiveness

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Can relationship bring more provision in rural public goods? Empirical evidence from rural China

China Agricultural Economic Review ◽

10.1108/caer-07-2016-0098 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 9 (1) ◽

pp. 48-61 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Yuxin Wang ◽

Qing Liu ◽

Yanrui Wu ◽

Huaqing Wu

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Rural China ◽

Public Goods Provision ◽

Content Type ◽

Rural Public Goods ◽

Neighborhood Relationship ◽

Different Types ◽

The Impact ◽

The Village ◽

Positive Effect

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate how different types of the village relationship influence different types of public goods provision in rural China. Design/methodology/approach The three components (clan-based relationship, neighborhood relationship and external relationship) were derived by employing factor analysis. The simultaneous discrete choice model was used to estimate the influence of these components on public goods provision, using the survey data from the China Household Income Project conducted in 2007. Findings The findings indicate that considering different components of village relationship allows for a better understanding of the public good provision. The results indicate that the neighborhood relationship has a significantly positive effect on rural public goods provision, particularly on water conservancy and irrigation, while the external relationship has a significantly positive effect on all types of public goods. Practical implications Local public goods provision is the core of the new rural construction in China. These findings imply that relationship in villages plays a vital role in the provision of public goods and is necessary in the construction of the new harmonious countryside in China. The results also have implications for rural public goods provision in other developing countries. Originality/value To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to quantitatively model the impact of different relationships on public goods provision at the rural level. A consideration of the different components in village relationship allows for a more precise understanding of the pubic goods provision in the village.

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Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China

American Political Science Review ◽

10.1017/s0003055407070153 ◽

2007 ◽

Vol 101 (2) ◽

pp. 355-372 ◽

Cited By ~ 212

Author(s):

LILY L. TSAI

Keyword(s):

Public Goods ◽

Rural China ◽

Case Study Research ◽

Government Officials ◽

Public Goods Provision ◽

Local Officials ◽

Original Survey ◽

Bureaucratic Institutions ◽

Informal Accountability

Why would government officials in authoritarian and transitional systems where formal democratic and bureaucratic institutions of accountability are often weak ever provide more than the minimum level of public goods needed to maintain social stability? Findings from a unique combination of in-depth case study research and an original survey of 316 villages in rural China indicate that even when formal accountability is weak, local officials can be subject to unofficial rules and norms that establish and enforce their public obligations. These informal institutions of accountability can be provided by encompassing and embedding solidary groups. Villages where these types of groups exist are more likely to have better local governmental public goods provision than villages without these solidary groups, all other things being equal.

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