In Favor of the Classical Quine on Ontology
AbstractI make a Quinean case that Quine’s ontological relativity marked a wrong turn in his philosophy, that his fundamental commitments point toward the classical view of ontology that was worked out in most detail in his Word and Object (1960). This removes the impetus toward (a version of) structuralism in his later philosophy.
2020 ◽
Vol 319
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pp. 128338
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1959 ◽
Vol 242
(690)
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pp. 151-204
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Keyword(s):
1995 ◽
Vol 16
(5)
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pp. 220-222
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2014 ◽
Vol 54
(12)
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pp. 1184-1186
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2019 ◽
Vol 9
(9(5))
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pp. 557-576
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