Auction Design for the Private Provision of Public Goods in Developing Countries: Lessons from Payments for Environmental Services in Malawi and Indonesia

2012 ◽  
Vol 40 (6) ◽  
pp. 1213-1223 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oluyede C. Ajayi ◽  
B. Kelsey Jack ◽  
Beria Leimona
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Environmental Services ◽  
Payments For Environmental Services ◽  
Auction Design ◽  
Private Provision

scholarly journals Cost-effective provision of environmental services: the role of relaxing market constraints

2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
BEN GROOM ◽  
CHARLES PALMER
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Poverty Alleviation ◽  
Cost Effective ◽  
Environmental Services ◽  
Payments For Environmental Services ◽  
Environmental Goals

ABSTRACTFerraro and Simpson (2002) argue that when markets are competitive, payments for environmental services (PES) are more cost-effective in achieving environmental goals than more indirect approaches such as subsidies to capital. However, when eco-entrepreneurs face non-price rationing in input or output markets, as is typical for credit in developing countries for example, we show that interventions which relax constraints can be more cost-effective than PES. One corollary of this is that such indirect approaches are preferred to PES by interveners (e.g., donors) and eco-entrepreneurs alike. Both of these outcomes are more likely when constraints are severe. This has implications for schemes with dual environment and poverty alleviation objectives.

A Model of Inequality Aversion and Private Provision of Public Goods

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hide-Fumi Yokoo
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Theoretical Foundation ◽  
Inequality Aversion ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Marginal Rate ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
Marginal Rate Of Substitution ◽  
Good Provision ◽  
Corner Solutions

AbstractI develop a model of inequality aversion and public goods that allows the marginal rate of substitution to be variable. As a theoretical foundation, utility function of the standard public goods model is nested in the Fehr-Schmidt model. An individual’s contribution function for a public good is derived by solving the problem of kinky preference and examining both interior and corner solutions. Results show that the derived contribution function is not monotonic with respect to the other individual’s provision. Thus, the model can be used to explain empirical evidence for the effect of social comparison on public-good provision.

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