Associative processes in intuitive judgment

Carey K. Morewedge; Daniel Kahneman

doi:10.1016/j.tics.2010.07.004

Associative Processes in Probabilistic Sequence Learning

PsycEXTRA Dataset ◽

10.1037/e527342012-447 ◽

2007 ◽

Author(s):

Jennifer P. Provyn ◽

Marc W. Howard

Keyword(s):

Sequence Learning ◽

Associative Processes

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Triggers of Thought: Impressions within Hume’s Theory of Mind

History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis ◽

10.30965/26664275-01301007 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 13 (1) ◽

pp. 105-121

Author(s):

Anik Waldow

Keyword(s):

Theory Of Mind ◽

Associative Processes ◽

Sensory Inputs ◽

The World ◽

Theories Of Meaning ◽

Conceptual Resources

This essay argues that Humean impressions are triggers of associative processes, which enable us to form stable patterns of thought that co-vary with our experiences of the world. It will thus challenge the importance of the Copy Principle by claiming that it is the regularity with which certain kinds of sensory inputs motivate certain sets of complex ideas that matters for the discrimination of ideas. This reading is conducive to Hume’s account of perception, because it avoids the impoverishment of conceptual resources so typical for empiricist theories of meaning and explains why ideas should be based on impressions, although impressions cannot be known to mirror matters of fact. Dieser Aufsatz argumentiert dafür, dass humesche Eindrücke („impressions“) Auslöser von assoziativen Prozessen sind, welche es uns ermöglichen, stabile Denkmuster zu bilden, die mit unseren Erfahrungen der Welt kovariant sind. Der Aufsatz stellt somit die Wichtigkeit des Kopien-Prinzips in Frage, nämlich dadurch, dass behauptet wird, für die Unterscheidung der Ideen sei die Regelmäßigkeit maßgeblich, mit der gewisse Arten von sensorischen Eingaben gewisse Mengen von komplexen Ideen motivieren. Diese Lesart trägt zu einem Verständnis von Humes Auffassung der Wahrnehmung bei, da sie die Verarmung der begrifflichen Mittel, die für empiristische Theorien der Bedeutung so typisch ist, vermeidet und erklärt, warum Ideen auf Eindrücken basieren sollten, obwohl Eindrücke nicht als Abbildungen von Tatsachen erkannt werden können.

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The Interpretation of 'Likely' Depends on the Context, But 70% is 70% - Right? The Influence of Associative Processes on Perceived Certainty

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.1304758 ◽

1999 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Paul D. Windschitl ◽

Elke U. Weber

Keyword(s):

Associative Processes

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Associative processes in differentially reared rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta): Blocking

Developmental Psychobiology ◽

10.1002/dev.420240304 ◽

1991 ◽

Vol 24 (3) ◽

pp. 175-189 ◽

Cited By ~ 33

Author(s):

Alan J. Beauchamp ◽

John P. Gluck ◽

H. Edward Fouty ◽

Mark H. Lewis

Keyword(s):

Macaca Mulatta ◽

Rhesus Monkeys ◽

Associative Processes

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Hyperactivity of Associations in Psychosis

Australian & New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry ◽

10.3109/00048678909062141 ◽

1989 ◽

Vol 23 (2) ◽

pp. 241-248 ◽

Cited By ~ 17

Author(s):

Robert Miller

Keyword(s):

Negative Symptoms ◽

Inductive Inference ◽

Great Variability ◽

Acute Psychosis ◽

Variable Response ◽

Neuroleptic Treatment ◽

High Anxiety ◽

Associative Processes ◽

Psychotic State ◽

Anxiety Levels

Disordered associative processes have long been regarded as central to the psychological description of psychotic states such as acute schizophrenia. Previous work is briefly summarised concerning the idea that hyperactive associative processes of thought underlie many of the symptoms of psychosis. The idea is developed further, with respect to several features of the psychotic state. Schneiderian symptoms are seenas a consequence of hyperactive associations of thought, combined with perceptual hypersensitivity characteristic of many psychotic individuals. Anxiety in psychotic states is seen as arising from the great ambiguity of mental images when associations are loosened. A vicious circle between high anxiety and hyperactive associations is postulated. The slow and variable response to neuroleptic treatment is seen as being determined in part by the dynamics of change of the memories acquired during a period of hyperactive associations. This essay has dealt exclusively with the positive (productive) symptoms of psychosis, and their treatment. It has briefly traced the origin of the idea that hyperactive associations of thought (i.e. of inductive inference) play an important part in the psychology of acute psychosis. Further it has attempted to show that this idea can be extended to give an account of Schneiderian symptoms, the high anxiety levels commonly found in acute psychosis, as well as the great variability in the rate and extent of response to drug treatment. The negative symptoms of schizophrenia are not included in the discussion. Some of these symptoms are not responsive to neuroleptic drugs. This leads one to suspect that other pathological processes in addition to those discussed above may be involved in the genesis of the negative symptoms.

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