The Differential Game Analysis of Manufacturer and Supplier's Carbon Emissions under Different Game Conditions

Author(s):  
Ping Chen ◽  
Xue He ◽  
Shuangliang Tian ◽  
Meijun Chen
2014 ◽  
Vol 687-691 ◽  
pp. 1662-1667
Author(s):  
Xue He ◽  
Shuang Liang Tian ◽  
Ping Chen ◽  
Wen Wen Tian

Using the differential game theory, we studied the investment problem on public libraries, and established the Leader-follower differential game model, which is between the governments and the private enterprises (social organization). By building the Hamiltonian solving the Stackelberg balanced optimal solutions in the main two game players when they choose their strategies. By adjusting the strategy of government and social utility’s coefficient of dynamic to increase the comprehensive social utility of libraries.


Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 15
Author(s):  
Gila E. Fruchter ◽  
Hussein Naseraldin

Production emissions in the industrial sector are a major source of environmental pollution. In this paper, we explore how emission considerations are integrated with production decisions. We develop a dynamic model consisting of two firms located in the same industrial park, which satisfies exogenously given demands in separate markets. The two firms can build up or rundown stocks (full backlogging), both of which are costly. The emission cost depends on the total output of the two firms. We develop Nash equilibrium feedback strategies, where each firm decides on its output based on its inventory or the inventories of both. We also develop a social planning solution where decisions are centralized. We present the analytic results for the total profits in these settings. The results show the benefits of a decentralized approach over a centralized one, provided there is a mechanism for coordination. Finally, emission costs are compared for the various solution concepts.


Symmetry ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (11) ◽  
pp. 1861
Author(s):  
Xia Cao ◽  
Xiaojun Yang ◽  
Lupeng Zhang

Civil-military integration enables the symmetry development of dual-use technologies in the defense and civilian areas. In this paper, we used stochastic differential game theory to build theoretical models of the dual-use technology conversion between a military firm and a civilian firm. The models include three directions of dual-use technology conversion, namely, spin-off, spin-in, and mix. In particular, we incorporate the dynamic development of dual-use technology into the research framework. Our results show that the order of the Pareto optimality results is mix, spin-in, spin-out, including the best effort, the highest revenue, and the most technology value-added. The results also indicate that: (1) Some random interference factors can affect the transfer efforts, such as the coefficient of technological innovation capability and cost coefficients. (2) The military subsidies factor is an inventive mechanism that can promote dual-use transfer from the civilian firm to the military. (3) The military enterprise only earns more than the civilian firm in spin-in. (4) The growth of models in the dual-use technology conversion process faces increased technology uncertainty.


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