Implementing endogenous inside options in Nash wage bargaining models

2009 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Knabe
Keyword(s):  
Wage Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Models

Government employers in Sweden, Denmark and Norway: The use of power to control wage and employment conditions

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nana Wesley Hansen ◽  
Åsmund Arup Seip
Keyword(s):  
Wage Bargaining ◽  
Employment Conditions ◽  
Bargaining Models ◽  
Political Intervention ◽  
And Control ◽  
Political Norms

How do government employers exercise power in highly voluntarist bargaining models? In this article, we analyse the potential power of public employers in Sweden, Denmark and Norway and examine how they use this potential. We call attention to three areas in which government employers exercise power: direct political intervention, attempts to decentralize wage bargaining and control of wage movements. We argue that government employers in the three countries have similar institutional capacities for power, but their ways of exercising power vary according to political norms and practice.

On Tax Over-Shifting in Wage Bargaining Models

2007 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-143
Author(s):  
Edward Calthrop ◽  
Bruno De Borger
Keyword(s):  
Wage Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Models

Experimentalism as a Tool of Economic Innovation in Germany

2001 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wade Jacoby ◽  
Martin Behrens
Keyword(s):  
Industrial Relations ◽  
Information Gathering ◽  
Wage Bargaining ◽  
The Other ◽  
Social Partner ◽  
Social Actor ◽  
Comparative Political Economy ◽  
System A ◽  
German Model ◽  
Economic Innovation

Our purpose in this article is to analyze changes in the German wagebargaining system, a system that has attracted enormous attentionfrom scholars of comparative political economy and comparativeindustrial relations. We argue that the wage bargaining portion ofthe German model is neither frozen in place, headed for deregulation,nor merely “muddling through.” Rather, we see the institutionalcapacities of the key actors—especially the unions and employerassociations—making possible a process we term “experimentalism.”In briefest form, experimentalism allows organizations that combinedecentralized information-gathering abilities with centralized decision-making capacity to probe for new possibilities, which, oncefound, can be quickly diffused throughout the organization. We willshow that the capacity for such experimentalism varies across actorsand sectors. And, to make things even tougher, neither major Germansocial actor can sustain innovation in the longer term withoutbringing along the other “social partner.”

Equilibrium Selection in Bargaining Models

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Binmore ◽  
Larry Samuelson ◽  
H. Peyton Peyton Young
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Bargaining Models
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