scholarly journals On the Quantitative Importance of Wage Bargaining Models

1998 ◽  
Author(s):  
James S. Costain
Keyword(s):  
Wage Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Models ◽  
Quantitative Importance

Government employers in Sweden, Denmark and Norway: The use of power to control wage and employment conditions

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nana Wesley Hansen ◽  
Åsmund Arup Seip
Keyword(s):  
Wage Bargaining ◽  
Employment Conditions ◽  
Bargaining Models ◽  
Political Intervention ◽  
And Control ◽  
Political Norms

How do government employers exercise power in highly voluntarist bargaining models? In this article, we analyse the potential power of public employers in Sweden, Denmark and Norway and examine how they use this potential. We call attention to three areas in which government employers exercise power: direct political intervention, attempts to decentralize wage bargaining and control of wage movements. We argue that government employers in the three countries have similar institutional capacities for power, but their ways of exercising power vary according to political norms and practice.

On Tax Over-Shifting in Wage Bargaining Models

2007 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-143
Author(s):  
Edward Calthrop ◽  
Bruno De Borger
Keyword(s):  
Wage Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Models

Estimating the Quantitative Importance of Various Sources of Macroeconomic Variability

1994 ◽  
Vol 33 (4II) ◽  
pp. 1073-1087
Author(s):  
Rizwan Thair
Keyword(s):  
Research Agenda ◽  
Oil Price ◽  
Macroeconomic Fluctuations ◽  
Early 20Th Century ◽  
Technology Shocks ◽  
Money Stock ◽  
Price Shocks ◽  
The Business Cycle ◽  
Structural Shifts ◽  
Quantitative Importance

Providing a reasonable explanation for the business cycle has been the research agenda for many economists since the early 20th century, from Mitchell (1913), Pigou (1927) and Adelman and Adelman (1959) to Lucas (1972), Black (1982) and King and Plosser (1984). For a review, see Zarnowitz (1985). Most attempts to explain the sources of macroeconomic fluctuations' attribute the variability in output and prices to only a few sources, sometimes to\mJ.y one. Kydland and Prescott (1982) and others proposed technology shocks as the main source of aggregate variability; Barro (1977) pointed to unanticipated changes in money stock; Lilien (1982) argued for 'unusual structural shifts' such as changes in the demand for goods relative to services, and Hamilton (1983) concluded in favour of oil price shocks.

Experimentalism as a Tool of Economic Innovation in Germany

2001 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wade Jacoby ◽  
Martin Behrens
Keyword(s):  
Industrial Relations ◽  
Information Gathering ◽  
Wage Bargaining ◽  
The Other ◽  
Social Partner ◽  
Social Actor ◽  
Comparative Political Economy ◽  
System A ◽  
German Model ◽  
Economic Innovation

Our purpose in this article is to analyze changes in the German wagebargaining system, a system that has attracted enormous attentionfrom scholars of comparative political economy and comparativeindustrial relations. We argue that the wage bargaining portion ofthe German model is neither frozen in place, headed for deregulation,nor merely “muddling through.” Rather, we see the institutionalcapacities of the key actors—especially the unions and employerassociations—making possible a process we term “experimentalism.”In briefest form, experimentalism allows organizations that combinedecentralized information-gathering abilities with centralized decision-making capacity to probe for new possibilities, which, oncefound, can be quickly diffused throughout the organization. We willshow that the capacity for such experimentalism varies across actorsand sectors. And, to make things even tougher, neither major Germansocial actor can sustain innovation in the longer term withoutbringing along the other “social partner.”

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